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I - THE THIRTIETH ANNIVERSARY--A TIME FOR REFLECTION? 
========= =========== = ==== --- ========== 
The thirtieth anniversary of the European Community1 does not 
provide a mere formal occasion for engaging in a retrospective 
analysis of the evolution of the main framework 2 for European in-
tegration. The early 80's have been a focal point for several de-
velopments which are likely to affect fundamentally the future 
shape, direction and mode of operation of the Community. Three 
such developments deserve special mentioning. 
3 
a. The accession of Greece has opened the second phase of en-
largement. Once completed the number of Member States originally 
parties to the Treaties of Paris and Rome will have doubled. The 
quantitative increase is likely to put serious strains on the Com-
munity's decision making apparatus as well as raising a host of 
technical problems; the social and economic character of the new 
Members is likely to put no less a strain on the substantive poli-
cies of the Community and the precarious balance of Member State 
interests which they represent4 . 
b. The impact of the European Parliament--directly elected in the 
closing months of the last decade--on the institutional balance is 
likely to increase. The newly legitimized chamber has already 
flexed its muscles indicating its growing awareness of the dis-
crepancy between its self-perceived functions and its constitu-
tional pov-1ers. Institutional conflict is likely to increase 5 . 
c. The third development is a combination of several factors the 
coincidence of which goes beyond the periodic crises to which the 
6 Community has become accustomed . The Common Agricultural Policy, 
one of the mainstay Community policies, the elaboration of which 
in the '60''s was not only a major addition to the Com:rnunity juris-
diction but also a political indication of the communion of inter-
ests between France and Germany, seems to be on a crisis course. 
2. 
Not only are its effects criticized from without but even by its 
own internal budgetary rules the Community will not be able to 
finance it from 1982 o~wards. The process of reformulating this 
basic policy is to take place in an economic climate of stringen-
cy, unemployment, energy shortages and balance of payment defi-
cits which are likely to sharpen national differences and test 
the Community cohesion to its limit. The difficulties are al-
ready apparent with an ominous resurgence of protectionism. The 
commitment of the British Labour partv to withdraw from the Com-
mon Market and the Debre-Foyer Bill in the French Asserobly are 
indications of strong grass roots feelings 7 The French outright 
defiance of a European court decision--the first incident of its 
kind in thirty years 8--poses a much more direct and immediate 
threat, since if non-compliance became widespread, one basis on 
which the day to day operation of all Community policies depends 
will have been destroyed. 
My purpose is not to try to predict solutions for these di-
lemmas nor even to examine the substantive issues which they 
raise. Rather, taking the 80 1 s as a turning point in the evolu-
tion of the Community, I shall attempt to analyze afresh the 
framework within which these and other problems will have to be 
resolved. ~1y direct concern, through a retrospective analysis of 
legal and structural political developments and a prospective as-
sessment of the future challenges to these developments, will be 
to give a clear picture of the special character of the European 
Community--still defying the traditional definitions of an inter-
national organization-~as it appears today. 
r 
II - SUPRANATIONALISM 
================ 
The term traditionally employed in attempts to concep-
tualize the Community's politico-legal character -- even if 
0"' 9 
currently out of vogue -- has been that of supranationalism . 
ii To define and give meaning and content to this term is 
to capture the essence of the particular model of integration 
experienced in Europe. The literal meaning of" ... over and 
above individual states" 10 g_ives~too ge!l~~Cil~ and ant~iquat~d 
',~ 
a notion of supranationalism. For we know that whatever the 
3. 
dreams of the past,the Community's present system of govern-
. 1 1111 
ance involves "bits and pieces of the nat1ona governments ... 
/ 
with a crucial say in all aspects of Community activity. But 
even so, in the transfer of certain functions to Community 
organs and in relation to certain constitutional hierarchies 
there remains a measure of "a]::>oveness" in the old.sense. Fur-
ther, like all "federal" models 12 the Community presents a 
tension between the whole and the parts, centrifugal and cen-
't:E~:[)~tal forces, central Community organs and Member States. 
In some ways the balancing of this tension in the Community 
system departs -- perhaps even radically -- from most other 
"federal" models. In the term supranationalism one must thus 
seek to give expression to these special phenomena; to map 
the "bits and pieces", to define the aboveness and to explain 
the European balancing of the "federal" tension. Yet trying 
to do so despite the passage of thirty years is an uneasy 
task. For although supranationalism is a term well established 
in the political and legal lexicon its usage is not unambigu-
ous or without difficulty. It is possible to identify four 
interconnected issues around which these difficulties and 
ambigu~ties revolve. 
4. 
a. The definitional problem 
The need to revert to a novel term in characterizing the 
Community was indication that existing terminology was not felt 
13 to give adequate expression to the new venture . But since 
the new term, supranationalism, derives from, indeed is the ex-
plication of, the phenomenon it seeks to define a measure of 
circularity is inevitable. For one must employ the distin-
guishing features of the Community to give meaning to the term 
supranationalism which in turn is the concept used to express 
distinctions between the Community and other international or-
ganizations. Thus, to the extent that the European Community 
experience was and remains unique one cannot usefully speak of 
a strict definition but only of one or more hallmarks which ei-
ther identify it with, or--more importantly--distinguish it 
1Ll from other forms of association of states and legal orders -. 
In the earlier analyses the concept was tackled by reference to 
the known juridical-political categories of public internation-
al law (which embodies the formal traditional modes of interna-
tional relations) and municipal law (which embodies the variety 
of non-unitary state arrangements). 
15 In a powerful study of synthesis, Hay analyses the most 
16 important of these attempts Few writers adopted extreme po-
't' f t t 1 . '1 . 17 f h 1 Sl lons o o a asslml atlon . More o ten t e ana yses, us-
ing an analogical method, characterized supranationalism as 
veering towards one or the other of the two known systems. In-
sistence on finding a positive definition could only resolve 
itself in characterizing the system as sui-generis. But to so 
18 
characterize it with no more is hardly helpful And to say 
more leads inevitably to the necessity of fixing the distin-
guishing marks. Thus although the current trend is to include 
the Community among international organizations its distin-
guishing supranational character--whatever this may be--is al-
ways emphasized19. 
Even if one cannot, as a result, have. a fully fledged 
definition, the exercise of determining the most relevant 
hallmarks as indicia for supranationalism remains of inter-
est. First, these may serve as a significant comparative 
tool for evaluating the similarities anddifferences between 
on the one hand both older and novel associations of states 
and on the other hand the European Community. Also,should a 
true pattern of resemblance between other such associations 
and international organizations and the Community begin to 
emerge,the hallmarks may become a proper definition. 
Secondly, in relation to the European experience it-
self, the hallmarks may provide a tool which will enable us 
to tackle the problem deriving from the dynamic nature of 
the Community and supranationalism. 
b. The dynamic nature of supranationalism -- the Community 
experience as a process 
In attempting to fix certain distinguishing features 
there is a danger of failing to give expression 
to the dynamic nature of supranationalism. The Community ex-
perience has not been a static one, neither in the substan-
tive activities pursued by it nor -- more significantly for 
our discussion -- in the internal principles of its oper-
ation be they in the institutional framework, the location 
and exercise of decision making power, and, generally, the 
relationships between the Community as a whole and its con-
5. 
stituent parts. The interplay of centripetal and centrif-
ugal forces manifesting itself in different equilibria 
at different times -- is a constant feature of the Community 
as a "federal" creature. Indeed, as will be readily accepted, 
in many ways the Community can only be understood as a type 
of dialectical process of action and reaction among the var~ 
ious ~orces shaping it. This poses a double edged problem: 
6. 
one may select hallmarks reflecting the evolution of the Communi-
ty at a fixed point in time. But with the passage of time these 
may be overtaken by events and cease to give a true reflection of 
supranationalism. Thus, for instance, studies which concentrated 
--as the primary distinguishing factor--on the ability of Commu~ 
nity organs to take decisions immediately binding on individuals 
within the national legal systems 20 would, today, in the light of 
subsequent developments in the Community, no longer reflect the 
mature evolution of that factor. Alternatively, a completely 
fluid set of hallmarks constantly changing with events would be-
come no more than a description thereby losing its value as a 
comparative tool and its potential as an embryonic definition the 
importance of which was underlined above. 
A compromise could be to shape as a dynamic tool a. set of 
criteria within which the hallmarks would feature. The criteria 
would be sufficiently wide so as to be applicable to different 
legal orders and international organizations and so maintain 
their utility in comparative analysis. The hallmarks related to 
these criteria but changing with the evolution of the Community 
would provide the elastic element enabling us to understand su-
pranationalisw as a processual rather than fixed relationship or 
structure. This feature is particularly important in a retro-
spective analysis. The processual character highlights, however, 
two further difficulties: the cleavage between legal and politi-
cal assessment and the diffuse nature of the term suoranational-
ism. 
c. Evaluating the supranational process - The cleavage between 
political and legal assessment 
Acceptance of the processual character of sunranationalism 
and its subject, European Integration, entails the possibility of 
evaluating it in the sense of establishing, with whatever measure 
of precision, the progress or .retrogression of supranationalism 
and integration. It has been common to divide the process of Eu-
r 
7. 
ropean integration into "phases" and "~eriods" characterized by dif-
ferent degrees and levels of supranationalization and inte-
gration21. So as to avoid confusion in illustrating the le-
gal-political cleavage it is necessary to draw a distinction 
between European integration and supranationalism. "European 
integration" is a concept wider than supranationalism for 
whereas the focus of the latter is on the constitutional, 
institutional and decision making process within the Communi-
ty, the former incorporates these processes but includes also 
the substantive developments in the areas covered by Commu-
nity activities and their social and economic impact on the 
system as a whole. In this sense it could be said that supra-
nationalism is concerned with the "means" and European inte-
gration with the totality of social,political and economic 
results. The separation is, naturally, not total since a 
strengthening of the means available for substantive integra-
tion, e.g. establishing that Community measures in general 
override national measures, may in itself, be regarded as a 
substantive achievement. Thus, a diagnosis of stagnation in 
European integration as a whole would seem necessarily to 
entail a stagnation in the process of supranationalization. 
Conversely substantial progress of supranationalism would in-
dicate progress in an important facet of European integration 
22 
generally 
The cleavage between the legal and political evalua-
tion of the progress of European integration and supranation-
alism is most apparent by reference to contrasting assess-
ments of different "phases" in the process. 
The chasm appears both in the choice of phases and, 
more strikingly, in the evaluation of progress. Thus in a 
useful study synthesizing three decades of political theories 
on European integration, the period of 1958-1969 is signalled 
out as a' "distinct phase" 23 . Evaluating this period the learn-
ed writer comments that "Throughout L_these/ eleven years 
during which General de Gaulle i_who was "allergic to any-
thing supranational~/ remained in power, no notable progress 
could be made in integration, either in the political domain, 
the institutional domain, the monetary domain or in the geo-
graphical extension of the Common Market" 24 . Yet, from the 
juridical point of view as shall be analyzed in detail be-
low -- it was precisely during this period that certain fun-
damental facets of supranationalism took crucial, even rev-
olutionary, strides ahead establishing, e.g., the doctrines 
of direct effect and supremacy of Community law25 . This, of 
26 
course, is not a unique example of the cleavage . To be sure 
the departure point of each discipline is different. The 
political theories of European integration were to a large 
measure wedded to a certain notion about the outcome of the 
process and embodied to a larger or smaller extent a certain 
predictive element about continuous progress. In addition 
political theory laid great emphasis on the social, political 
and economic substantive achievements and lesser emphasis on 
means and ways. The starting point was thus one of high ex-
pectation and failure to maintain the visible social polit~ 
8. 
ical momentum led to a measure of disillusion in the reassess-
t fE . t . 27 men o uropean ln egratlon . 
The juridical point of departure was different. The 
constituent instruments of the Communities were traditional 
multi-partite international treaties which even if including 
certain novel institutional features were, in line with 
precedent, expected to be interpreted in accordance with the 
normal canons of treaty interpretation one of which is, for 
example, a presumption against loss of sovereignty by states. 
The process of integration which in the legal sphere was 
accomplished by a "constitutionalization" of the Treaties 28 
was set against limited initial expectations. This conditioned 
among lawyers a far more positive evaluation of the process 29 . 
9. 
Besides, legal preoccupation especially in Europe has been con-
cerned traditionally with means and tools, the legal instruments, 
and somewhat less with their political-social impact. Important 
as the supranational developments were, they formed only part of 
the total picture of European integration. 
This attitudinal explanation cannot obscure the fact that in 
dealing with the same subject matter, such a cleavage has 
emerged. Thus even in reviewing the narrower instrumental notion 
of supranationalism one of our concerns must be to try and pro-
vide some mechanism which will bridge, at least partially, this 
cleavage. 
Finally, the existence of the cleavage within the context of 
the processual character of supranationalism, points to the last 
difficulty deriving from the complex nature of the term. 
d. The "diffuse" nature of supranationalism 
In discussing the definitional problem we noted the need to 
rely on a multiplicity of distinguishing attributes--hallmarks--
to give meaning to the term. We also noted the evolutionary na-
ture of supranationalism reflecting the developments in the Com-
munity. 
But how are these two factors to be related? The difficulty 
may best be illustrated by reference to the relationship between 
sovereignty and supranationalism. 
Hay correctly suggests that "{~/ith few exceptions, ... 
the criteria for the loss of sovereignty coincide with those 
which much of the literature regards as the elements of suprana-
tionalism. Thus, the concept of a transfer of sovereignty may be 
the le-gal-analytical counterpart of the political-descriptive no-
t . . l' ,30 lon of supranatlona lsrn. 
10. 
The criteria which Hay distilled from the literature as 
elements of supranationalism include one or more of the fol-
lowing: 
i) The "independence of the organi zation and of 
its institutions from the member states ... " 
ii) The " ... ability of an organization to bind its 
member states by a majority or weighted majori-
ty vote." 
iii) The " ... direct binding effect of law emanating 
from the organization on natural and legal persons." 
iv) The attribution to the organization of certain 
powers, functions and jurisdictions which in 
terms of sheer quantity result in a qualitative 
difference from non-supranational organizations. 
v) The nature of supranational institutions -- prin-
cipally the Parliament and Court. 31 
It is not necessary at this stage to examine in depth 
these criteria and evaluate the extent, if any, to which they 
fulfil a distinguishing function and meet the other problems 
mentioned above. 
In general, in trying to choose the most apt hallmark 
one could of course focus on a single criterion such as the 
creation of a parliament or court as representing the most 
critical distinguishing factor and evaluate the process by 
reference to this single factor. The danger there would nat~ 
urally be one of missing the complexity of supranationalism 
and indeed of European integration. The political-legal cleav~ 
age described above can, in some cases, be explained by an 
emphasis on one or some of the criteria to the exclusion of 
others by political scientists and jurists respectively. By 
selecting a multiplicity of factors a different danger is 
created --that of treating them as an integrated complex pro-
gressing or retrogressing as one whole 32 A cursory exami-
nation of the list of criteria cited above will reveal that 
it is quite possible that in respect of some there may be "a 
loss of sovereignty" whereas in relation to others much less 
or none at all. 
How then. is one to evaluate the progress or retrogression of 
supranationalism? To recognize the complexity of supranation-
alism which calls for a multiplicity of factors but to fail 
to realize that the processual character may take a different 
evolutionary direction in relation to each of these factors 
is to deny the diffuse nature of the term and to deprive the 
dynamic analysis of one of its important elements. 
In order to overcome some of the difficulties outlined 
above it is submitted that a distinction should be drawn --
if only for use as an analysis tool -- between two facets of 
1 1 • 
supranationalism. 
tive and decisional 3 3. 
FOr convenience, I shall call them norma-
Normative supranationalism is concerned with the rela-
tionships and hierarchy which exist between Community poli-
cies and legal measures on the one hand and competing poli-
cies and legal measures of the Member States on the other. 
Decisional supranationalism relates to the institutional frame-
work and decision making processes by which Community policies 
and measures are, in the first place, initiated, debated and 
formulated, then promulgated and finally executed34 . The 
make up of both these terms may include factors which can 
be stated at sufficient a level of generalization so as to 
serve as criteria for evaluating the progress or retrogression 
of the two particular facets of supranationalism. 
A high measure of normative supranationalism will de-
note, in general, a hierarchy in which Community measures 
will take effective precedence over national ones. The choice 
of criteria is relatively simple since we may use the tradi-
tional principles by which relationships between on the one 
hand national and/or state law and, on the other, federal, con-
federal and international law are expressed: The principle of 
Self-execution (direct effect), the principle of 
12. 
supremacy and the principle of preemption. The hallmarks will be 
the specific manifestation in the Community of these principles. 
A high measure of decisional supranationalism will denote a 
process in which measures will be adopted and policies formulated 
and promulgated by means departing from traditional diplomacy and 
intergovernmentalism. Specifically in the Community context this 
will be indicated in relation to decisions taken 
a. by Community organs the composition and mode of opera-
tion of which are autonomous (communautaire) and not in-
tergovernmental in the traditional sense , 
or b. by Community organs the composition and political func-
tions of which are intergovernmental but the process of 
decision making--e.g. the voting procedures--is not 
strictly that of intergovernmental diplomacy, 
or c. in pluri-institutional decision making where the role of 
the autonomous organs may be said to be critical , 
and in which the execution of these measures will be 
d. either directly by 1or under the supervisory authority 
and responsibility of 1 the autonomous bodies
35
. 
Although all four factors are expressed in relation to the 
institutions of the Community, by virtue of the composition of 
these institutions, they contain the involvement, both direct and 
indirect, of the Member States in the decision making process. 
The separate treatment of these two facets covers the es-
sence, if not the detail, of both the "juridical" approach which 
focuses on formal relationships, demarcation of competences and 
resolution of conflicts, and the more "political" approach which 
is concerned with the actualities, influenced by legal and non-
legal factors, of cooperation and coordination of the different 
1 3. 
elements in the association of states. Having a clearer view of 
developments in both spheres may be helpful in drawing composite 
conclusions. 
A final factor--relating to the Community's implied and ad-
ditional powers--falls uneasily between the two facets and will 
consequently be treated separately. 
Having introduced these distinctions it is now possible to 
analyze and trace the dynamic nature of supranationalism as a key 
to understanding the evolution of the legal-political framework 
of the Community. 
c . ~~;; ~~~g~~~g ££ ~£~~-~~~~;; g~~ B;;~~g~£~g~ ~~I;~g~g~~£~g~~,g~ = 
~~~;;~g~~g ~~;;~~g--~~~ ~ ~;;g~~~~~g ~g~g~~;; 
Examination of the European Community's evolution in the 
last three decades reveals the apparently paradoxical emergence 
of two conflicting trends. One may have expected in the process 
of integration a parallel evolution in the transfer of power from 
the periphery to the centre--an increase in central normative 
competence accompanied by a strengthening in the "centralized" 
decision making process. In the Community, however, we can trace 
on the one hand a, more or less, continuous process of approfon-
dissement of normative supranationalism whereby the relationship 
between the (legal) order of the Community and that of the Hember 
States has come to resemble increasingly a fully fledged (USA 
type) federal system. On the other hand, and contemporaneously, 
we can detect a, more or less, continuous process of diminution 
of decisional supranationalism, stopping, in some respects, only 
short of traditional intergovernmentalism. The very existence of 
supranationalism--in both its forms--in itself distinguishes the 
Community from most other international organizations. The di-
r I 
1 4 • 
vergence in the evolution of the two forms may be one of the spe-
cial--perhaps even unique--features of the Community as a process 
of integration and as a form of governance. The possible meaning 
to be given to these diverging Community trends will be discussed 
and assessed below. First, however, I will examine in greater 
detail the two facets of suoranationalism with a view both to a 
clearer understanding of their meaning and so as to illustrate 
the respective evolutionary processes. 
1. Normative Supranationalism: the Process of Approfondissement 
a. Self-Executing Measures--The Doctrine of Direct Effect 
The first distinguishing feature, or hallmark, of suprana-
tionalism in its early ECSC days was the power vested in the Com-
munity's main autonomous institution, the High Authority, to 
adopt self-executing measures which were directly binding on in-
36 dividuals--mainly undertakings in the coal and steel sectors . 
Once the Treaty of Paris was ratified by the Member States this 
power could be executed regardless of the monist or dualist char-
acter of the municipal legal order of the ~1ember States. Hither-
to, traditional international organizations had the powers " ... 
to negotiate agreements ad referendum; . . . to take decisions 
which were binding on the rnembers 37 but which would depend on na-
tional governments for their implementation . 
. !_an~/ to take 
decisions which the organization itself could implement." 38 ·The 
po~Ter of the Community's High Authority directly to bind indi vid-
uals, subjects of national law, was, thus, a major innovation in-
troduced by the Treaty of Paris which was acknowledged in most 
analyses of that period as the central characteristic of the Com-
munity. Despite the novelty of this feature, at least in modern 
times
39
, the international law character of the Treaty of Paris 
remained largely unaffected, since this manifestation of self-ex-
ecuting rule-making power was explicitly agreed upon by the Hem-
1 ~. 
ber States which were signatories to the Treaty. 
Later, however, this first characteristic of normative supra-
nationalism was judicially developed in relation to the Treaty of 
Rome. In a series of landmark decisions the European Court of 
Justice, throughout the 60's and 70's took this doctrine far fur-
40 
ther than the limited provisions in the Treaties . 
It first held that subject to certain conditions, provisions 
of the Treaty of Rome--a Treaty which on its face resembled other 
treaties establishing international organizations--could become 
self-executing (have direct effect) bestowing enforceable rights 
41 
as between individuals and the Member States Important as this 
celebrated decision may be in relation to the substantive con se-
quences which would follow in respect of all Treaty Articles which 
could be shown to satisfy the conditions for direct effect, the 
main interest lies in the fact that this was the first major step 
42 . t t in the "constitutionalization" of the Treaty of Rome --l s rans-
formation by adopting a "constitutional interpretation" method in-
to a quasi-constitution of the supranational entity. Implicit in 
the decision of the Court was the notion that the Member States 
were bound in their internal legal orders by their international 
treaty obligations. The individual was put, in certain respects, 
on a par with the state, a feature which usually appears only in 
· · 1 1 In other words, breach of international obliga-munlclpa aw. 
tions, at least those. which were self-executing and materially ca-
pable of bestowing rights on individuals, became a matter of in-
ternal law. 
Thus, ~1ember States, vis-~-vis individuals, could no longer 
break their international treaty obligations relying on the weak-
ness of traditional public international law. A weakness based in 
part on the exclusion of the individual as a direct subject of 
rights and duties (and of individual standing to sue) and on the 
traditional tardiness of states in bringing international claims 
on behalf of individuals when their national interest is not in-
~--~---------------------------------------------------
16. 
volved. The Court's rulinq had another dimension since it gave 
a new vigilant and efficient quardian to intPrnational obliga-
tions--the individual. 
Since that 1963 decision the doctrine of direct effect 
has been extended, deepened and elaborated. Important steps 
in its evolution have been its extension to create directly 
enforceable Treaty rights between individuals inter-se43 and 
its application, step by step, even to types of Community 
secondary legislation (e.g., directives) which are addressed 
to Member States and which on their face would not suggest 
the possibility of bestowing rights and duties on individu-
44 
als . The process of refinement continues to date. 
b. The Doctrine of Supremacy 
During the same period the European Court evolved its 
second crucial doctrine, the doctrine of supremacy, which, 
again, encapsulates a major aspect, in this sphere, of fully 
fledged federal legal systems. In another landmark case, 
45 Costa v. ENEL , the Court established a clear hierarchy 
of norms. In its view, which, according to the Treaty of Rome, 
is the authoritative view regarding the interpretation of 
that Treaty, Community law within the sphere of competence 
of the Community, be it primary or secondary, is superior to 
Member State law even if the latter is subsequently enacted 
and of a constitutional nature. As in the case of "direct ef-
fect'' the derivation of supremacy from the Treaty depended on 
a "constitutional" rather than international law interpreta-
tion46. The Court's reasoning that supremacy was enshrined in 
the Treaty was contested by the Governments of Member States 
in this case and others. Acceptance of this view amounts in 
effect to a quiet revolution in the legal orders of the Mem-
ber States. For, in respect of any matter coming within the 
competence of the Community47 , the legal Grundnorm will have 
been effectively shifted, placing Community norms at the top 
of the legal pyramid. 
It follows that the evolutionary nature of the doctrine 
of supremacy would necessarily -- be hi-dimensional. One 
dimension would be the elaboration of the parameters of the 
doctrine by the European Court. But full reception thereof, 
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the second dimension, would depend on its incorporation into the 
constitutional orders of the Member States and its affirmation by 
their supreme courts. It is relatively easy to trace the evolu-
tion of the Community dimension of the doctrine. In the Costa v. 
~ decision, where it was launched, the Court was concerned 
with the paradigmatic conflict between substantive national and 
Community law. One may single out from the numerous cases in 
which it was affirmed the decisions in ttV'al t Wilhelm 48 and Simmen-
thal49 as illustrations of subsequent development. In the for-
mer, the Court accepted the possible leqitimacy of having nation-
al competition policy operating besides the Community policy with 
each proceeding " ... on the basis of the considerations pecul-
iar to it" 50 . Thus the issue was not about the possible co-ex-
istence of conflicting substantive law. But despite the legiti-
macy of having a parallel national competition policy which the 
Court did not dispute, the principle of supremacy required that a 
national court in proceedings before it in cases of national com-
petition law must keep an open eye that its decisions even in 
their procedural, civil or penal aspects would not prejudice any 
' d' 51 I th concurrent Community--as yet 1ncomplete--procee 1ngs . n 1e 
Simmenthal case the issue was not whether supremacy should exist 
but which court, in the national order, would decide this. The 
European Court, controversially52 , but consistently with its ear-
lier jurisprudence, insisted on the immediacy of supremacy so 
that even national procedural rules which did not deny the ulti-
mate supremacy of Community law but designated internal proce-
dures as to the court in which the review of the national legis-
1 . h k 1 h'b' d 53 at1on s ould ta e p ace, were pro 1 1te 
As ~egards the second dimension, the evolutionary character 
of the process is more complicated. It should be remembered that 
respect of the original Member States there was no specific 
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constitutional preparation for this European Court inspired devel-
opment. The process of approfondissement may be thus seen in the 
gradual acceptance of the doctrine by the supreme courts of the 
Six. The pattern although uneven is clearly progressive. In some 
Member States the reception of the principle caused little prob-
54 lems , in others, the Courts accepted the doctrine with reserva-
tions regarding the possible incompatibility of Community law with 
f d 1 h . h h ' d ' h . 't ' 55 N un amenta uman r1g ts ens r1ne 1n t __ elr const1 ut1ons . ow 
that the European Court has indicated its willingness to review 
Community law itself in relation to a "higher law" of human rights 
based, in part, on the aETIOn constitutional traditions, these ob-
56 jections will have been somewhat quelled In others still, the 
judiciary split, with one branch accepting the doctrine and the 
other refusing it57 . As regards the new Member States, especially 
those with a written constitution, the matter was simpler since at 
the time of accession supremacy was already an established princi-
1 d ld b 1 d f 11 . h f . 58 p e an cou e regu ate orma y 1n t e process o access1on . 
The U.K. however presented a special problem since doubts remain 
as to the very theoretical possibility of a shift in the Grundnorm 
of the type discussed above. The problem derives from the lack of 
written constitution and the conceptual difficulty of entrenching 
legislation--such as an Act giving prospective supremacy to Commu-
. 1 b' d b . 59 h . n1ty aw--so as to 1n su sequent parl1aments . T e matter 1s 
not fully resolved since no clear case involving U.K. legislation 
contradicting earlier Community law has come before the Courts. 
In those cases in which the House of Lords occupied itself with 
Community law60 it has, judiciously, avoided making a direct pro-
nouncement on the subject. The Court of Appeal under the tutelage 
of Lord Denning has been less inhibited; its pronouncements--al-
ways obiter--see-sawed but have now settled on a halfway house ac-
61 
ceptance . 
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So far we have treated the doctrine of direct effect and su-
premacy as distinct concepts;whereas analytically--linked by the 
court's vision of the exigencies of a cohesive and integral legal 
order and its insistence on the principle of uniform interpreta-
tion and application of Community law--the two are tightly con-
nected; in this sense supremacy is consequential of direct ef-
fect. Consideration of this connection will highlight another 
aspect of the evolutive nature of normative supranationalism. In 
van Gend en Loos the Commission of the European Communities in 
its submissions stated that 
. . analysis of the legal structure of the Treaty and of 
the legal system whic~ it est~blishes shows ... that the 
Member States . . . /intended/ . . . to establish a system 
of Community law and-... that they did not wish to with-
draw the application of this law from the ordinary juris~ 
diction of the national courts ... /that Community la~/ 
must be effectively and uniformly applied throughout the 
whole of the Community. The result is ... that the na-
tional courts are bound to apply directly the rules of 
Community law and finally that the national court is bound 
to ensure that the rules of Community law prevail over 62 
conflicting national laws even if they are passed later 
By contrast, the Advocate General in that case argued 
against the extension of direct effect to Treaty articles. He 
suggested that such extension--at a time in which the principle 
of supremacy was not established (and according to his exhaustive 
comparative analysis at least in some Member States Treaty law 
was decidedly not supreme over national laws)--would have the 
" ... consequences of an uneven {non-unifor~/ development of the 
isubstantiv~/ law involved in the principle of direct applica-
tion, consequences which do not accord with an essential aim of 
th . .,63 e Cornmun1ty . 
The Commission and Advocate General reached different con-
clusions in their submissions but were ad idem in seeing the in-
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evitable linkage between supremacy and direct effect once the 
need for uniformity was established. It is submitted that the 
fact that the Court rejected this cue and preferred to intro-
duce the two concepts into the Community legal order in two 
separate cases--even if, inevitably, using the very similar 
''uniformity' argumentation--indicated a deliberate and political-
ly wise attempt to phase out the progressive evolution of nor-
mative supranationalism so as to ensure as far as possible a 
smooth reception in the national legal and political orders. 
The strict connection between the two is evident also in Sim-
menthal where at times it is difficult to tell if the Court was 
applying the principle of supremacy or that of direct effect. 
c. The Principle of Preemption64 
It is here that one finds the third and final hallmark of 
normative supranationalis~. In its purest and most extreme 
form preemption means that, in relation to fields in which the 
Community has policy making competence, the Member States are 
not only precluded from enacting legislation contradictory to 
Community law (by virtue of the doctrine of supremacy) but they 
are preempted from taking any action at all. Initially, before 
the full ripening of the doctrine, the European Court achieved 
this objective by its earlier decisions which forbade the dis-
h f l . 65 h' h guise of t e Community nature o regu at1ons T lS 0\•Jever 
was clearly insufficient. Subsequently, the principle ca~e to 
its ovm even though it is still in an evolutionary stage. The 
Court of Justice is striving to attain an equilibrium between, 
on the one hand, the need to consolidate the pdlicy making ea-
~--
pacity of the Community (which is at the essence of the preemp-
tion doctrine) and~ on the other hand, the pragmatic necessity 
of regulation in fields in which the Community has competence 
but in vThich--for various reasons such as problems in its deci-
sion making processes-,it has not been able to evolve compre-
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l . · The Court has felt that in these hensive Community po 1c1es. 
situations the policy lacunae could be filled by Member State 
ction implying a more flexible rendering of the pure preemption a -
In thl·s the Court will be following in the footsteps principle. 
of all federal systems none of which apply pure preemption. 
This shift in the Court's formulation may be illustrated by a 
number of decisions in the field of external economic relations. 
one of the questions in the ERTA Case 66 was whether the compe-
tence to negotiate and conclude an international agreement in 
the transport field rested in the Community or the Member 
states. Since, in its Transport Chapter, the Treaty does not 
refer specifically to Community competence to engage in interna-
t l't was argued that such matters were to be tional agreemen s, 
left within Member State powers. In a judgment the importance 
of which goes beyond the specific auestion before us, the Court 
laid down an emphatic absolute principle of preemption: 
/E/ach time the Community, with a view to implementing a 
common policy envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions 
laying down common rules, whatever form these m~y t~ke~ 
the t1ember States no longer have the right, act1ng lndl-
vidually or even collectively, to undertake obligations 
with third countries which affect those rules. As and 
when such rules come into being, the Community alone is 
in a position to assume and carry out contractual obli-
gations towards third countries affecting the whole 67 
sphere of application of the Community legal system 
In the OECD case 68 this emphatic statement was even 
----
strengthened whereby the Court said that the occupation of a 
field may be determined by the external act rather than by an 
initial internal measure: 
A commercial policy is in fact made up by the combina-
tion and interaction of internal and external meas-
ures. . . sometimes agreements are concluded in exec~­
tion of a policy fixed in advance, sometimes that pol1cy 
·- 69 is defined by the agreements themselves 
[I 
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70 In the case of Kramer there is a certain retreat from the earli-
er emphatic position in ERTA. The Court stated that despite the 
fact that the Community had adopted internal measures, these 
" . limit themselves to providing the Community institutions 
with the power to take measures similar to those which the ~lfernber 
States ... did take. L!lhe Community not yet having fully 
exercised its functions in the matter . the Member States had 
the power to assume commitments . . . and . the right to en-
sure the application of those commitments within the area of their 
. . d' t. "71 JUrlS lC lOll. 
On the wide ERTA formula one may have expected absolute pre-
emption and yet the Court in Kramer, mindful of the practical dif-
ficulties which such an approach might have had, was more lenient. 
This leniency was not, at that stage of the evolution of the 
principle, unqualified. The Court added that this concurrent Mem-
ber States competence was transitional. The Treaties 72 had stipu-
lated a deadline for the Council to adopt a fully fledged co~mon 
policy and the prospect of adoption could have been an alternative 
explanation to the Court's praqmatic approach. 
' 73 In the International Rubber Agreement Case the Court ac-
cepted concurrent jurisdiction of the Member States in a field 
"occupied" by the Community "/i/f . the financing (of the 
agreement in question) is to be by the Hember States''. The Court 
acknowledged however that as, unlike Kramer " ... no formal deci-
sion has been taken on the question {as to whether the Community 
of Member States should finance the agreement, and a~/ there is no 
certainty as regards the attitude of the various Mewber States .. 
The exclusive competence of the Community could not be envisaged 
in such a case" 74 . In other words, the pragmatic approach was ac-
cepted even without the definite future prospect of a common poli-
cy. A pragmatic approach implies inevitably more difficulties in 
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the determination of parameters and in the application thereof. 
onlY through successive court decisions will these be clarified. 
On its face then it would seem that in relation to the prin-
ciple of preemption there has been a retardation rather than a 
deepening of the scope of the principle in the Community legal or-
der. For, in the terminology aptly adopted by Professor 
waelbroeck, there seems to have been a shift by the Court from a 
"Conceptualist-federalist approach" which corresponds to preemp-
tion in its purest and most exclusive form to a "pragmatic ap-
proach" which leaves the Member States concurrent competence with 
the Community. It should first be pointed out that in its seconcl. 
approach the Court has displayed, characteristically, a measure of 
political acumen. To insist on pure preemption when the Community 
institutions are not yet ready for their task could be retrogres-
sive for the general evolution of the Community. At the same ti~e 
the Court has insisted that in certain cases the pra0matic ap-
proach is transitory in nature. With the full occupation of a 
field by a Community policy, national measures (even if not con-
tradictory and thus not in violation of the supremacy principle) 
could become prohibited per se. In other cases concurrent juris-
diction may remain constant. The approfondissement of preemption 
may thereby be explained in two ways. First, by its maturing from 
a crude even dogmatic statement of pure principle to a relatively 
sophisticated doctrine sensitive to Community needs. Secondly, 
preemption is seen to be spreadin~ from one substantive field of 
Community law to another. It now affects sectors such as fisher-
ies, competition policy and agriculture75 
d. The Evolution of Normative Supranationalism--An Interim As-
sessment' 
The evolution of normative supranationalism has been both de-
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termined and rapid and, until recently, largely consistent. The 
moving force behind it, as we have seen, has been the European 
Court of Justice, the self perception of its role in the process 
of integration being the key to understanding the development. 
As a supreme adjudicator in a non-unitary system in which inher-
ent tensions exist between central institutions and the constitu-
ent member states, the Court of Justice had the choice between 
two different visions of its role. Article 164 EEC which charges 
the Court with ensuring" ... that in the interpretation and ap-
plication of L_th~/ Treaty the law is observed" may indicate a vi-
sion in which the Court would be cast as an aloof and remote ar-
biter decidedly detached from the national-Community conflicts 
related to supranationalism and European integration. According 
to this vision the role of the Court could even be to prevent the 
normative evolution unless specifically agreed upon by the r'lember 
States. The entire jurisprudence of the Court of Justice repre-
sents a rejection of this approach, and, not surprisingly, it has 
come under acute criticism for this. Thus, in a critical even if 
sympathetic article, Hamson76 , implicitly adopting the restric-
tive view based on Article 164, charged the Court in relation to 
the Van Gend en Loos case and its progeny of severing" ... the 
legal world--the world in which it operates--from the world of 
what we called real or actual events", of "short-circuitL_in~/ the 
scheme elaborated in the Treaty" and warned of the danger of the 
Court trespassing" ... outside its province and /attemptin9:/ to 
establish by its own fiat what the Treaty directs to be estab-
77 lished by a very different process" . 
Although it is clear that the Court has not remained aloof 
in interpreting the Treaty and has taken a decidedly integration-
alist approach, even Hamson has been careful not to charge the 
Court of actually overstepping the limits of the powers conferred 
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upon it by the Treaty. The first question that has to be an-
swered nevertheless is whether the integrationalist approach 
adopted by the Court is juridically legitimate within the scheme 
of the Treaty. 
The key to answering this question and to understanding the 
court's own vision of its role--which contrasts sharply with the 
narrow interpretation of Article 164--must be found in the Pream-
ble and Part one of the Treaty dealing with the principles uDon 
which the Community is founded. The Preamble and Articles 1 - 2 
- 3 declare the main objectives the attainment of which guided 
the founding fathers and the specific tasks and means to be pur-
sued and employed in attaining these objectives. Thus we find., 
as the first provision in the Preamble, the objective of laying 
down foundations for an ever closer union among the peoples of 
Europe, in Article 2 the task, inter alia, of establishing a Com-
mon Harket and in Article 3 the elimination of custom duties. For 
our purposes Article 4 is of importance. It provides that the 
tasks entrusted to the community (namely the provisions ino.icated 
generally in the Preamble and outlined more specifically in Arti-
cles 2 and 3) shall be carried out by the Assembly (Parliament), 
the council, the Commission and the Court, each institution act-
ing within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by the 
Treaty. It is clear that the court, within its powers and while 
faithful not only to the Treaty but also to the general fundamen-
d l·s charged alongside the other in-tal guarantees of ue process, _ -
stit~tions with forwarding the tasks entrusted to the Community. 
In van Gend en Loos, the Court can be seen as taking its philoso-
--- ---- -- ----
phy from Article 4 to which Article 164 is subordinate. Van Gend 
en Loos is a specific case which links the elements of uniti~1 the 
---
of Europe (Preamble) establishing a Common !'1arket (Arti-
- 1 
Cle 2) and eliminating custom duties (Article 3) in one maverick 
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doctrine which simultaneously achieved all three effects. The en-
tire pattern of decisions creating the normative framework repre-
sents a grand design to achieve the same effect. 
In the light of Article 4 the Court has not stepped outside 
the province entrusted to it. It has, in a committed manner, ful-
filled its task as perceived by the Treaty. This however does not 
preclude us from pointing out the implications of this perception 
according to which the Court "regards itself as the trustee of the 
hopes and aspirations, the purposes and the objectives of the 
founders of the Community . ,78 
The Court was able--at least for a time~~to maintain the mo-
mentum of normative evolution because of the traditional insula-
tion which separates courts from direct pressures from the other 
political actors. At the same time the very vision adopted by the 
Court--a vision which, in the wide sense, gives it a measure of 
partizanship in the Community-Hember State tensions.,..-has the pos-
sible effect of eroding the traditional insulation and diminishing 
the authority with which the Court may speak. This in turn may 
lead to a curtailment of the Court 1 s power to preserve and even 
continue the process of normative evolution. This interrelation-
ship between the judicial process and the political process will 
be discussed in the light of the analysis of decisional suprana-
tionalism. 
e. Limits to Jurisdiction? 
Direct effect, Supremacy and Preemption are the core attri-
butes not only of supranationalism, but can be found also in fully 
fledged federal systems. Whence then, the acknowledged paramount-
cy of the Member States in the Community system? 
First, it should be recorded that even today the Community 
d . . 79 remains, functionally, a multi sectoral con om1n1um 
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nity legal order, with all its above attributes, extends only to 
those fields for which the Community has competence. But this 
alone would not be sufficient explanation. Several developed fed-
eral systems are based on a doctrine of enumerated powers which80 
however did not prove an obstacle to subsequent wholesale expan-
sion. Indeed the evolution of European integration from the lim-
ited spheres of the Coal and Steel Community to an "Economic Com-
munity" indicated a great increase in the number and breadth of 
these sectoral condominiums. Further, the Common Market itself 
has seen a continuous process of extending the limits of Community 
competence often through the Community's own variant of judicially 
81 
created doctrines of additional and implied powers The impact 
of Community law and the range of Community policies extend in 
some cases far beyond that which a literal reading of the Treaties 
might have suggested. One may perhaps talk here of "substantive 
approfondissement". Nevertheless, there are many fields, some 
even critical such as defence, fiscal and monetary policy and edu-
cation, to mention just a few, which remain.,--for the time being--
outside the Community sphere. 
As regards the Community's expanding jurisdiction, although 
the very existence of A.rticle 236 EEC, which specifies the method 
of Treaty amendment, indicates that theoretical limits do exist to 
this expansion, from the normative point of view the European 
Court of Justice~-true to its integrationalist ethos--has consist-
ently attempted to narrow those limits interpreting widely and 
creatively existing provisions so as to allow jurisdictional ex-
. 82 Pansion without recourse to complicated Treaty amendment . In 
this, it has somewhat emulated the jurisprudence of another court 
--the US. S c t · th 1 tt ' f h . \]preme our --1n e a er s treatment o , say, t e USA 
. 83 
Clause . However, the expansive approach adopted by the 
Court of Justice is explicable, at least partially, by 
I I 
28. 
the different political structure of the Community, a structure 
which highlights in another way the centrality and paramountcy of 
the ~1ember States. For in Europe, unlike the USA, national gov-
ernments are responsible, by and large, for decision making at 
the national level and at the Community level. When policies are 
adopted, even at the jurisdictional limits of the Treaty and be-
yond, the central decision making organs of the Member States 
will have partaken in the process, thereby diffusing the debate 
84 
on ultra vires competences . 
This then is another clue to Member State centrality. For 
the principles of normative supranationalism provide only a 
framework into which substantive rules and policies must be fit-
ted. The Community system did not opt for a classical federal 
governmental structure characterized by a federal legislature di-
rectly elected "by the people", and a federal executive likewise 
selected, both bodies separate and independent of their would-be 
national counterparts. Instead the Treaty provides for a system 
in which the Hember States governments play a key role in "fill-
ing in" the normative framework. However, the Fathers of the 
Treaty hoped that by creating a hybrid structure of decision mak-
ing which would differ substantially in its operation from tradi-
tional intergovernmental organizations, the Community interest 
would prevail despite the prominence of the Member States. Deci-
sion making was also to be supranational. We must turn then to 
examine the evolution of decisional supranationalism. 
2. The Diminution of Decisional Supranationalism 
Decisional supranationalism and its expression in the 
evolution of decision making in the Community are, by compari~ 
son to normative supranationalism, less easy to trace and ana-
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lyze. Several reasons account for this difficulty. Strange-
ly (or, perhaps, wisely), the Treaties are rather cryptic 
in their institutional provisions. A literal reading of 
texts gives little indication as to the function of the in-
stitutions and only a formal indication as to their compe-
tences and powers. Inevitably, there is an enormous gap be-
tween these formal provisions and the actual Realpolitik man-
ifestation of power in Community life. We noted, in discuss-
ing normative supranationalism, the preeminent role played 
by the European Court of Justice in widening and deepening 
the scope and meaning of normative supranationalism. Apart 
from all other features the judicial process is character-
ized by a high measure of transparency which facilitates the 
task of the community observer. It was possible to identify 
with relative ease and precision the evolving stages of 
normative supranationalism. By contrast the process of polit-
ical decision making and policy formulation is much more 
obscure 85 and its evolution is marked less by clear cut land-
marks -- although some critical ones exist -- and more by a 
86 h . b 
subtle process of institutional interplay . T e tens1on e-
tween "whole and parts" is, naturally, a constant feature 
of this field as well. It manifests itself here in two, 
sometimes converging, axes: l) Community versus Member States; 
d within the Community, 2) non-intergovernmental ver-an , 
sus more intergovernmental ins.ti tutions. It would, naturally 
enough, be far too simplistic to suggest that decision making 
may be explained by simple reference to these axes. The 
formulation of Community policies is a complicated and multi-
phased process and the duality of axes manifests itself at 
almost each stage8 7. This will be illustrated below. At the 
same time, if a global view is adopted -- one which would 
correspond to that which was adopted in relation to normative 
supranationalism -- it is possible to detect a clear enough 
evolutionary line in decisional supranationalism -- namely its 
30. 
decline. This decline is apparent in relation to all criteria 
which were used to characterize decisional supranationalism. 
i) The independence and tbe autonarrous policy and decision 
making role of the intergovernmental institutions 
is declining; 
ii) the weight of non-intergovernmental institutions 
in pluri-institutional decision making processes 
is declining; 
iii) within quasi-intergovernmental institutions there 
is a decline of their unique supranational features; 
iv) in the execution of Community policies there has 
been a shift to Member States domination. 
To understand this decline we must first discuss brief-
ly the political institutions themselves and then turn to 
the decision making process. 
The main European Community institutions are sufficient-
ly well known and do not need detailed description here. In the 
first three decades of Community life, apart from the Court, 
the institutions which dominated the scene were, clearly, the 
Commission (and High Authority) and the Council of Ministers. 
Also clear enough is the general role assigned to both or-
gans. The Commission and its staff -- although reflecting 
the national composition of the Cornrnunity88 is undoubted-
ly the more communautaire and less intergovernmental of the 
two. The Commissioners are required by the Treaty "i!7n the 
performance of {theiE7 duties {neither t~7 seek nor take in-
structions from any Government or from any other body .. 
Each Member State undertakes to respect this principle and not 
to seek to influence the members of the Commission in the 
performance of their tasks." 89 
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The Commission as a body is thus notionally autonomous from 
the Member States and specifically free to pursue the Community 
interest. The functions of the Commission are varied. It has the 
exclusive role of initiating legislation (in the formal sense); 
according to this scheme i~ is also the central administrative or-
gan of the Cornrnunity90 ; it has a potentially important "diplomat-
ic" role in acting as broker between the Member States; it acts as 
"federal agency" in those spheres where the Community has assured 
fully fledged federal powers (e.g. competition policy); it super-
vises the execution of the Treaties anc1. Community law by Hember 
States and acts as a "supranational public attorney general" in 
case of violation. According to early theory of the Community it 
was to be the technocratic "functional" core which would engineer 
and precipitate the famous spillover leading the Community towards 
political union. 
The Council of Ministers by contrast is the main formal leg-
islator--clearly indicating the centrality of the Member States. 
It vmuld be wrong, stricto sensu, to characterize the Council as 
an intergovernmental institution. Its rules of voting and proce-
dure, the role of the President and the formal reliance on Commis-
sion draft legislation distinguish it from classical intergovern-
mental organs and characterize it as supranational as well--albeit 
91 in a limited way Also, one important feature must be empha-
sized if the supranational character of the Council is to be fully 
appreciated. It is true that the Council can refuse to enact any 
legislation put before it by the Commission even if the policy is 
clearly in the interest of the Community. In rejecting such leg-
islation, or amending it92 , the Council can be--and often is--mo-
tivated,by interests which are contrary to the "Community spir-
it"93 The Member States are, however, obliged to act jointly, 
though not necessarily unanimously, within the framework of the 
Council of Ministers. This is one of the striking interactions of 
normative and decisional supranationalism. In any given field 
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which is regulated by Coromunity 
law and for which competence has been transferred to the 
Community organs, the individual Member States are precluded 
from taking unilateral action in implementing and/or changing 
the policy; they must act jointly as the Council of Hinisters 
within the normal decision making procedures of the Community. 
Thus, in the field of agriculture the Community has 
evolved a Common Policy which determines inter alia annual 
price rises. The Council is free to reject any proposal from 
the Commission or from one of its members. Any member may veto 
any given proposal and thus block a decision. This is an in-
dication of the low measure of decisional supranationalism in 
the Council. What is, critically, not permissible is for one 
Member State -- or more -- to "go it alone" in the face of 
Council deadlock. That is the expression of high measure of 
normative supranationalism. If decisions in the particular 
field are to be taken,they must be taken by the Ministers act-
ing qua Council. At least to that limited extent the Council 
of Ministers remains a supranational institution. In theory, 
then, the tandem of Commission -- charged with policy initia-
tive, a secondary legislative 94 function and with execution 
and supervision tasks -- and Council -- charged with policy 
decision making and actual "primary" legislation thereby representing di-
rectly the interests of the Member States -- was meant to 
achieve the balance in the decision making process between 
Community and Member States. The real story has been very dif-
ferent, its main theme being the ever increasing strengthen-
ing in the weight of the Council and Member States and a cor-
responding decline of the Commission 95 . This process has mani-
fested itself in several ways: 
a. The decline of the Commission: the signs 
In the early years of the Coal and Steel Community, 
the High Authority enjoyed a large measure of 
autonomy. Its responsibilities were fairly narrow -- confined 
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to these two sectors -- and its functions resembled the cur-
rent Commission functions in,. say, the field of competition. 
rts main addressees were sectoral undertakings and the govern-
mental departments directly concerned. This relative narrowness 
explains perhaps its measure of autonomy. The effect of High 
Authority activity on the Member Stat.es was ex hypothesi rather 
limited. Politically it did not emerge as a serious focal point 
of real power. Moreover, normative supranationalism was as yet 
fairly embryonic. The High Authorit:v was king in its Court. 
With the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome the sphere of 
activities of the Communities received an enormous qualitative 
and quantitative boost. Despite the deliberate attempt to play 
down the supranational character of the Cornrnunity,since 1958 
Community decisions have ·had a much g.r;eater effect on nati'onal 
life: establishment of the Customs Union, the pursuit of the 
Communities' four "freedoms"(free movement of goods, labour, serv-
ices and capital) and the creation of Community common policies 
inevitably and increasingly encroached on national policies, 
national legislative competences and national administrative 
freedom. One could expect an a priori greater interest and great-
er involvement of the Member States in the Community process. 
A further problem was bound to develop -- the emergence of the 
Community "democracy deficit" 96 . The democracy deficit has two 
tight~y connected aspects. In the first place given the possible, 
often exaggerated, tensions between Community interests 
and national interests there was a fear that Community programmes 
would be developed which did not pay due respect to national in-
terests. The European Assembly (Parliament) was denied by the. 
Treaties any meaningful say in the evolution and supervision of 
POlicies and law. Its members were not directly elected to · 
their posts but nominated by and from national parlianents. The 
Commission for its part lacked any direct popular legitimacy and 
e Council of Ministers -- the main legislative body -- repre-
ted the 2xecutives of the Member States. It was only to be 
cted that uneasiness about the Community legislative proc-
would develop. In the absence of an effective democratically 
itimate Community check on the legislator,it was inevitable 
that there would be a shift to ~tional scrutiny. Alas, nation-
al paLliaments have created largely unimpressive mechanisms 
for control of Community actions97 . Instead a powerful Council 
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of Ministers which was, at least in theory, answerable to nation-
al parliamentary control could be seen as some answer to this 
aspect of the democratic deficit
98
. This solution is largely 
illusory. Much of the Council work is done by the civil serva.11t 
COREPER members which are no more "legitimate" than the Commis-
sion and with the possible exception of Denmark, there is little 
direct control, except on major issues, on ministerial work 
within the Council. Indeed-:--and this is the other aspect of the 
deficit, which remains unanswered to date-- the national min~ 
isters may use the legislative forum of the ~ouncil so as to 
pass legislation which may have been checked and even vetoed in 
the national parliaments. The other traditional check on the 
legislature was of course to be the Court of Justice. ·In the early 60's, 
however, the Court saw as its main task the evolution and· con-
solidation of European institutions and policies. Thus, for ex-
ample, when a Community measure allegedly violating fundamental 
rights enshrined in a constitution of a Member State was brought 
before it for judicial review, the Court adopted a .. narrow formal-
istic approach an~ declared in effect that the Treaties did not 
impose a duty to respect those rights 99 The Court was concerned 
not to impede in any way the function of the Community institu-
tions nor to threaten the primacy of Community law. Later the 
Court learnt that the process of integration would be enhanced 
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Court's early attitude added thus to the democracy deficit. 
Despite these two factors, the enormous increase in the 
range of Community activities and competences/and the emergence 
of the democracy deficit ~- both of which would seem to suggest 
an inevitable increase in the importance of the Council of Min-
isters -- the eclipse of the Commission was not immediately 
apparent. Two interrelated factors contributed to the maintenance 
of Commission power. First, the proximity in time to the con-
clusion of the Treaty of Rome bestowed legitimacy on the activi-
ties of the EEC in its first years. The Treaty and its provisions 
were debated in all six national parliaments and were approved. 
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Secondly, so long as the Community was seen to be confined to an 
implementation of the exolicit 09erative parts of the Treaty, 
the democratic deficit did not come to the fore. Given that the 
Commission's main task was the execution of these explicit poli-
cies--principally the establishment of the Customs Union--it did 
not come into major policy conflicts with the Council. (There 
were in fact certain personality clashes, in itself indication 
of the political self-perception of the Commissioners and their 
101 President in the early years.) 
The Cowmission was thus able to gain immense prestiqe by 
the rapid and professional manner in which it coordinated the 
process of implementation and by its skill in fulfilling its 
"broker" role in securing the agreement of, and settling the 
disputes among, the governments of the ~~ember States. Once 
these first tasks were substantially achieved, however, the 
process of erosion in the Commission's position began to become 
more transparent. 
The signs of the Commission declin~ are clear enough and 
102 discussed ably elsewhere . Of the more important signs one 
should mention the rise to eminence of the Committee of Perma-
nent Representatives (COREPER) as a powerful intermediary be-
b.-Teen the Commission and Council and the initial exclusion and 
subsequent toleration of the Commission in the new policy-shap-
ing European body--the European Council. The European Council 
was set up dehors the Treaties and became the institutionalized 
forum for the meeting of Heads of State and Government. Its 
function was not only to shape new "second generation" policies 
but also to serve as the main arena for the settlement of inter-
governmental disputes regarding Community issues. The rise of 
COREPER meant that Commission initiatives were subject to inter-
governmental influence at an extremely early stage in their for-
mulation thereby detracting from the Comm.ission role as repre-
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senting the Community vision103 The emergence of the European 
Council contributed to the detraction from the Commission's role 
as a source of Community fresh ideas and as the broker between 
the Member States 104 . The Commission was heiTmed in by two new 
bodies ''usurping" both its technical and political-diplomatic 
functions. 
b. The Council of ~tinisters--Erosion of supranational features: 
the signs 
The erosion of decisional supranationalism has not only 
been apparent in the decline of the Commission vis-a-vis the 
Council (in both its derivatives: European Council and Council 
of Ninisters). Within the Council of Hinisters itself there has 
been a decline in its supranational characteristics. We have 
already noted the emergence of the European Council. This, it 
is submitted, is an indication of the failure of the Council of 
Ministers' "First Eleven"--the Foreign Ministers--to assert 
themselves as an institutional body capable of giving direction 
to the Community and solving its problems. The need to resort 
to old style loosely structured summitry is a clear regression 
in the role of the Council of Ministers qua Community body. 
The second, perhaps more, important landmark in the decline 
of decisional supranationalism was the retreat bv the Council of 
Ministers from majority voting--which had been designed as the 
clearest manifestation in the decision making orocess of the 
precedence of the Community interest over the national interest 
--to consensus decision making. This move, precipitated by 
France and at first grudgingly accepted by the other five in the 
105 legally dubious Accord of Luxembourg , was to become, with the 
accession of the three new JVlerr.ber States, an accepted Community 
norm. Thus, one of the truly outstanding suoranational features 
of the Council's procedure was reduced. Majority voting itself 
j I • 
is not entirely exceptional in international organizations. It 
is the law making power of the Council and the effect of that law 
on and in the national legal orders as expressed in the concept 
of normative supranationalism which made the prospect of majority 
voting so unique. The existing veto power which each Member 
state novl holds does not necessarily paralyze the Council be-
cause, as we have seen, in areas controlled by the Community the 
council must at the end of the day take a decision if entire pol-
icies are not to come to a halt. The power to veto does not give 
an individual ~-!ember Sta·te the power to impose its ovm desire as 
to the eventual outcome of the decision making process._ P.ather 
the effect has been to force the nine partners into "package-deal 
decision making" with compromises being sought not only as re-
gards each policy but among various policies. This development 
was no doubt instrumEntal in the emergence of the European Coun-
cil as a forum for this high powereo. political horse-trading- al-
though, as submitted above, the Council of Foreign Hinisters 
could have assumed this function. 
The Luxembourg Accord and the power of veto did not com-
pletely destroy Community superiority in decision making. First, 
there is the simple fact that, albeit by consent of the Council, 
. 106 s dl many issues are still decided by majority vot1ng . econ y, 
the veto power of the Nember States in itself does not necessari-
ly entail, as most commentators assume, the blocking of the Com-
munity supranational process. What is crucial is the legislative 
context in which the veto is exercised. When the Treaty provides 
1 . . 107 explicitly for Council unanimity in adopting certain po 1c1es , 
the veto power thereby entailed gives the individual Hember State 
the ability directly to block any unacceptable measure. And to 
the extent that the Luxembourg Accord extends this power to meas-
ures in which the Treaty provides for majoritarian or qualified 
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majoritarian voting, the same ability will naturally exist. 
However, Article 149 EEC provides that when acting on a pro-
posal from the Commission "unanimity shall be required for a 
L_Counci_!/ act constituting an amendment to that proposal". In 
this case, then, the veto power available to the individual Mem-
ber State gives it the power to prevent any tampering with a Com-
mission proposal--i.e. a "supranational veto"--but not the abili-
ty to force an amendment. The only Y.Tay open to a recalcitrant 
Member State whose proposed amendments are "supranationally 
blocked" by the veto of another state insisting on the Coi!'lmission 
original proposal, is to veto the entire measure which of course 
is a much more serious matter and demands a higher threshold of 
national interest. Indeed Parliament made astute use of this 
principle in its latest budgetary wrangle with the Council. The 
ability of three Member States to block by a nqualified veto" 10 ~ 
the changes which Council wished to introduce to the 1980 Parlia-
mentary supplementary budget enabled that budget to be adopted by 
the President of Parliament. 
c. Decline of Decisional Supranationalism--the execution of ool-
icies 
The strict doctrine of separation of powers according to 
which the executive is concerned solely with implementation of 
policies adopted elsewhere was probably never tenable and the 
crucial policy making role of executives is so apparent as to 
viate any analysis. The definition of the executive function 
the Community system is not easy. l"i'e have already noted that 
traditional function of executives in contemporary Western 
racies, that of initiating and submitting policy proposals to t 
legislative branch--a task initially associated with the Commis-
sion--has, except in the narrow technical sense, been taken over 
to a large extent, by the Council of Ministers and the European 
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council. 
Has there been a similar decline in the post-legislative 
phase? The issues here are complex and our conclusions must be 
regarded as rather tentative and speculative. In some limited 
fields, such as competition, the Commission acts like a federal 
agency with full executive powers although even here it has to 
rely for enforcement measures on the national systems. In most 
matters, hov1ever, the practical execution of Cornmuni ty policies 
and rules, be they in the field of agriculture, external imports 
and the like, is performed by the national administrations act-
ing as "agents" for the Community in such things as collecting 
charges, issuing clearances and dispensing grants. ~o the ex-
tent that the "agency" is automatic, acting directly on Communi-
ty measures and Commission instructions, this feature cannot be 
vie\'lred as a \\reakness in the executive role of the Commission and 
as a sign of decline in decisional supranationalism. 
However, the Com~llnities as a political system have not es-
caped the world-wide trend of increased government by adminis-
trat.i ve legislation and action. Thus, whereas the legislature 
(the Council) enacts enabling measures or issues policy man-
dates, it is left to the executive to implement the policies by 
series of secondary legislative measures and administrative 
acts. Just as the COREPER was introduced by the 1965 Herger 
Treaty as an extra tier of .Hember State representation designed 
ostensibly to facilitate the technical preparation of Council 
meetings but in practice precipitating an erosion in the policy 
initiatory role of the Commission, it is possible to identify a 
Similar trend in the establishment of Member State Cowmittees in 
relation to the executive functions of the Commission. I shall 
by way of illustration, on two aspects of this develop-
first, by way of micro-analysis on the role of one Corn-
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rnittee already provided for in the Treaty of Rome, and, secondly, 
by way of overview on the general proliferation of Committees se 
up by Council secondary acts. 
i. The nArticle 113 Committee" 
Article 113 EEC dealing, inter alia, vli th conclusion of 
trade agreements by the Community bestows responsibility on the 
Commission for negotiating agreements although acting on a man-
date given by the Council. The Commission must consult with 
. a special cornrni ttee appointed by the Council to 9ssist t 
Commission in this task ... ". This ''113 Committee" was duly 
109 
set up , composed of representatiyes of the Hernber States; its 
11 
presidency held in rotation by the r1.ernber States holding the 
presidency of the Council. Its mode of operation is a useful i 
h . . 11 lustration of the diminishing executive role of t e Comm1ss1on 
On the one hand a Council-r-!ernber State Committee '17ould be useful 
especially if amendments to the mandate were needed and could be 
provided at the locus of negotiations. The Committee would also 
ensure that agreements negotiated would receive the ultimate as-
sent of the Council upon which the constitutional power to con-
clude the agreement is bestowed. A.t the same time it has been 
pointed out that the role assigned to the Committee (and to na-
tional observers in other types of Community agreements) has 
meant that " ... the Member States are able to oversee the 
mission's behaviour in every negotiating session and. insure 
its application of the mandates to concrete issues comports wi 
their wishes" 111 and that thus the" ... picture of the Commis-
sion ... is that of Community spokesman and agent or, more 
technically, plenipotentiary of the Council. The term 1 negoti-
ate' has clearly not been interpreted {by virtue of the role as 
surned by the Member States and the Council/ to accord .the Commi 
sion an authoritative role in forming EEC negotiating policies 
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112 directing the negotiations themselves . To the extent that the 
Commission has managed to re-build its role it has not relied on 
a reinterpretation of the Treaty provisions but on the sheer 
technical expertise which it can bring to the treaty making proc-
ess. But in this sense it is no more than an equivalent to a 
competent national civil service. 
It is perhaps worth pointing out that use of a "democracy 
deficit" argument to justify these developments is hardly con-
vincing for, except in the most formal sense, curtailment of Corn-
mission power has reduced the role of one set of (Euro~ean) civil 
servants and elevated another (national) set. The continued re-
luctance of the Council to increase the role of the European Par-
liament in the process of treaty rnaking113 testifies to the fact 
that national interests play a greater role than does concern for 
democracy. 
ii. The proliferation of Committees 
With the substantive expansion of Community activities, es-
pecially in the agricultural sector, a wide ranging network of 
Committees has been set up, many of them to partake in the "leg-
islative implementation" of Community policies. Some of these 
are advisory committees the consultation of which is obligatory 
but the opinion of which once consulted is not binding114 Oth-
ers, the Management and Regulatory Committees, have a more deci-
sive role. 
As regards the :Management Committees, particularly prominent 
in the agricultural and fishery fielc.s, the Commission must sub-
mit its draft measures to them. The Committee may a!?prove the 
measure--by a qualified majority--or fail to reach a decision (if 
no qualified majority is reached either way) whereupon the Corn-
mission is free to adopt the measure which will have full legis-
lative force. If the Committee manages in fact to "reject the 
i 
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measure'' (qualified agreement against) the Commission may still 
adopt the measure but this measure will come into effect only af-
ter a certain period in which time the full Council may--by quali 
fied majority--reject it. The Reoulatory Committees procedure is 
slightly more restrictive on the Commission115 . 
It is difficult to assess this proliferation of Committees 
relation to the power of the Commission. Unlike, say, the "113 
Comrni ttee", the Commission presides in all these Hanagement and 
Regulatory Committees. And since executive pov.rer is exercised 
here through legislative means the involvement of the Council 
would seem to be natural. Pragmatically, the involvement of rep-
resentatives of the .Hember States may also contribute to smooth 
functioning of whatever policy is executed regardless of the im-
plications to the institutional balance. Besides, in the decisi 
making process the qualified majority rule means that--as 
Management Committees--the vetoing power of a few States 
ally assist the Commission in adopting the measure. All these el 
ements would tend to point to the conclusion that the prolifera-
tion of Committees serves the ends of open end efficient govern-
116 
ment . 
At the same time--takinq a longer term view--one cannot 
noting that these mechanisms indicate an unwillinqness of the 
Council and Member States to entrust the execution of policy to 
the Commission with, say, safeguards of reporting and information 
In this sense, then, the proliferation of Committees may be re-
garded as one element in the decline of decisional supranational-
. 117 
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d. The Reasons for Decline 
It now remains to try to give some reasons for this erosion 
in the position of the Commission and the general decline of 
sional supranationalism. Several such reasons may be given. 
i. 
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We noted the early success of the Commission in implement-
ing the explicit policies in the Treaties. The need to evolve 
a "second generation" of Community policies based on broad in-
dications in the Treaties but not explicitly set out imposed a 
much more delicate and politically sensitive task on the Corn-
mission. The power of "initiative" now called for was less 
formal and technical, that is it no longer called for proposals 
which gave legislative form to explicit Treaty obligations but 
rather it called for wide, reflective and more "value" prone 
proposals. Whereas the first generation of policies were nega-
tive--in the sense that the Member States undertook to refrain 
from certain actions and the Commission was charged with imple-
menting this negative regime--the new policies were to have an 
actual positive content on which agreement was more difficult. 
The ability of the Commission to propose new initiatives and 
get them accepted was thus considerably weakened. The impor-
tance of the Council of Ministers and European Council was 
strengthened. It was those bodies which could give the drive 
to new policies. To be sure, the Commission retained its oosi-
tion as a source of ideas and vision for developments on the 
Community level. The environmental policy, to give but one ex-
ample, would not have emerged without an internal Commission 
initiative. But it was for the European Council to sanction 
the policy, to balance it and officially to launch it. The 
Commission was left somewhat in the background. 
ii. The need for ''second generation" policies brought the de-
mocracy deficit to the fore. t'7hat is more, with the wicening 
of Community activities, national parliaments felt threatened 
by a'process which would wrest even more power from them. The 
Commission which had little formal democratic legitimacy became 
an easy target for attack. 
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iii. The Commission itself, although g-rowing in experience, 
put on much bureaucratic fat. This expressed itself not only 
in its numerical staff growth but also in the evolution of 
traditional bureaucratic ailments which sig-nificantly reduced 
. t . t 1 ff. . 118 f ( 1) 1 s 1n erna e 1c1ency Lack o internal latera coor-
dination, distortions in the pattern of promotion, and per-
sonal and national rivalries all contributed to an internal 
drop in morale and an external drop in esteem. The IPaterial-
ly privileged position of CoiPmission employees (alongside all 
other Community employees) in the current harsh climate rray 
also have contributed to this process. 
iv. The independence of the Commission and its judicial im-
V. 
partiality began breaking down in a bizarre dialectical proc-
ess. The very importance of the Commission prompted the Mem-
ber States to take not only--as was constitutionally permis-
sible--an active interest in the appointment of the Commis-
sioners themselves but also in the promotion of personnel 
within the Commission and in the allocation of portfolios 
among Commissioners. The Commission v1as t:b.us seen to be los-
ing its impartiality, a singular handicap when considering 
its intended mediatory role in Council disagreements. Inter-
nally, this governmental intervention contributed both to a 
strain on the collegiate nature of the Commission and the 
thority of its President119 
Finally, it may be that the process of rofondissemen 
of normative supranationalism, as described above, had a neg-
ative effect on decisional supranationalism both in the Coun-
cil-Corrmission relationship and vri thin the Council itself. 
Normative supranationalism meant that the impact of Communi 
policies and law was perceived as growing 
to cover more fields-.,-but also in depth.,--so as to have a 
45. 
,, ,:iJ~I(l;t~d:i,.9::t!2 "~!11:<1: ,p;inding, l~gal e£f~p;t cfiliOm whi<::h the. ~~~ember 
• • ' • - - ' • ~ • r • • ~· •• ' ' - • - • • • • 
S:l;.fit:~,; .. could f!Q:\:, e~fi-H-pe. Thlf:p,' ·th~. po:lr~tip~J;;ty pe}ic~te is-
S\1~-r6ff ·'~upr~Jl:lacy w~:~uS::Qu![lt~red .R¥,.St:tl;:iJ1.Ei:~~:lf!=nP~ of .the l'1ember 
St?·te-R. on, tbf3ili:· cont;r;-ol. o£ !t.he .mak;i.;qg ,p·©::~hft.p, 1 /JFiupreme" law 
anq i:Gh~j,jl;:- a:l?iliky . to block its, Jna~,i.ng:- Thi,q:,,,:v.i,ev-7? oJ the role 
and ,pg'lr!.e:J:.:yOf: national go.:ve:J;:nments .·wp.s,, emP:b·aSi·JZedr strongly by 
."pp::,>;-g!;lfil(~et~~;J:'S:'~in the 1975 U.-K •. Refep,e.ndum, using it (some-
~h,~iP:~~;ni"sL~~fic'!:ing;Jc¥)· as,a, 't-9Pk·~a,g:;q:fl,p.st, :~Fg~p,, of the iiloss of 
sq:v~r~~f!:Il~:Jf_f~~cYlh~sh~Y·~<?WfC\Ur):~r~Y:: ,~~~b~cf"qb;ip;.~1entc:til~d.. It is thus 
' S].lgg~s~~~d ,,;ljh:5t~ :i:he; <;:q~re19t)t;ipl} betw~~n, :;I;P~ c?;pprofondis semen t 
o :Er no::t;:1Ilat,~tv:~;, ?UPJ(~n<:t'j:io.p.ali &.~, r C).:P.d:- ,et}}~ i {l,imi:nu tion of decision-
-·- - . . . -~... - . ~- - . ~- . _,.__ ,·. - .. , . ' . ' ·-. ' __;_ . ' ' ; . 
?:l sup;t;anc:t,;l;.i,gnajl;i;_pm .:i,s,,np~. a:<{.piq~n~al J:mt .. -at ilea.st partiall v 
'. ·- ,_ " . • --·- •• -· - -· ...• · ·' • -· '-· - • .' . ; '. • .: ~ .' ·-- "'~ '. '. ...4 
caus9-::L:·< .T]l.u,s a·s.:.Jtle ,l}otep., :'t:lf~ ,·f:!-lrone.Cl:I\ ,~q~t o£ Ju,stice had 
no~t--exJ;:~pd!=d :.thed;;~ns~tive .. ..-:Sield .o,f ~fqr,eAg;r .. economic rela-
tions~-r~+=l1P~ :t;::h.e,. ~f:f~Pt:E? _of n()r.mq.;~;i('f~-- E;;_UPJ;:C~-n.~1 ;~on_al:ism--gi ving 
one. 9f\ its decis:i,ye rulin,gs-:-...,the ERT~ qeo:i,s.:ion.--:On::,,,the doe-
--- ••. -~ • .... ••. -- ··"-· -- -·-· >)J _., ~ •• , 
trine, of preemption in re:;Jc9:tion ,to tpe i're:atv;·, .making caoaci tv 
' ' ..... • ·~) '•-- ' :.J, .1. - •• ~-
pf:J:~e _Cpmmuni ty.. The CouJ1gi]:: s::>;f. Min:Ls:~ef:"~, 13:!}~1 th~ ~~ember 
St:at:es, for •their part, -ha:.v:e en9:t1re.}1 •.. --}:ha:t, ,,;i.,rh,;the exec.u t:i,on of 
the Community's external po.licy the Commission is kept--by 
devices such. as the .113 Commi t,teer-:-on a yery t;ight ,re·in and 
that the Member Statep, by a leg-aL interpre.tation of the lim-
its of Community competence, are active parties in many 
120 
.Agreements . 
3. The Diverging Trends--an Assessment 
' ' 
'-·' -,, 
It is this: ·last ,reason which,. r(J;i,:v,:~s, '~the, clue:, to on~ pqssible 
signif~.saztH~; of t:he o:i"y:e:r:g.l:ng f trepqs lf?:t::,i :i::tr·~A,s ,_~uJ:nni,t;t;,~d I the 
outco~:::Pf tqe zRrpy_esr_s rep;r;esents a, rFJ=.rt.;aiJ~'· pa,la,_nce: of. ,action and 
rej:lctiqri, wh,ereby tb~ ,peri!leaif.,i9n .. an:d.,,e:xpq.;ns,Jpn qf:Co,romp.n,i·ty in.;.. 
fluence-wexpansion, i.:Q. breadth,. .e,xp.resiseQ.; l?.Y: th,e,\,grq~~.i·ng nurober of 
'·· fields where .~_qmmupii;:y impa,ct As felt -and ;e.xpar;tE;;ion .J;n, depth as 
/ 
I 
i. 
46. 
expressed by the approfondissement of normative supranationalism 
--is matched by an ever closer national control exercised in the 
decision making processes. To the extent that the approfondisse-
ment and diminution are causally connected the relationship is 
surely two way: a cyclical interaction of the judicial-normative 
process with the political-decisional one. Here then is one di-
mension of the Community formula for attaining an equilibrium be-
tween whole and part, centripetal and centrifugal, Community and 
Member States. It is an equilibrium which explains a seemingly 
irreconcilable equation: a large, surprisingly large, and effec-
tive measure of transnational integration coupled at the same 
time with the preservation of strong--unthreatened--national .r1em-
ber States. Shonfield, in his seminal political analysis of the 
C . 121 ommun1ty , noted this duality juxtaposing on the one hand 
" ... the extent to which the detailen operation of the Communi-
ty powers is today jealously observed and controlled by the mem-
122 . ber governments" w1th, on the other hand, two European Court 
123 h' h d cases w 1c emonstrated the hiqh level of what I have called 
normative supranationalism. He created the "bag of sticky mar-
bles" metaphor to express this duality and, correctly, souqht the 
explanation in the substantive features which both draw and repel 
'the members of the Community: A Community characterized on the 
one hand by a shared, historical, political and cultural back-
ground which, since repeatedly threatened by strife and co~flict 
in the past and finding common economic and political exigencies 
in the present, was and is being pushed and drawn towards inte-
gration. But also a Community which is, on the other hand, 
equally characterized by a rich diversity which has evolved in a 
history of separate tribal, religious, linguistic, economic and 
political development confinement of which into a fully fledged 
federal framework is neither feasible nor desirable124 • The 
analysis of normative and decisional supranationalisrn. complement 
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the substantive explanation of the "bag of marbles" by givino it 
its instrumental expression. It also gives us a clue about the 
future of European integration. The divergence beh1een norma-
tive and decisional supranationalism indicates that many of the 
tools for integration in the normative armory of the Communities 
--even the more subtle tools, like the directive--are likely to 
remain underemployed because of decisional difficulties. In the 
preparation of new policies and programmes the Commission will 
have to shift emphasis. In present conditions it is no longer 
sufficient to introduce grand programmes for Community policies, 
based on a reasoned presentation of Community needs and poten-
tials. In relation to each policy the Commission will also have 
to engage in a micro-analysis of the barriers to Council deci-
sion making, which may vary from issue to issue, with a view to 
presenting programmes particularly sensitive to decisional ob-
stacles as well as to normative ones. In this context the dis-
cussion of committees takes a different turn. For what could be 
seen as a reduction in the Cornm.ission' s autonomous executive 
role could be usefully employed, by that very Commission, as a 
device to reduce the decisional barriers. The greater the in-
volvement of the representatives of the Hember States, the less 
reluctant may they be to new Commission proposals. 
The Commission can, in certain fields, radically reassess 
its own role. Where the decisional barriers seem insurmountable 
it could abandon, selectively, its function as initiator of pol-
icies and engage in direct-voluntary-contact with the Hember 
States to assist them to develop independent oolicies which may 
however serve Community ends. 
Finally, relating the two facets of supranationalism--while 
recording that the distinction between the two was made so as to 
give us an additional tool of analysis--provides us with a dif-
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ferent set of terms of reference, albeit a tentative set, with 
which to examine the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and 
the type of integrationalist philosophy which, as we saw above, 
was at the basis of its judicial policy. The Court's case law 
and judicial policy may be subjected to four different orders of 
analysis. 
The first--technical-legal--order is concerned with ascer-
taining the precise meaning and parameters of the Court's judi-
cial decisions. Thus, for instance, whereas the case law per-
taining to supremacy seems consistent and clear there remains, 
as regards the doctrine of direct effect, especially as it ap-
plies to directives, a measure of obscurity with which the Court 
is currently grappling. 
The second order of analysis is concerned with evaluatina 
-- I 
in the strict legal sense, the correctness and legitimacy of the 
Court's case law. The challenge of the French Conseil d'Etat in 
the Cohn-Bendit Case as regards alleged constraints which Arti-
cle 189 imposes on the European Court is a judicial reflection, 
even if feeble, of this order of analysis. 
The third order of analysis is concerned with the evalua-
tion of the Court's case law as regards its impact on European 
legal integration. It hardly needs repeating that without the 
bold steps taken by the Court, the most important of which were 
discussed briefly in our analysis of the evolution of normative 
supranationalism, the legal structure of the Cornrnunitv would 
manifest only a fraction of its present cohesion. So, unlike 
the second order of analysis the terms of reference here go v1ell 
beyond a strict legal evaluation of the leqitimacy of the 
Court's judicial policy. They are widened to incorporate the im-
pact of these decisions on the general architecture of the legal 
49. 
order. But even here the analysis is still confined to an area 
which flows al~ost directly from the Court's jurisprudence. 
The evaluation, to use our terminology, remains at the level of 
normative supranationalism. 
The fourth order of analysis then will try to widen the 
terms of reference even further. The questions which will be 
asked--and to which, at this stage of research., only extremely 
tentative answers may be given--concern the relationship be-
tween the Court's case law and its impact in the normative 
field on the one hand and the dedi~ional facet of supranation-
alism on the other. This is, of course, a two-way relation-
ship. I have already suggested that in evolving its doctrine 
of preernption the Court will have been cognizant o£ decisional 
difficulties in the Communities policy and rule making struc-
ture. To insist on pure preemption and expect it to work ne-
cessitates efficient central organs; the absence of these in 
the Community gives one explanation to the pragmatic--less pure 
--approach adopted by the Court in this instance. It was on 
the basis of this analysis that I had argued that what appeared 
as a retrogressive judicial approach was in fact part of the 
approfondissement process. One could at this stage only specu-
late whether the Court would have taken a different approach as 
regards preemption had the decline in decisional supranational-
ism not occurred. Looking at the relationship the other way 
round one may speculate whether the ongoing process whereby the 
Court is, say, giving a higher normative value to directives 
(e.g. construing even non directly effective directives as a 
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basis for judicial review of Member State legislation) -- a 
process motivated undoubtedly by the integrationalist approach 
of the Court may be one of the reasons for the decisional 
difficulties in adopting certain directives. Even if one 
cannot expose a direct causal link, the mere possibility 
should certainly feature in the minds of the European judicial 
policy maker. 
D. ~~~g~gg=g@=~~J:J:=~~=~~~Q~@g=~~~~g~" 
There remains one crucial factor missing from the instru-
mental analysis. What are the ties that keep the framework 
together? By what means has it been possible to take normative 
supranationalism to the degree that it was taken despite the 
evident decline in decisional supranatbnalism, the outright 
hostility from certain national quarters 125 and the lack of 
independent federal enforcement mechanisms the evolution of 
which one would normally expect to accompany the development 
of normative supranationalism? 
1. Withdrawal or Selective Application 
The natural departure point for a reply would be an 
examination of the possibilities of Member State withdrawal 
from the Community. Here again we find if not a cleavage 
between legal and political analysis at least a sharp differen 
of emphasis. Juridically, in discussing withdrawal from the 
Community a distinction is drawn between the European Coal 
and Steel Community on the one hand and the European Economic 
Community and Euratom on the other. As regards the former, 
Article 97 ECSC provides that "This Treaty is concluded for 
a period of fifty years ... ". As regards the latter, Articles 
240 EEC and 208 Euratom provide respectively that "This Treaty 
is concluded for an unlimited period." A recent study126 
b d l . t t. l . . t. l l 1 27 l ase on genera 1n erna 10na 1nst1tu 1ona aw, cogent y 
argues " ... that no right of withdrawal can be implied in 
the case of treaties like ECSC ... ". 128 The same view is 
reached as regards the EEC and Euratom, namely that the 
aforenoted Articles" ... exclude any implied possibility 
of unilateral withdrawal" since " no other meaning which 
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could be given to these provisions would not make them redun-
11129 dant . 
This juridical argument is curtly dismissed in a political 
analysis of the Community system: Pryce argues that "~'!:/he 
question of unilateral withdrawal is not dealt with in any of 
(the Treaties)--for the good reason that none of the partners 
was willing to tie its own hands with regard to this matter ... 
The silence on this means quite clearly that each of the signa-
tories maintains absolute authority to take such a decision at 
any point in the future. The fact that the Treaty of Paris was 
concluded for a 50-year period and the other two for an unlimit-
. h' "130 ed period is irrelevant 1n t 1s context. 
This legally dubious statement has a strong measure of po-
litical truth behind it. Should a Member State be determined to 
withdraw, lack of legal consent from its partners will not be an 
obstacle in its way. The general Hobbesian maxim that covenants 
without swords are but words is accurately reflected by Pryce in 
his statement that in the Community "/t/here is no army to con-
131 
vince a reluctant partner" . The real glue that binds the 
Community together is the bond of common vision and common in-
terest in pursuing what has aptly been called "Alliance poli-
t . ..132 lCS • 
Does this mean that the supranational systerr is irrelevant 
to the discussion of withdrawal? It is submitted that the ques-
tion of unilateral withdrawal is the wrong one to ask. Unlike 
pre-World War II practice it is rare in the life of contemporary 
international organizations for states to withdraw their rnember-
ship133. The more common pattern is one of selective applica-
tion-by' states of those duties and obligations of membership 
which seem to conflict with national interests. Given the wide 
range of duties and obligations 
which flow from community membership such practice, if 
adopted, would be lethal to the communities. Equally coroiT.on 
is the failur~ of international organizations to adopt sanc-
tions against breach and --on those occasions when measures 
The essence of 
are adopted-- to enforce them effectively. 
effect" in 
what for convenience I call the "all-or-nothing 
the European Communities is 
tain the ultimate political 
that whereas Hember States re-
option of withdrawing from the 
· 1' t' of community and thereby disengaging from the1r ob 1ga 1ons 
membership (an option v.Jhich the process of economic and po-
litical enmeshment has made increasingly t~eoretical), they 
are -- as long as they opt for membership -- largely unable 
selective application of Community obligations. 
remain, for reasons -vrhich Hill be explained be-
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to practise 
There still 
low, certain lacunae in the full realization of the "effect", 
but it has certainly reached a stage '"here it can be stated 
as a fundamental distinguishing mark of supranationalism in 
hoth its facets. 
Tf'Je have already noted the central role of 3~he Court of 
· 1' But the Justice in the evolution of supranat1ona 1sm. 
· t't t' nal framework 
existence of a court as part of the 1ns l u lO 
· t · · n.ot unique and cannot, of an international organ1za 10n lS 
· ff t" nor can the as such,explain the "all-or-nothlng e ec , 
existence of a compulsory jurisdiction per se3b5e sufficient 
l b . . 
explanation since-- as recently exemplified --su m1ss1on 
to the compulsory jurisdiction and suhsequent obedience to 
an award are among the obligations which in the current state 
of international law can often be flouted with impunity. 
Rather it is the entire system of judicial review involving 
both n 0 tional courts and the European Court, which trans-
nationalizes mechanisms hitherto used only in the context of 
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municipal judicial review136 which produces the "effect". 
2. The Functional Division of Adjudicatory Tasks and Judicial Re-
. 137 
v1ew 
The Community features a double-limbed system of judicial re-
view which operates on two levels. Two sets of legislative acts 
and administrative ro~asures are subject to judicial review: a) 
(the first limb) those of the Community leaislative and adminis-
trative institutions (principally Council and Commission) which 
are reviewable for conformity with the provisions and principles 
of the Treaties and with an emerging unwritten higher law based on 
the constitutional traditions of all Hember States as well as in-
ternational treaties such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights 138 ; and b) (the second limb) acts of the Member States 
which are reviewable, in accordance with the principle of suorema-
for conformity with Community law itself. Needless to say, in 
context of compliance of ~llember States with Community obliga-
t . ff . . f h 1 . h . 1 . 1 3 9 1ons, e ect1ve rev1ew o t e atter set lS t e cruc1a 1ssue 
Judicial review may take place at the exclusive level of the 
Community Court. As regaro.s the first--less critical--limb, the 
organs of the Community and the Member States, as well as individ-
140 
uals, may, in accordance with the Treaty , challenge Community 
measures directly before the European Court. As may be 
the rules of standing for individuals are quite narrowly 
defined and the Court has added to this narrowness by interpreting 
th t . 1 141 ra er s r1ct y . 
As regards the second--critical--limb the Commission and l-1ero-
142 States may, in accordance with the Treaty , bring an action 
against a Member State for failure to fulfil its obligations under 
Treaty. Failure to fulfil an obligation may take the form of 
implementing a Community obligation or enacting a na-
al measure contrary to Community obligations. Although, as 
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indicated above, not unique, the very existence of a non-optional 
judicial forum for adjudication of these types of disputes sets 
the Community above most international organizations. 
time the "intergovernmental" character of this process and the 
consequent limitations on its efficacy are clear enough. Four 
weaknesses are particularly glaring. 
In the first place, the decision of the Commission and/or 
Member States to bring an action against an alleged violation by 
another Member State will often be influenced by political cons 
erations; the Commission might not wish to risk a political crisi 
which may be precipitated by a Court decision on a sensitive is-
143 
sue Secondly, effective supervision will depend on the abili 
ty of the Commission to monitor the implementation of Community 
law. Given the vast range of Community measures this becomes an 
impossible task144 Thirdly, the type of action which is likely 
to be brought will relate la_rgely to abject Hember State failure 
to implement a national measure required by Community law or to 
national measure which is in clear violation of Community law. 
will be far less suited to review of the ordinary application 
enforcement by Member States of Community obligations especially 
h ff . d. . d 1 145 as t ey a ect 1n 1v1 ua s . That type of violation becomes 
normally transparent only through cases and controversies 
ing individuals. Even if alleged violations were brouaht 
attention of the Commission, it is unrealistic to expect them 
take up all but the most flagrant violations. Finally, given 
intergovernmental character of this process, a Hember State 
to have failed to fulfil an obligation may simply disregard 
. . 't146 JUdgment aga1nst 1 . 
These weaknesses are to an extent remedied by the review 
both limbs at the national level, a process possible throu~h 
functional division of judicial tasks between the European 
of Justice and national courts and which essentially produces 
"all-or-nothing effect". It is hardly vTOrth mentionin<? that of 
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all Treaty provisions the sinale 
most important Treaty Article is 177 147 . This multi-function-
al Article provides inter alia that when a question concern-
ing either the interpretation of the Treaty or the validity 
and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Commu-
nity is raised before national courts, the latter may (and 
in the case of courts of final instance, must) refer the is-
sue for a preliminary ruling of the European Court of Justice. 
Once this ruling is made it will be remitted back to the 
national court which will give, on the basis of the ruling, 
the decision in the case pending before it. The national 
courts and the European Court of Justice are thus integrated 
into a unitary system of judicial decision making. The two 
limbs of judicial review exist on this level as well. A 
reference to the Court on the validity of acts of institu-
tions is clearly a mode for judicial review of Community 
acts at the instance of individuals. One will note that the 
question of locus standi from the point of view of the European Court 
does not arise. Thus it may even be possible for an individ~ 
ual to be denied standing in a direct challenge before the 
European Court but have the act reviewed if he has standing 
in accordance with national procedural law. The individual 
will be able to challenge the Community act in the national 
courts (Community law being, of course, part of the ·~aw of the 
land"), whereupon it will be remitted to the European Court of 
Justice for an interpretation on validity and returned back 
to the national cour'c for pronouncement 148 . Taking then judi-
cial review of Community measures as a whole, the trend, in 
respect of individual challenges, is one of a restrictive 
attitude to actions brought directly before the European Court 
With a shift to national courts as the forum for adjudica-
tion, using, when necessary, the preliminary reference for an 
inte,rpretation or che9k of validity, of a Comnunity measure 149 . 
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Turning to the second limb concerning the judicial review 
national measures for conformity with Community law, the European 
Court has made astute use of that part of Article 177 which pro-
vides for references on the "interpretation" of Community law. 
On its face the purpose of the procedure is to guarantee uniform 
interpretation of Community law in all Member States. However, 
often the factual situation in which Article 177 is employed is 
when a litigant pleads in the national court that a rule or rneas 
ure of national law or an administrative practice, should 
applied as it is in contradiction with Community law. On remis-
sion to the European Court it renders its interpretation of Com-
munity law within the factual context of the case before it. 
Theoretically, a division exists in the adjudicatory tasks of 
two courts: the European Court states the law and the national 
court applies it--using of course the principle of supremacy 
where necessary--to the case in hand. Thus the traditional for-
mula of the Court is to state that: 
.. The Court of Justice ruling under Article 177 of the 
EEC Treaty does not hold that a given national {la~/ is 
incompatible with Community law. . . Within the context 
of the judicial cooperation established by the provision 
it is for the national courts, applying the fundamental 
rule that Community law takes precedence, to uphold the 
right, of the subjects_based, under the Treaty_itself on 
the direct effect of /the provisions concerned/ when dis-
putes are brought bef~re them by those concer~eo.150. 
But as usefully concluded in a study on the role of the European 
Court in judicial review: 
It is no secret, hovrever, that in practice, when making 
preliminary rulings the Court has often transgressed the 
theoretical borderline . . . it provides the national 
judge with an answer in which questions of law and of fact 
are sufficiently interwoven as to leave the national judge 
with only little discretion and flexibility in making his 
final decision151. 
What is important--indeed crucial--is the fact that it is 
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the national court acting in tandem with the European Court which 
gives the formal final decision on the compatibility of the na-
tional measure with Community law. The main result of this pro-
cedure is the binding effect and enforcement value which such a 
decision will have on a Member State--coming from its own courts 
--as opposed to a similar decision handed down from Luxembourg by 
the European Court of Justice wearing its intergovernmental hat. 
This then is a procedural dimension of the Constitutionalization 
of the Treaties and a European confirmation of Hr. Justice 
Douglas' maxim that" ... it is procedure that marks much of the 
difference between rule by law and rule by fiat" 152 . It is also 
one of the clearest distinguishing marks of the supranational 
system. The quest for an effective law of nations in the tradi-
tional international legal order has been characterized by the 
creation of a succession of international courts, tribunals, ar-
bitration bodies and other judicial and quasi-judicial fora. 
With a few exceptions these bodies have all been victims of the 
inherent weakness of international judicial bodies by comparison 
to their national counterparts. International jurisprudence, 
with all the attention it receives from scholars, has remained on 
the periphery of international law and international relations. 
By contrast, the supranational system--in a synthesis of inter-
national law and constitutional law -- puts the inherently 
stronger national system in the service of the transnatiorial or-
der. 
The above analysis helps to express the current limitations 
of the evolution of the "all-or-nothing effect" in the Community. 
If all issues involving alleged violations of Member States Com-
munity opligations became matters involving private parties tria-
ble before national courts the "all-or-nothing effect" could be 
said to be complete. Inevitably, however, there are certain mat-
ters which concern directly Hember States only and which can not 
I 
58. 
realistically become case-and-controversy issues. Violation 
these would still remain a matter for "Community level" inte 
ernmental judicial review. In addition, even in 
where an individual action--a case and controversy--could, by 
virtue of the subject matter, take place, there may be an array 
of additional barriers to overcome. These may be connected wit 
ignorance by the individual of his "higher" Community rights, 
barriers of expense and time of litigation and the low stakes 
which the individual may have in vindicating a right despite 
wider Community importance. (In Costa ~· ENEL 
the actual controversy concerned q,sum: of :b 1) 
Finally, the use of Article 177 as a method 
dicial review of ~![ember State measures depends on the full ac-
ceptance by the national courts of the doctrine of supremacy an 
on a willingness to utilize 177 to its full potential. 
noted that both in Britain and in the administrative judicial 
branch in France the first issue is not clearly resolved and 
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regards the latter there are mixed trends . Nevertheless, 
if incomplete, the existing "all-or-nothing effect" remains a 
singular expression of supranationalism distinguishing 
nity from most other international organizations. Its 
tion and consolidation must surely be one of the important chal 
lenges of the future. 
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III - SUPRANATIONALIS~-~--PROSPECTIVE 
================ =========== 
It is not my purpose in this section to engage in an exercise 
of political or legal futurism. The volatility of European inte-
gration renders questionable the utility of such an exercise. 
Rather I propose to concentrate on certain concrete recent devel-
opments which would seem to pose challenges and raise question 
marks as regards the future functioning of sunranationalism as an-
alyzed above. 
Two of these developments are specific "tangible" occurrences 
already mentioned in the introduction: (a) the commencement of 
the second round of enlargement which, with the accession of 
Greece, has already taken the Community of Nine to Ten and which 
prospectively will bring it up to twelve; and (b) the direct elec-
tions to the European Parliament. These two developments will be 
analyzed in relation to their possible impact on decisional supra-
nationalism. The third development is less tangible. It is con-
cerned with the consequences and implications of normative supra-
nationalism resulting from the lateral expansion of Community pol-
icies into new fields but, as we shall see, also from the very 
process of approfondissement. 
I shall not deal with all the impact on the Community of 
these developments but only with those aspects which touch on the 
essential features of the retrospective typology. By necessity 
the treatment will be synoptic; the questions can be posed but an-
swers only guessed. 
A. ~£~~g~~~~ ~~g~g~g~~£~g1~~~--~~~ ~~g11~~g~~ ~! ~~g1~;g~~~g~~£~, 
~~~££~~ ~gg1~£g~~£~ g~~ ~~££~£~~~~~ 
It is difficult to give precise time limits to the evolution 
of normative supranationalism as outlined in the retrosnective 
analysis. As far as the starting point is concerned, although ac-
ademic and political literature existed long before the actual 
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conclusion of the Treaty of Paris, the Schuman Declaration pro 
represents the political point of transformation from theory 
to practice. At the other end we already noted that not all 
strands in the process have come to full fruition so that 
in a sense the trends identified continue today. The thrust 
of these developments took place, however, in the SO's, 
60's and up to the mid-70's. Taking all these developments 
as a whole it would be possible perhaps to describe them 
as establishing the relational principles of normative 
supranationalism and to characterize the period as the 
constitutional phase. For as we saw the major developments 
were concerned with the relationships between the two mer9-
ing legal orders and the constitutional hierarchy therein; 
it was in this sense that we described normative suprana-
tionalism as being concerned with the effective precedence 
of Community policies and laws over national measures. 
But effectiveness cannot be guaranteed solely by the 
existence of solid constitutional principles and accepted 
relational hierarchies. These only ensure a certain type 
of resolution to Community-national conflicts. Substantive 
Community policies and law must be applied and the duties 
and rights they bestow vindicated and enforced. Should con-
crete application of policies or vindication of rights be 
impaired -- or executed in a manner inconsistent with Commu-
nity norms -- the relational principles of normative supra-
nationalism will be rendered constitutionally arid. Effective 
application may be inhibited by several factors both legal 
and meta-legal. I propose to deal with three of these fac-
tors each indicative of a larger problem and each operating 
at a different level in the complex Community social, polit-
ical and legal order: the quantitative challenge, the pro-
cedural challenge and the Access-to-Justice challenge. 
61. 
1. Monitori~g1 Supervising and Adjudicating the Implemen-
tation of Community Law: The Quantitative Challenge 
So far we have refrained from discussing directly the 
various legislative tools available in the Community. Taking 
the EEC as an example the Treaty distinguishes among three 
principal binding tools 1 54 . The se are the regulation, vrhich is gener-
ally binding, directly applicable and if conforming with 
th 'b d . 155h e prescr1 e requ1rements as automatic direct effect; 
the decision, which is binding only on its addressee;and 
the directive which is binding as to the result to be achieved 
upon the Member State to whom it is addressed but leaves 
national authorities the choice as to the form and methods 
of implementation and introduction into the municipal legal 
order. It is clearly regulations and directives which are 
the main general legislative instruments. To be sure, the 
doctrine of direct effect as applied to directives has 
blurred some of the distinctions between the two. But direct 
effect of directives remains exceptional156 and the instru-
ments maintain their substantive distinction. The choice of 
instruments is determined in the first place by explicit 
provisions in the Treaty. In some cases the Treaty is neu-
tral -- speaking of "measures" 157 to be adopted; in others 
specific, giving the Council and the Commission choice be-
tween r Ul t . d. t. 15 8 d d . . 15 9 h eg a 10ns, 1rec 1ves an ec1s1ons . In ot er 
instances it stipulates the use of a directive -- noticeably 
in dealing with the general provision for approximations and 
harmonization of laws, one of -the principal instruments for 
ff t . . t t. 1 60 e ec 1ve 1n egra 10n . 
it 
The directive is a more subtle tool than the regulation: 
is mindful of the social and political fabric to 
which laws belong and the intricate relationships which fre-
quently operate between apparently disparate rules. By im-
posing on the Member States the duty as to the result to be 
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achieved but allowing them to find the best methods of internal 
implementation, the framers of the Treaty were making allowances 
for the disadvantages of fully centralized legislation which, al-
thouah being generally binding and directly applicable and thus 
more likely to produce direct effect, could orocuce disruption in 
national systems. 
The orice to be paid for the choice of directive as a tool 
lies in the efficacy of implementation. For unlike the regula-
can Come 1'nto effect immediately, the directive, by tion, which • 
definition, has to give a measure of time for Hember State ad-
from the exceptional cases where directives justment and--apart 
will produce direct effect--implementation depends on Jlft.ember 
state compliance; it is this last link which exposes the main 
quantitative challenge. To be sure, the systems of judicial re-
view and the principles of normative supranationalism provide for 
legal remedies in case of failure to implement a directive. But 
before the Commission--one task of which is to ''ensure that the 
provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken £y the institu-
. 161 . 
t th t are app l1ed" --can take legal act1on tions pursuan ~~~ 
against a recalcitrant or dilatory Jl1ember State, it has to be 
f 1 . To be cognizant of non-compliance cognizant o non-comp 1ance. 
· h · In the retroacti it must have effective monitor1ng mec an1sms. 
analysis we noted the role of the individual as a guardian of 
Treaty achieved by the decentral1·zed component in the Community' 
. 162 
system of judicial rev1ew But the individual can come into 
t f measures which o._roduce direct ef-direct play only in respec o 
feet which is very often not the case in relation to directives 
or in situations where the directive has already been incorporat 
· 1 1 The commission remains itself the main ed into nat1ona · aw. 
guardian of implementation of directives. 
The magnitude of this problem can be gauged by 
the numerical explosion in the number of directives. 
reference 
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d . t' 163 . 1rec 1ves were 1n force. Ten years later it would appear that 
within the legal order of the Community there are no less than 700 
164 directives in force . Even on an assumption of only one nation-
al measure to implement each directive, in a Community of Ten this 
would mean that the Commission has to monitor the introduction of 
7,000 implementing measures. Admittedly these are spread over a 
number of years but the trend is likely to continue into the fu-
ture. The Comro_ission has introduced data processina equipment to 
try and fulfil this task. It has also introduced,in certain di-
rectives. a duty on the 1'1ember States to report on incorporation 
measures, failure of V>7hich could trigger enforcement proceedings 
under Article 169 EEC. But even should the Co~mission eventually 
be able to put tags on all the implementing measures three further 
problems immediately arise. 
Firstly the sanction against non-compliance depends on direct 
judicial adjudication before the European Court of Justice--albeit 
after a conciliatory phase in which the M.ember State is given time 
to put its house in order. The prospect of a flood of actions 
which may congest and even choke the Court is no less alarming 
than non-implementation especially since the Court is already 
working under a heavy case load. A further increase of such case 
load will not only threaten the Court's efficiency but also dilute 
165 its normative-constitutional role as a supreme court . 
In the second place, even on the optimistic assU1Tlption that 
the Commission would indeed be able to monitor the introduction of 
implementing measures (and pursue an enforcement policy not too 
influenced by illegitimate political considerations166 ), the fact 
Of implementation alone would not in itself be sufficient to en-
sure effective application and enforcement. The national legisla-
tive act might after all misconstrue the enabling directive. Ad-
mittedly, the implementing measure can be judicially reviewed 
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against the enabling directive at the instance of individuals167 
affected by it. But often in order to test the validity or le0 
i ty of an implementing act the incli vidual would first have to Vi 
1 168 . ate it in order that the validity may be contested , a rlsky 
course of action which many individuals would be loath to take16 
In addition the Community origin of the implementing act may be 
oblique170 so that the individual is not aware of the possible 
ground for judicial review. 
In certain classes of directives--say in the agricultural 
field--the !-~ember States are required to submit the. draft of the 
implementing measure to the Commission for commentary. 
this would not completely solve the final problem since even a 
well drafted national implementing measure has to be executed a 
applied. In the Cowmunity system this is done by 
istrative authorities which creates a new tier of potential mis 
plication which would need Community supervision. 
Monitoring the incorporation of cUrecti ves into national 
controlling the conformity of the national measure with the 
rective and supervising execution are problems which are inevita 
ble consequences of the system. The Council and Commission are 
primarily legislative organs, the execution of their positive po 
icies being entrusted--unlike most federal states--to the }1ember 
States. The quantitative explosion may be the result of a 
lator not fully responsible for the execution of policies. Be 
that as it may~the quantitative challenge renders a problem 
has always existed very acute. Approfondissement in this area 
will mean the creation of mechanisms, legal and otherwise, \>!hi eh 
will enable the Community despite the large numbers concerned 
only to introduce the Community normative measure but to ensure 
that in complying with it--from implementation through executi 
the Member States will meet their full Treaty obli~ations. 
65. 
2. The Uniform Protection of Community Law--Unequal Remedies: 
the Procedural Challenge 
Even in those situations where individuals are able to invoke 
Community law directly before the national courts (and ·thus serve 
as indirect guardians of incorporation and application of Communi-
ty law by Member States), the special character of suprana-
tionalism produces a problem which touches on the fundamental is-
sue of uniformity and diversity with which all "federal" systems 
have to grapple. I shall be concerned here with the situation in 
which Community law has already been introduced either directly, 
by a measure having direct effect, or through state implementa-
tion. My focus will be on the use of such laws by individuals in 
seeking to protect the rights bestowed upon them. 
The uniform application of Community measures throughout .~1em­
ber States has been among the most consistent principles upon 
which the Court of Justice has insisted in its jurisprudence. It 
has been used amongst other reasons as a justification for evolv-
171 ing the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy and was one of 
the strongest arguments used by the Court in resisting the nation-
al constitutional challenge in the context of the human rights de-
bate. Should this principle be unjustifiably compromised one of 
the very foundations of normative supranationalism would be 
threatened. Thus in a recent restatement of its human riahts po-
sition, the Court affirmed172 that 
~!/he introduction of special criteria for assessment /of 
the co~patibility of Community law with fundamental human 
right~/ stemming from the legislation . . . of a particu-
lar Member State would, by damaging the substantive unity 
and efficacy of Community law, lead inevitably to the de-
struction of the unity of the Common Market and the jeop-
ardizing of the cohesion of the Community173. 
And in another case the Court elaborated this general constitu-
tional principle by stating that 
'I l 
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/t/he binding force of the Treaty and of measures taken in 
application of it must not differ from one state to anoth-
er as a result of internal measures, lest the functioning 
of the Community system should be impeded and the achieve-
ment of the aims of the Treaty placed in peril17 4 
The explicit underlying value of this uniBprinciple is 
clearly integrationalist. Its counterpart in the Treaty is the 
very Article 177 which provides the mechanism for ensuring that 
Community measures will be uniformly interpreted and, as we saw 
in the retrospective analysis, applied throughout the Communi-
ty175 Beneath the explicit integrationalist value lies an even 
deeper one. Non-uniform protection in similar situations, with-
out a meaningful distinguishing criterion, would violate the 
se principle of equality before the same law. Thus from the 
strict, almost idealist, integrationalist point of view the ex-
istence of unequal remedies--remembering that rights and duties 
are only meaningful and measurable in terms of the remedies 
. 1 bl f h . . d. t. 176 f th t t. f th aval a e or t elr vln lca lOn -- or e pro ec lon o e 
same substantive Community based rights, would be inconsistent 
with fundamental principles of equality acknowledged in democrat 
177 ic legal systems . In this sense the constitutional principle 
and procedural principles become interchangeable. To the extent 
that this inequality would coincide with national boundaries, 
thereby redividing nationally the integrated legal system, it 
would represent a serious gap in the normative edifice of supra 
nationalism. 
And yet the very enmeshment of the legal Community and na-
tional orders, whereby Community derived rights and duties are 
often vindicated--by the logic of the system--through the nati 
al courts by means of national procedural law, has come to pro-
duce this very result--a disturbing inequality of remedies. 
en that the Community system is not a unitary one, it is unavo 
able that differences of protection will, in some cases~ 
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ably exist among the constituent parts--a fact accepted even in 
well developed federal systems like the USA178 . This problem, 
solution to which must necessarily be one of the main future 
challenges in the evolution of normative supranationalism, may be 
best illustrated by reference to a number of concrete judicial 
decisions. 
a. Unequal remedies--a conflict of principles 
As a background to uno.erstanding the emergence of the prob-
lem of unequal remedies and non-uniform application one Must re-
call two aspects in the process of judicial reviev1. Ne noted in 
the retrospective analysis that a reference under Article 177 for 
an interpretation of Community law often serves as a means for 
judicial review of national laws or administrative practices for 
their compatibility with Community law. Frequently, the review 
takes place when a litigant challenges a national charge, levy or 
tax (often on imports) which 1 he claims 1violates a superior Commu-
nity norm. 
The matter is rendered particularly complex since the Euro-
pean Court in the first place, has insisted on the declaratory 
rather than constitutive nature of its interpretative judgments. 
~'The interpretation which, in the exercise of the jurisdiction 
conferred on it by Article 177 ... the Court of Justice gives 
to a rule of Community law clarifies and defines ... the mean-
ing and scope of that rule as it must be or ought to ha~e been 
179 
understood and applied froM the time of its coming into force . 
In the context of challenging a national charge or levy, the 
ex tunc effect of the judgment would mean that in situations 
where the,national measures were in fact to be declared incompat-
ible with Community law the full vindication of Community rights 
would entitle the individual not only to a moratorium on future 
charges of the same kind but also to a repayment of all sums pre-
viously illegally exacted frbm him. 
I. 
I 
t ·n doctrinal In the second place, despite cer a1 
the strict individual binding force which insist on 
type180 the better and more 
68. 
Cou~t judgments of this 
have at least de facto, ~ 
ed view is that these judgments 
effect. 
This 
f as to state that 
The Paris court of Appeal went so ar 
f Justice of the European 
The decisions of the.Court o tion are of a general nature 
nities rendered for 1nterpreta 'f the case law of the 
because they are designed to ~~~ y are therefore binding on 
courts of the Hember States; y 
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those courts · 
the individual claimant be enti 
means that not only would 
to retroactive redress but 
States, from whom unlawful 
all others, even in other Member 
charges were exacted would be equal 
large: in 
h economic stakes can be very so entitled. T e 182 h' kind the Dutch authori 
after a decision of the Court of t 1S 
Seven million Florins i 
· excess of 
t1·es were obliged to repay 1n 183 
·11 llv levied · respect of a charge 1 ega ~ 
f the Court's decisi 
Yet in many cases characterization o . 
· f' · 1 especl ff t) is quite art1 1c1a -
as declaratory (with ~ ~ e ec . 
in situations in which a widespread diverse understan~"1~g 
ly . d . to the dec1s1on. 
individuals and Hember States preva1le pr1or 
1. n one instance, 184 has recognized 'the The Court, so far only 
. h if aiven eraa omnes ~ 
. effects" its judgment m1ght ave -' --"'-
r1ous . " ·ud 
'b'l'ty of a "constitut1ve J 
validity and accepted the poss1 1 1 
ment. 
In that exceptional case the court 
its applicability to past relationships 
gave a prospective 
extending only to 
· d t But in 
claims already lodged at the time of JU gmen . 
emphasized the exceptional nat 
quent jurisprudence the Court 
f t that only the Court 
that judgment, and the ac 185 
omnes effect 
elude general ~ tunc or erga 
itself could 
It is submit 
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that, in addition to the vertical relation, between public author-
ities and individuals, a decisive factor in applying retrospectiv-
ity was the fact that horizontal legal relationships were estab-
lished in good faith among individuals on the basis of the previ-
d d . f h 1 186 . h . 'k ous un erstan 1ng o t e aw . Prospect1vity t us 1slh!l1 ely to 
be used frequently by the Court in future cases involving solely 
individuals and Member States. In principle, then, in all cases 
involving monies illegally exacted, the individual claimant and 
all those in his class would be entitled, pursuant to the direct 
effect of Community law, to reimbursement going back to the com-
mencement date of the Community measure. 
In practice, since the vindication of these rights takes 
place necessarily through the national courts and national legal 
systems, successful claimants will have to satisfy the procedural 
requirements of their national legal system, say, as regards time 
limits. And it is the procedural variations among the different 
systems which gives rise to the problem under discussion. The is-
sues became concrete in two cases in the mid-70 1 s 187 . It has been 
brought into sharper focus and magnified in a spate of recent cas-
es188 and is likely to arise in a variety of manifestations until 
the source of the problem is tackled in the future. The complex 
issues are best discussed by reference to some of these cases. 
b. The case of Rewe and its progeny 
The facts in this case are as simple as the law and issues 
raised therein are complex. The plaintiff, a German importer of 
apples was claiming the reimbursement of a charge imposed on him 
in 1968 by the German authorities for a phyto-sanitary examination 
of his imported fruit. In fact the charge had been unlawfully ex-
acted, a fact which came to light in a decision of the Court de-
Cided some years after 1968 189 which found the charge to be conP 
trary to the directly effective Article 13 EEC and a Council req~-
,; >."-' 
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lation190 . It should be pointed out that there are many hundreds 
of diverse non-tariff barriers to trade in the Community and to 
most intents and purposes only the European Court can authorita-
tively decide which of these are prohibited in accordance with 
the rules of the customs union. The facts of these cases may 
seem trivial but it should be remembered that, apart from the 
procedural-constitutional principles which concern us, the eco-
nomic stakes are very large; further, the smooth operation 
customs union is a mainstay policy which the Common ~~arket ousht 
to achieve. The fact of illegality was undisputed in the present 
case by the defendants, the German administrative authorities. 
But an application for refund by Rewe was met by the defence that 
b h 1 . 't t' per1'od
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wh1'ch they were time barred y t e German 1m1 a 10n 
had expired long before the illegality came to light. 
The question which the European Court had to answer was 
. whether where an administrative body in a state has 
infringed the prohibition on charges having an effect 
equivalent to customs duties ... the Community citizen 
concerned has a right under Comronnity law to the annulment 
or revocation of the administrative measure anC'/or to a 
refund of the amount paid ev~n if under the rules of pro-
cedure of the national law Lthrough w~ich, by necessity, 
the citizen must vindicate his right~/ the time limit for 
contesting the validity of the administrative measure is. 
192 . past 
In its laconic judgment193 the Court first affirmed the di-
rect effect of the Community measures in question--and it is 
worth noting that Article 13 of the Treaty comes within Part 
of the Treaty dealing with Principles, a fact which the Court 
often adverted to in its jurisprudence--and the duty, in accord-
ance with the supranational system, of national courts to protec 
the rights those measures confers on citizens. It also noted 
that as far as the remedies for violation of the principles were 
concerned the Community did not have its own procedural rules to 
----------------------------------------------
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grant a remedy. Hence, and herein lies the crux of the problem, 
it was for ". . . the domestic legal sv. stem of each 
_ Member State 
to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the 
procedural conditions governing actions . . ~ 194 
The Court did insist--delphically--that these must be "rea-
sonable", and that the national procedural requirements 195 should 
not make it completely impossible in practice to exercise the 
rights which the national courts are bound to protect. It also 
said that ~ithin the national system the procedural requirements 
in respect of Community measures should not be less favourable by 
comparison to requirements concerning purely national claims. on 
the factsJthe German limitation period of one month was not con-
sidered "unreasonable". The Court accepted the fundamental reci-
procity between remedies and rights in that total exclusion of 
the former v1as seen to extinguish the latter. And yet, as stated 
by the Comm.ission in its submissions, the time limits laid do'\ilm 
by national law vary between one month, as is the case in Germa-
196 
ny, and 30 years 
The effect of the Court's decision, leaving the vindication 
of Community rights almost exclusively to the procedural require-
ments of national law, was to create the unsatisfactory situation 
whereby the measure of protection afforded the individual in re-
spect of the wrongful application of Community law by national 
authorities would vary considerably depending on the natio~al fo-
rum where the case would be tried and its rules of procedure. 
The differences are not mere discrepancy between constitu-
tional-substantive Community rights and national procedural 
rules. For to the extent that in the Community system in many 
situations national law and national courts become wi1ly-nilly 
Community law and Community courts, and further, to the extent 
that civil procedure defines and limits the remedy (and therefore 
I 
I 
I 
I. 
I 
i ,. 
I 
the right) , these differences imply a contradiction in 
tutional right itself. 
7"2. 
In principle and as a permanent solution the European Court 
could not have excluded completely the legitimacy of i~posing a 
time limit for bringing an action to redress wrongs caused by 
tional administrative measures violative of Community law. Time 
limits serve the essential leqal principle of certainty, and bal-
. 197 
ance the interests of the individual with that of soc1ety . 
Court was also probably correct in judging 
tification of this diversity--leading both to the non-uniform 
tection of Community rights throuqhout the Coro.mon r1.arket and 
unequal treatment of individuals before the same substantive 
could be achieved by harmonization of procedural law, a matter 
coming within the legitimate domain of explicit legislative 
the precise technical details of \'>7hich are best left to the 
States. Thus the Court stated that "Where necessary, the harmon 
zation provisions of Articles 100 to 102 and Article 235 enable 
appropriate measures to be taken to remedy differences between 
Lprocedural provision~/ in Member States if they are likely to 
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distort or harm the functioning of the Common Harket" 
nevertheless, be useful to examine whether the Court, so impact 
in the "Constitutional Phase~ of normative sunranationalism is 
obliged to leave this important next evolutionary step entirely 
the hands of the political organs. The arguments are too .finelY 
balanced to sive a decisive reply. On the "integrationalist" s 
one could make the following observations: 
There is a certain tension--at least in tone and emphasis- ... 
' ' 19 
between Rewe and, say, the decision of the Court in Si~.menthal 
In the latter case, the integrity of the legal order of the 
nity was regarded as sufficient to prohibit the internal Italian 
procedural requirement which obliged lower Italian courts to re 
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any questions of supremacy to the national court designated for 
this purpose--the Italian Constitutional Court. In Rewe, and its 
progeny, by contrast the Court stated that " ... in the absence 
of Community rules . Lit is permissibl~/ for the domestic le-
gal system of each Member State to designate those Courts having 
jurisdiction and to determine the procedural conditions . n 200 
At first sight Sirrunenthal is distinguishable since in that 
case there was no absence of Community rules: Article 177 itself 
fills the gap. But it was only the creative interpretation of the 
Court which enabled it to do this--a similar interpretation by 
which could not therefore be excluded in the present instance. 
Especially if we are to remember that the very purpose of Article 
177 is to ensure the uniform interpretation and, necessarily, ap-
plication and enforcement of Community law. 
A more fundamental distinction is tied to the fact that bv 
.1. 
contrast to Simmenthal where the Court could strike do\'>m an incom-
patible procedural requirement of the Italian legal system, in 
Re-v1e and its progeny it would appear that the Court could not 
merely strike out but would have to provide a replacement since, 
as stated above, time limits are an essential feature of any legal 
system. It would be unrealistic to expect positive judicial lea-
islation on such intricate and technical issues;although in rela-
tion to Community rules of procedure the Court has not been com-
pletely impotent201 As a permanent solution, undoubtedly specif-
ic Community legislation or harmonization measures are called for. 
But this in itself does not exclude the possibility of judicial 
action by way of striking out the national time limits as an in-
terim measure until such time as a unifying instrument is intro-
duced. ·Qualitatively the Court would be doing no more than it did 
in any of its previous "grands arrets" such as Costa v. ENEL. 
Making Community rights procedurally unconditional would be stiff 
,i 
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medicine indeed, but this would provide a strong incentive for 
· t' Thl's p_roposal for J'udicial action Community legislatlve ac 10n. _ 
t f . t s1'ght Two legal prin-is less alarming than might seem a 1rs · 
fl . t the intearity of the Community ciples are locked in con lC : _ 
11 f the uniform protection of Community gal order which ea s or 
rights andequality before the law, as against the principle of 
gal certainty which is at the foundation of the national time 1 
it. The thrust of my argument is that there was no compelling 
reason for the court to compromise almost completely the first 
principle at the expense of the second one. 
It could be argued that by provisionally striking down na-
h t Of inequality would be created tional time limits anot er ype 
within the national legal system whereby different time limits 
would be applied depending on the source of the right at 
of the claim--national or Community. This inequality is 
lusory than real, however, since differentiation of time limits 
depending on substantive source of law (e.g. contractual 
tual) is quite normally accepted in most national legal systems. 
Furthermore, substantive Community law in any event does not al-
ways fall easily into the procedural categories of national law 
· · the national procedural rules for the purpose of determ1n1ng 
202 
should apply to it . 
This conclusion leads to a further point. The 
islative correction which will be required need not involve a 
· f nat1'onal procedural law but rather 
wholesale harmonizatlon o 
1 actl. on to establish relevant time 1 cific Community regu atory 
its in respect of Community acquired rights. This would be 
ly justifiable and, it is suggested, politically feasible. 
can only speculate whether the efforts already made in this 
203 · d a considerable boost had the tion would not have rece1ve 
of Justice taken a bolder stand on the normative princi:9les. 
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At the same time one should not forget that the existence of 
different municipal legal systems which include a diversity of 
procedural rules is not a mere technical obstruction to uniform 
protection of Community rights to be removed--with or without the 
Court's prompting--by a simple technical exercise. Rather, argua-
bly, the strict connection between procedure and substance may in-
dicate that the national procedural diversity is a reflection of 
deeper differences depending on societal values such as the rela-
tionships between the citizen and the administration, the privi-
leges of the executive and the general balance between communal 
and individual interests. 
If the latter hypothesis is correct--and comparison with non-
't t • t • th' d' t' 204 h h I un1 ary sys ems may po1n 1n lS 1rec 10n --t en t e Court s 
decision becomes more understandable. Integration in this case 
would clearly become a matter for a slower, orderly and voluntary 
process of harmonization--as provided e.g. in Articles 100-102 
EEC. And, as far as equality is concerned, this alternative hy-
pothesis would suggest that given that the "belongingness" of in-
dividuals to different legal systems is not a mere technicality, 
and that, as a result, similar factual claims based on identical 
Community rights are in effect objectively "unlike situations", 
this reasoning would justify unlike treatment. 
Pending final resolution of this issue it may be possible for 
the Court to take a midway position. The Court could perhaps con-
sider a policy of judicial abstention as regards the actual na-
tional time limits but impose a Community judge-made rule as to 
the moment time must start running. A possible commencement point 
could be the moment when the plaintiff should reasonably have be-
come aware of his rights, such as the date on which the Court it-
self clarified the issue. This would not affect the ex tunc na-
ture of the judgment, although it would favour the individual's 
' I 
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ignorance of his rights as against the Member States' ignorance 
their wrong. This may be a useful via-media between the need f 
equal and uniform protection on the one hand and the 
ment of Member State legitimate procedural diversity on the 
d 205 The issues raised in Denkavi t, Just and Fenrer a were 
broadly similar. The basis for non-uniformity in those cases 
not the diversity of time limits but the basis for calculating 
loss suffered as a result of the illegally exacted charcres and 
levies. Apparently in some systems the question of whether the 
trader has passed on the cost of the illegal charge to 
er is relevant in calculating monies to be repaid. In 
terns this matters not. Once again the Court employed the formul 
that " . in the absence of Community rules concerning the re-
funding of national charges which have been unlawfully levied, i 
is for the domestic legal system of each Member State . "206 
prescribe the remedies. The Court specifically allowed 
tions of unjust enrichment to be taken into account so that. it 
would not be contrary to Community law to consider whether 
the unlawful levy was passed on to the customer and full 
h . 207 would constitute an unjustified windfall to t e lmporter 
again, individuals, in apparently equal factual situations 
be treated differently according to the jurisdiction in which 
sought or were obliged to seek Community derived protection. 
Ferwerda the reverse situation arose. The question was under 
conditions could the national-Community authorities claim 
dividuals the repayment of a subsidy erroneously granted. The 
Court accepted that (Dutch) national rules of legal certainty 
should govern the question, leading of course to the same type of 
diverse treatment. 
A peculiar twist to this problem occurred in the' EXpres~ 
208 Dairy case There the illegal charge was collected by the 
ber State acting as an agent for the Community in 
respect of a Community measure held to be illegal. This then 
was a situation in which a Community measure created a 
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wrong applied across the board throughout the Member States209 . 
And yet vindication of rights, dependent on the national le-
gal systems with their procedural diversity was acknowledged 
as leading to" ... difference in treatment on a Community 
1 ,210 sea e . As a result, individuals affected similarly by 
the same illegal Community measure may receive different re-
dress, in terms of time limits, quantum of repayment, inter-
est charges and so forth. 
In this context the procedural challenge is particu-
larly stark, since in this situation there would undoubted-
ly be uniform enforcement of the Community rule but no uni-
form redress should the rule be found to have been illegal. 
c. Unequal protection--other instances 
Bewe and its progeny illustrate most clearly the 
emerging constitutional-procedural gap and one of the pro-
spective challenges to the evolution of normative suprana-
tionalism. Two other illustrations will serve to demonstrate 
that this line of cases is not unique and that the procedur-
al challenge is likely to creep up in a variety of other 
situations. 
It will be recalled that one way of sidestepping the 
restrictive approach of the European Court regarding direct indi-
vidual challenges to general Community legislation under 
Article 173 was by way of reference on the validity of Com-
munity law under Article 177. The substitution is not com-
plete since the effects of annulment (under 173) are different 
from those of declaration of invalidity under 177211 , but it un-
doubtedly ameliorates the almost completely blocked avenue 
under '173. Yeb agaiTh the ability of the individual to use 
the 177 challenge to validity will depend on the range and 
! : 
'il 
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form of national forms of action. Thus for example in the Royal 
Scholten Hoenig case212 , an English plaintiff was able 
the application of a Community measure (through the intermediary 
the British administrative authorities) by way of an application 
for a "declaration" in the English High Court--a specific form of 
action suited to judicial reviev.r of administrative action. The 
High Court duly referred the matter to the European Court of Jus-
tice which in turn gave its decision on (partial) invalidity 
was applied by the High Court. The plaintiff had his redress. 
This is a particularly efficient remedy since the law can be clari 
fied in advance of any action the legality of which is unclear. 
This satisfactory result depends of course on the availability of 
the declaration and its scope. Thus, if the Community measure, s 
a directive, were not merely a matter for national administrative 
action but called for legislation to be introduced by an Act of 
Parliament, it is doubtful whether in England a declaration would 
lie. By contrast it would seem that in Denmark and Ireland, if t 
individual could establish sufficient interest it probably would. 
Once again we have the prospect of unequal remedies in relation to 
a Community norm which presents itself identically throughout the 
legal order. 
Finally, it is easy to imagine that as regards the non-con-
tractual liability of the Community the policy of the Court 
tice to encourage the processing of claims through national 
213 
. 11 . . 1 1 1 d t d. . t f d. . 1 dl' courts w1 s1m1 ar y ea o a .. 1vers1 y o reme 1es--1nc u 
perhaps the quantum of damages--depending on the specific national 
delictual rules. 
There are no easy solutions to these problems. They involve 
profound policy issues about the measure of diversity which the 
Community system can tolerate and no less difficult pragmatic que 
tions about the feasibility of Community regulation and harmoniza~ 
tion in so technical a legal field. Nevertheless, the centrality 
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of the principle of uniform interpretation and application of Com-
munity law to the entire normative structure of supranationalism is 
~uch that the present difficulties cannot but be a major challenge 
to be resolved in the future. The per se value of non-discrimina~ 
tion only adds moral acuteness to the integrational problem. 
3. Application and Enforcement of Community Law--The Access to 
214 Justice Challenge 
This final challenge to normative supranationalism is only be-
215 ginning to reach the consciousness of the European policy maker . 
Access to justice is concerned with the need to transform formal 
rights into effective rights. In its basic manifestation it is 
concerned with the essential constitutional requirements in civil 
(and criminal) procedure to ensure a process which corresponds to 
. t 1 t' f . . 216 soc1e a no 1ons o JUStlce At a second level it is concerned 
with facilitating the access of individuals and groups to dispute 
resolution fora and questioning the adequacy of the existing fora 
with a view to developing new processes and bodies more suited to 
the exigencies of the contemporary problems which face individuals 
in a mass society. Questions such as legal aid, the mechanisms, 
procedural and institutional, to vindicate diffuse and fragmented 
rights such as consumer and environmental rights, the role of indi-
vidual litigants, public authorities, prosecutors and special con-
ciliation and arbitration bodies are among the questions with which 
the search for effective access to justice has to grapple. 
At first sight there seems little connection between this 
range of problems and the evolution of normative supranationalism. 
It is possible to take the view that since, in most instances, the 
application of Community law and the vindication of Community based 
rights are achieved through the municipal legal system and national 
courts, the issues of access to justice do not rise at the suprana-
i 
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217 A closer look reveals, however, several points 
tional level · 
of contact. 
a) 
in its extra-legal manifestation can Accessible justice even 
the availability of ef 
be viewed as extension of proceCl.ural law; 
~s no less crucial to the party seeking fective legal services ~ 
is the need to satisfy procedural re-
vindicate his rights than 
1 . 't Substantial dif 
as locus standi and time ~m~ s. quirements such 
. the range of legal services affecting, inevitably, t 
ferences ~n 
't based riahts will lead to the same type protection of Cowmun~ Y -
1 1 . discussed in inequality along nationa ~nes 
Harmonization in this 
fragmentation and 
lation to the "procedural challenge.,. 
possib field, however, is far more difficult, for whereas it was 
h as time limits need 
to argue that procedural requirements sue 
for national and C be, within the municipal system, identical 
cannot as a general principle be argued 
nity rights, the same 
It would be difficult 
regards the provision of legal services. 
certain legal or meta-legal service 
and undesirable to argue for 
would be denied to non-Commun 
to 
ty 
Community migrant workers which 
218 The harmonization effort would have to be there 
migrants 
fore in most cases universal. 
In those fields where the Community exercises a very fre b) 
Over individuals such as competition and direct jurisdiction 
correspondingly frequent direct 
culture and where there is a 
h European court for legal course by individuals to t e 
th procedural rules before 
there is scope for investigating e -
f s to J'ustice in mind. Issues court with the concerns o acces 
d the role of the 
as locus standi for consumer groups an 
h e already emerged 
as a supranational public attorney av . 
field219 With the expansion of Community jurisd~ 
competition fie ~ er protection the classical 
tion to environmental anu. consum 
in 'VIThich fragmented and diffuse rights and duties arise and 
81 . 
the emergence of potentially interested parties constituted on 
transnational rather than national lines, this problem is likely 
to be magnified in the future. Issues such as Communitv class 
actions widening the roles of standing to allow individuals--or 
groups of individuals--to challenge more easily directives will 
all have to be tackled as part of this new consciousness. 
c) The emergence of access to justice as a major prospective 
preoccupation goes to the very social and human credibility of 
the Community and its organs, a Community often accused of being 
concerned solely with businessmen and trade. As has been argued 
elsewhere: 
. .. By its very nature, the Community, to give but one 
example, has encouraged the transnational mobility of la-
bour and goods. In so doing, it has incurred responsibil-
ity for resolving the special problems created by these 
phenomena. If we consider the plight of the migrant work-
er in contemporary Europe, and the problews he may have in 
finding housing, claiming social security and confronting 
immigration laws, problems which are exacerbated by the 
difficulties of language, social adjustwent and family and 
educational disruption, we can appreciate that integration 
at the level of governments raises a corresponding set of 
new problems at the lowest levels in society. Likewise, 
the free movewent of goods creates its own range of prob-
lems for the consumer. It will be argued, correctly, that 
solutions to these transnational problems can best be 
found, and in some cases have been found, by the Community 
at the transnational level. Indeed, the response of the 
Community--and the Court--has been to create transnational 
rights protecting migrant workers and the like. However, 
if these rights are to become more than "paper rights", 
institutions and machinery must be created to make them 
truly accessible to those whom they were designed to pro-
tect220. 
The problem also takes on a quantitative dimension since: 
As the Community branches out into new embryonic fields 
such as Consumer Protection, Environment and Workers' Par-
ticipation, one can envisage that quantitatively the num-
ber of cases coming before national and transnational "Eu-
~ 
I 
d) 
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ropean Courts 11 , and possibly choking the system, will be 
drastically increased. Moreover, movement into new sub-
stantive areas will no doubt give rise to a new set of 
substantive rights and these would, in turn, inevitably 
increase pressure for procedural developments within in-
stitutional frameworks. The problem is not one of simply 
creating new safeguards ... important as these may be. 
Rather, the problem is essentially how to make existing 
rights effective within these new situations. One of the 
most pressing tasks, then, will be in assisting the evolu-
tion of new types of legal services, prototypes of which 
exist in several ~'lember States and towards which the CO!t!-
munity has already taken certain steps221 . 
Finally, there is an access to justice dimension which is 
unique to the supranational system. The trad.itional concerns 
access to justice are with giving increased protection to the 
dividual and his rights and with the improvement of dispute re 
lution processes in society. It will however be recorded that a 
central feature of the supranational system was the function of 
the individual as a guarantor of inter-state obligations. The 
called "all or nothing effect" depended, in part, on the ability 
of the individual to bring actions before the national courts t 
judgments of which--when applying Community law--would be bindi 
on the respective governments. In this sense improved 
way of raising the level of Community law consciousness, and gen 
erally removing obstacles to Community based actions will have 
integrational consequence of strengthening an important dimensi 
on which supranationalism partly depends. Increased access will 
not only work for individuals but for the Community system itse 
4. Normative supranationalism--tentative prospective conclusion 
The Golden Thread linking the quantitative challenge, the 
procedural challenge and the access-to-justice challenge making 
these the necessary next phase in the evolution of normative su~ 
pranationalism is the notion of effective and equal Community-w 
implementation and protection. If this analysis were concerned 
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with the prospects of both European integration and the Communi-
ty as a whole, I would have tried to point out those substantive 
areas of social and economic policy where Community action is 
needed. Supranationalism as discussed here is, hm•rever, con-
cerned with the framework and instruments within which the poli-
cies may be adopted. In this sense it precedes the concrete 
policies. The ,. constitutional" phase of normative supranation-
alism was the necessary first step in laying down the hierarchi-
cal relationships. These principles may have been sufficient in 
a period in which the common rules and principles called prima-
rily for elimination of certain .Hember State practices. In a 
period increasingly characterized by the need for positive Com-
't 1' . 222 
mun1 y po 1c1es , normative supranationalism must develop so 
that the application of these policies, within, and mostly by 
the organs of, the Member States will be equal and efficient and 
will not destroy or contradict the pr.inciples already pioneered. 
A sound normative basis will thus be a condition for the success 
of all present and future substantive policies. 
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B. 
The constitution of the new directly elected Parliament and 
the commencement of the second round of enlargement are new, po-
tentially important, factors in the decision making process of the 
Community. They may be the keys--in the medium and long term--to 
the future pattern of the decisional process. f~ purpose here 
will be limited to a brief analysis of some of the incentives and 
barriers to such change. 
1. The Directly Elected Parliament--A New nRelance"? 
on its face it would appear that the new Parliament has_a 
223 . t h' h 
ready slot in the Community decision making process l~ o ~ lC 
it may fit: initially, even if denuded of formal legislative pow-
er it could make up, by virtue of its newly acquired le~itimacy, 
for the decline of the Commission and become the proposer of pew 
cormnunautaire policies; it could, by virtue of its much stre:p.gth-
ened composition which includes leading personalities drawn from 
the national political areas, become a political match to the Eu-
ropean Council and Council of Hinisters and assert a Community 
check or Community boost to the activities of these bodies; it 
could become a new focal point for galvanizing the political will 
which is a necessary condition for any further aualitative advanc-
es in the process of integration; further, by virtue of its more 
direct and immediate link to its constituents, it could bestov-7 a 
new "legitimacy" on the entire Community apparatus and cormnence a 
new relance of Community action. It could thus fill the democracY 
deficit in both its aspects by providing at the Community level 
effective representation of national interests and by preventing 
the council from using the Community legislature as a means for 
passing measures which on the national level would be subject to 
k d t 1 Accordl'ng to this admittedly opti-various chec s an con ro s. 
mistic vision the Commission, while maintaining its formal 
tory function, ~ould--because of its need for an influential 
ally in promoting poli-e-i.es hitherto received scep-
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tically by a reluctant Council -- associate closely with the 
Parliament .. in the formulation of new programmes and measures. 
The Council on its part, whether out of democratic respect to a 
directly elected charooer, or by political need would, accord-
ing to the same vision, concede at least de facto eo-deci-
sion to the new chamber. At a later stage there could be a 
formalization of this process by actual changes in the cur-
rent de jure competence of the Parliament. Such changes, were 
they to occur,could not only suggest an arrest in the decline 
of decisional supranationalism but perhaps even a reversal 
of trend. 
Mindful of the connection between the two facet-s of 
supranationalism, this reversal would follow a certain legal 
logic of the system. It will be recorded that in its land-
mark qonstitutionalizing decisions the European Court stated 
as one justification for making the normative supranational 
leap that" ••• it must be noted that the nationals of the 
states brought together in the Community are called upon to 
cooperate in the functioning of this Community through the 
intermediary of the European Parliament ••• " 2 24 • There was, 
With respect, a measure of judicial tongue-in-cheek in that 
reasoning since in 1963 both in terms of parliamentary de-
cision making power225 and in terms of Parliament's political 
composition226 this alleged cooperation by nationals was 
extremely tenuous. And yet,given that the normative supra-
national leap was taken for a good many other reason~, it 
would be possible, even justified, to turn ~he Court's rea-
soning on its head and suggest that instead of the coopera-
tion being a justification for the development of normative 
supranationalism, that very development which in any event 
took place should be the justification of effective coopera-
tion, namely a much strengthened Parliament. The call by the 
supreme German Constitutional Court for a fully fledged 
European Parliament to which the Council of Ministers would 
be answerable, as a condition for accepting completely the 
supremacy rule; follows the same logic. 
It is beyond the scope of this analysis to suggest with 
gree of precision what shape a reconstructed Parliament-Commis-
sion-Council triangle may look like and even what steps the 
Community organs may take short of a complete overhaul of the 
institutional framework. Rather I would like to suggest some 
of the barriers which any such initiatives would have to 
overcome in granting a new role to Parliament. 
i. The fact of direct elections is the single most impor-
tant immediate factor which gives both justification and 
political power to the demands for a new institutional role 
for the Parliament. And yet it should not be overlooked that 
the pattern of voting -- especially in those Member States 
which show least enthusiasm for the Community -- was disap~ 
pointingly low even by comparison to national elections 227 . 
The claim for "legitimacy" must therefore be treated with 
caution. Probably, the next direct elections, where the nov-
elty factor will have disappeared~ will be a more telling 
fact in this respect. Furthermore, in those Member States 
where -- by and large -- the European Parliamentarians are 
distinct from national political leaders, there would appear 
to be evidence of a noticeable divide between electors and 
elected2 28 . 
ii. This divide leads in turn to a further "legitimacy" 
problem. The European Parliament may be perceived as being 
part and parcel of the Community bureaucracy. There is a 
danger of a vicious circle emerging in the delicate rela-
tionships among the Community organs on the one hand and 
the Community as a whole and the Member States on the other. 
It was suggested above that in its first phases of asserting 
its political potency Parliament is more likely to challenge 
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directly the Council of Ministers than the Commission. In its 
exercise of parliamentary budgetary competence this tendency has 
recently been illustrated229 . The Parliamentary call will often 
d . 230 be for more Co~munity policies and more Community spen 1ng 
In the present economic climate and given a growing national 
grassroot reaction to the Community, this may be a source for a 
widening of the divide between Parliament and electorate. Find-
ing the middleway between electoral credibility and institution-
al reassertion will thus be another important challenge and bar-
rier to overcome. 
iii. That the Council may resist Parliamentary resurgence seems 
obvious. This resistance does not result merely from an inher-
ent unwillingness to concede power to a different forum. Coun-
cil opposition is rooted in the very structure of the Community 
which rejected both maxirnalist and minimalist, Proudhonian and 
Hamiltonian versions of federalism231 . The emerqence of the Eu-
ropean Parliament would, according to this perception, be a dan-
gerous revival of those federal inclinations to be resisted by 
the Council. The prospect then for a formal change involving, 
say, an amendment to the Treaties is highly unlikely. In the 
foreseeable future Parliament will have to utilize its existing 
powers and political will to carve itself a meaningful policy 
making role. What is perhaps surprising is the naissance of op-
position from the Commission. Here as well the peculiar dialec-
tics of the institutional balance produce slightly bizarre if 
not entirely unexpected results. The Commission, acutely cogni-
zant of its weakening position, is not going to concede lightly 
to an assault from yet a new body, the directly elected chamber, 
even-if, the latter is concerned with the strengthening of the 
totality of the Communautaire effort. There are already signs 
232 
of such strains between Commission and Parliament . 
iv. Finally, it must be noted that Parliament itself is not the 
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cohesive Community minded body with a unitary self-perception of 
its role as is often imagined. It include factions--important 
ones--which not only resist further strengthening of supranation-
alism in its twin facets 233 but which also resist any strengthen-
ing of the role of Parliament itself234 Apart from these inter-
nal, democratically understandable, divisions there is the ques-
tion of pure functional credibility. The new Parliament--with 
its numerous members and committees, beset by different tradi-
tions, languages and priorities, struggling under a proportional-
ity principle under which each internal parliamentary organ must 
square political affiliation and national origin235--will need 
considerable time before it finds the modus operandi to balance 
the conflicting demands coming from within and without. After 
the first two years it is evident that Parliament has not yet 
settled into a groove which will enable it to realize the poten-
. 1 . h . . . 236 . 1 h f t t1a 1n erent 1n 1ts ex1stence . Certaln y, t ese ac ors are 
among the most important challenges which the Parliament will 
have to tackle if the process of reshaping decisional suprana-
tionalism is to succeed. 
2. The Second Enlarqement--The Question of Numbers 
In a useful analysis of association of states in the Canadi-
an context
237
, Soberman and Pentland draw a distinction between 
two-member associations, associations in the order of six to ten 
(Canada, EEC, Australia) and large associations in the order of 
say fifty such as the USA. The decisional consequences of this 
distinction are significant. 
b . b h . . 238 d d The two-mem er association 1s ot prom1s1ng an anger-
ous. The small number may facilitate the actual process of nego-
tiation and cooperation with less interests to square and less 
technical communication barriers to overcome. Arriving at con-
cordance may be simply shorter239 . However, in situations of 
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conflict and polarization--assuming de facto or de jure veto power 
of each of the members--deadlock may, as Soberman and Pentland 
suggest, have to be resolved by dissolution. 
In the medium-size association of which the Community of six 
or even nine and, perhaps, ten is a good example dissolution pro-
ducing polarization is less likely to occur. Unless one Merober 
state finds itself consistently in a minority of one--and the 
240 
u.K. has at times come dangerously close to this situation 
h b b 'l't of a sh1'ft of alliances and interests there is a hig pro a 1 1 y 
from one group of states to another maintaining thereby useful 
equilibria of benefits and interests. The balancing within the 
community system of the interests of large and small Hember 
states is an interesting example of t.he use of formal voting in 
an increasing number of fields, the system eliminated the possi-
bility of either all the small states or all the large states im-
241 . posing their will on each other The Luxembourg Accord Slg-
nificantly altered this structure by moving from majority voting 
to consensus decision making giving each Member State an effec-
tive veto power. In a medium-size association the alteration 
would not be lethal. Apart from the effects of, say, the preemp-
tion principle which in certain cases obliges the Member States 
to reach agreement, the very fact of a Member State finding it-
self isolated in opposition to the rest of the Community renders 
a consistent use of the veto power difficult and exceptional. 
How will the enlargement to twelve--falling between the me-
dium-size and large categories of associations--affect the deci-
sional process? In the association of fifty, the possibility of 
a single constituent veto in the decisional process would render 
any effe~tive governance simply impossible. Assuming that, in 
principle, all Member States will continue to be represented, 
242 . t 
even if with a different weighting , in all Communl Y organs, 
the shift to twelve may 
produce different results. The addition of three new South 
Mediterranean countries at a substantially different level 
of industrial development compared to most if not all other 
Member States coupled with difficult socio-agricultural 
problems is likely to make consensus decision making 
much more difficult243 . It is not improbable that the three 
new Members will find a common line on many issues. The "em-
barrassment" factor of consistent isolated vetoing may 
thus disappear. The common denomination for Community action 
will be lowered even further. It is possible to envisage 
four possible outcomes to the process. 
a. The bumbling-on possibility: Continuation of the status 
quo with an increase in the measure of disagreement and 
crisis solution by way of ad hoc measures. The pattern 
of activities of the European Council and the Council 
of Ministers would according to this scenario continue 
as it is with the same negative impact on decisional 
supranationalism; 
b. The irrelevance possibility: The clash of interests will 
become so irreconcilable that it will in practice 
produce a debilitating standstill of achievement. The 
inability to advance and to take Carrmunity decisions in the face 
new challenges will not lead necessarily to a crisis but 
to irrelevance 244 , whereby the fora and methods of de-
cision making will simply shift elsewhere; 
c. The "two (or three?) speed" Europe possibility: Accession 
might bring revival to the idea245 of a Community posing 
a different range of duties and obligations and conferring 
different rights on its Member States. The measure of dis-
unity which this will bring may make this, if a choice 
is to be made, an unattxactive idea. It is certainly 
being resisted by the Commission246 ; it will have a 
disastrous effect on normative supranationalism as well. 
d. The dialectical possibility: It is possible that the de-
cisional difficulties which a Community of twelve will 
present under the current arrangements and the dangers 
indicated in the previous three options will push the 
Member States voluntarily to remedy the decisional proc-
ess, going beyond the technical suggestions made in the 
Three Wise Men Report. This remodification may take the 
shape of a rethink of the veto power; a less recalci-
trant attitude towards the European Parliament and 
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a reappraisal of the role of the Commission in the 80's, 
and 90's. In other words, the decisional dangers present-
ed by enlargement may give the drive to a more rather 
than less supranational decision making process. Which 
one or combination of several of these possibilities will 
emerge is a matter one must simply wait and see. 
The resiliance of the Community in the past thirty 
years and its ability to survive continuous political 
and economic crises may be partially attributable 
the supranational framework and the balance achieved 
between the normative and decisional facets. If the 
states, old and new, are to progress as an effective 
community, solutions will have to be found not only to 
the acute substantive economic and political problems 
but also to the internal challenges to the Corru:nuni ty '· s 
own system --supranationalism, in both its facets. 
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FOOTNOTES 
========= 
+ This paper was prepared within the franework of the project on 
European Legal Integration and the ll..:rr.erican Federal Experience 
directed by r1. Cappelletti and sponsored by the European Uni-
versity Institute and the Ford Foundation. 
++ B.A. (Sussex); LL.B (Cantab); Diplome of the Hague Academy of 
International Law, Assistant to the Department of Law, Europe-
an University Institute, Florence. ~ J.H.H. Weiler. 
I was fortunate in having the wise counsel, advice and encour-
agenent of many colleagues and friends in the course of v.rriting this paper. 
In particular I would like to thank Professors M. Cappelletti; T. Daintith; 
F. Jacobs; E. Rehbinder; D. Sobenran as well as llfr. J. Faull and Miss ~­
Seccombe, who read the early drafts of this paper and made val-
uable comrents. Any remaining errors of fact or weaknesses of opinion are 
entirely my own. 
1. ~he Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
(hereinafter: Treaty of Paris) which launched the Co~unity 
experience was signed in Paris on April 18, 1951. Treaties 
establishing the European Economic Community (hereinafter: 
Treaty of Rome) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(hereinafter: Euratom) were signed in Rome on Harch 25, 1957. 
The Schuman Declaration of May 9th, 1950 may be regarded as 
======= =========== 
the starting point: See 5/6 ~~~£g~~~ S£~~~~~~ 3 (1980) and 
see also, 13 ~~11~~~~ ££ ~~~£g~~~ S£~~~~~~~g 1.2.1. (1980). 
But see note 36 infra. 
Given the measure of institutional integration among the 
three Communities I shall refer to the combined structure as 
the Community. 
2. The treatment here will be confined solely to the Community 
experience although other regional organizations such as the 
Council of Europe have undoubtedly played a role in European 
I I 
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integration and display certain supranational features. See, 
~.:.;r_., Drzemczewski, The Sui Generis Nature of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 29 ~~s~~~~~ 54 (1980). 
3. Greece acceded formally on January 1, 1981. The Treaty of Ac-
cession v1as signed in Athens on Hay 28, 1979. For details .of 
the conditions of accession and the main provisions in that 
Treaty, see 12 ~~11~~~~ ~£ ~~~~~~g~ S~~~~~~~~~~ 1.1.1 -.1 .1.19 
(1979). 
Spain and Portugal are candida~es for accession within this 
decade. 
4. For a useful analysis of the possible impact of, and problems 
created by, accession, see ~~ ~g~~~g~~' ~g~1~~~~~~ !~E ~~~~g~ 
(Jonathan Cape, London, 1979) esp. at 30-33. 
5. ·· One· should' not exaggerate the potential for i:m:rhediate change' ' 
in the institutional balance which the new dire6tly ~lected 
Parliament may have. For a restrained and cautious analysis 
emphasizing " . the limits to the influenc~ upon publi6 
policy of a directly elected European Parliament", see The 
Policy Implications of Direct Elections (various authors) 17 
Journal of Common Market Studies 281-349 (1979). 
======= == ====== ====== ======= 
At the same time the Parliament has already exhibited its 
constitutional aggressiveness and legal astuteness by such 
acts as rejecting the 1980 budget in toto and, in a more sub-
tle manner, voting an increased supplementary budget in 1980 
deliberately so as to use unspent surpluses in 1981 (see 16 
~~~~g~g~ ~g~1~g~~~~ Column 1 (1980). This last move has pre-
cipitated a political crisis whereby Belgium, France and Ger-
many have refused to make their full Community budgetary con-
tributions. The Commission has commenced legal proceedings 
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against the recalcitrant states. In addition, the Parliament, 
astutely using a provision in the Statute of the Court of Jus-
tice (Art. 37) has managed to intervene in Court proceedings in 
which a Council regulation (Reg. 1293/79) was contested on the 
grounds that Parliament was not consulted, contrary to Treaty requirem:mts 
relating to that class of measure. The Court upheld the Par-
liamentary contention. See Joined Cases 138 and 139/79 ~~aizena 
Gesellschaft ~· Council; Roquette Freres v. Council. Decision 
of 29 October 1980 (not yet reported). 
6. "For years the Community has been described as being in crisis. 
But v1hen crises exist permanently, merely changing their imme-
diate causes, it should be asked if they really are crises, 
that is to say exceptional conflict situations. It is rather 
more likely that the conflicts the Community has so far experi-
enced are significant of tensions inherent in the integration 
process itself". Everling, Possibilities and Limits of Europe-
an Integration, 18 Journal of Common Market Studies 217 at 217 
======= == ====== ====== ======= 
(1980). 
Whilst I accept Everling's analysis of the Community as a 
system of crises my argument is not that the present problems 
and challenges are inherently more difficult than previous 
ones, but rather that conditions for solution--such as the present 
economic climate--have worsened. 
7. Of course when assessing the Labour Party decision, allowance 
must be made for the traditional licence of Opposition parties 
out of Government. For the Debre-Foyer Bill see, Proposition 
de Loi portant retablissement de la souverainte de la Repu-
--.-. 
blique en matiere ~'energie nucleaire, No. 917, Assemblee Na-
tionale, 2eme session extraordinaire de 1978-1979. 
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8. case 232/78 Commission ~· French Republic L197~/ ~~s~~~ 2729 in 
which the judgment was given, and Joined Cases 24/80 R and 97/8 
R of 28.3.1980 Commission~· French Republic in which non-com-
pliance was established (even though the Commission failed in 
this latter case to get interim measures against France) . See 
Editorial Comments, The Mutton and Lamb Story: Isolated Inci-
dent or the Beginning of~ New Era? 17 s~~~~~ ~~~· 311 (1980). 
A case of non-compliance occurred when Italy failed 
judgment against it in Case 7/6P Commission ~· Italian Republic 
/1968/ E.C.R. 4 and thus had to be prosecuted again, Case 48/71 
- - ====== 
Commission v. Italian Republic L197~/ E.C.R. 532. 
====== 
This however was an instance of dilatoriness rather than out 
right defiance as in the Mutton Case. Even more dangerous has 
been French judicial defiance by its Conseil d'Etat which, 
from rejecting the principle of supremacy (to be discussed in-
fra), has rejected positive principles of Community law as de-
cided by the Court of Justice. See Cohn-Bendit case (December 
--
1978 D 79 J 155) . This defiance is confined to the administra-
tive branch of the judiciary. 
9. Although the term supranationalism is used cow~only in the 
erature, within the framework of Treaties establishing~----t~_h __e __ ~---­
munity it is only mentioned in the Treaty of Paris ~Article 
The term, unjustifiably, became associated too much with 
integrationalism and was dropped in the Treaty of Rome and 
atom. 
10. Robertson, Legal Problems of European Integration, 91 ~~~ 
143 (1957). 
11. ~- ~~~~£~~1~, ~~~~~~: ~~~~~~~ !~ ~~ ~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~g~~~~ 
Lane, London, 1972) at 17. 
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12. In this context I am using the term "federal" in its widest, 
most fundamental sense of sharing in governance over activities. 
Elazar usefully records the origins of the term 
... first in the biblical hebrew term brit, then the 
latin foedus (literally 'covenant'), from which the 
modern 'federal' is derived .... Elaborated by the 
Calvinists in their federal theology, the concept 
formed the basis for far more than a form of political 
organization. . . L~/he original use of the term 
deals with contractual linkages that involve power 
sharing--among individuals, among groups, ~ong 
states. This usage is more appropriate than the defi-
nition of modern federations, which represents only 
one aspect of the federal idea and one application of 
the federal principle. 
D. ~1g~g~ (ed.), ~~~~ ~~1~/~~g~~~ ~~~~ (Turtledove, Ramat Gan, 
1979) at 3. 
This overview of the federal principle is particularly impor-
tant since although the Community is, in this wide sense, a 
"federal" entity, it decidedly does not conform to the tradi-
tional notion of having (or aspiring to have) a strong important 
centre and a periphery linked thereto. 
13. The Community is new in the post-World War II period. The 19th 
century German Zollverein (Keeton, The Zollvereil'! and thE7. Common 
Market, in ~§§~2~ ~ ~~b~~~~§~~§~g§~ (eds.), ~~g!!~b ~~~ ~~9 ~b§ 
------ - ---------~----- ------- --- --- ---
S~~~~ ~g~~~~ (Stevens and Sons, London,, 1963) 1) and the Danube 
Commission (Smith, Danube, 4 Yearbook of World Affairs (1950) 
======== == ===== ====r== 
191) were two antecedents in earlier days. The term suprana-
tionalism also predates the Community. Schermers cites Einstein 
as writing to Freud in 1932 and stating "At present we are far 
from possessing any supranational organization." ~~~· g£~~~~~~~' 
~~~~~~g~~£~g1 ~~~~~~~~~~~g1 ~g~, Vol. 1 (Sijthoff, Leiden, 1972) 
at 20. It is, of course, possible to adopt an ~,_priori defini-
tion but this theoretical approach depends on a choice of criteria 
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~tdch will necessarily be subjective. Schermers prefers this 
preach adopting a useful list of such criteria but even 
then pushed to conclude that since to be "completely suprana 
al, an international organization should fulfil all Lthese cri 
ri~/ ... no such supranational organization exists." Id. at 
21. I have preferred a more inductive approach relying on the 
experience of the Community itself even if the result 
theoretically satisfying as the ~-priori method. See also, G. 
Hally, ~~;; ~~;;£g;;g~ £;£~~~~;!;~ ~~ ~;;;;~g;;~;!;~~;; ,(Lexington Books, 
Lexington, 1973) esp. at 26. 
1 4. This is perhaps my bias as a Common Law lawyer: "The 
definitions has never appealed much to lawyers because they 
aware that the concepts they employ have been rough-hewn by 
tory ano stoutly resist philosophical formulation." Pollock, 
Distinguishing Mark of Crime, 22 H.L.R. 495 (1959). 
====== 
15. ~- ~g~, ~;;~;;;;g1~~~ g~~ ~~g;;g~g;!;~£~g1 ~;;~g~~~g;!;~£~~ (University 
Illinois Press, Urbana and London, 1966). In its historical 
thesis parts Hay's study offers the most exhaustive treatment 
different studies of supranationalism especially in its legal 
institutional aspects. ~1oreover, the analytical parts of the 
study have retained their value despite the passage of years~ 
Even today the book repays careful study. I have relied on 
for the brief survey of different treatments in the present 
respective analysis. 
1q. Id. chapter 2 and appendices pp. 77-78. 
17. See, e.g. ~~;;~gg;;~, ~~;; ~£~~;!;~£~ ~~ ;!;~;; !~~~~~~~g1 ~~ !~;!;;;~g~­
;!;~£~g1 ~g~ (Munksgaard, Copenhagen, 1962) (International Law 
preach) and Kohnstamm, The European Coal and Steel Community 
RDC 1 (1956 II) and comments thereon in ~g~, id. 
99. 
1 8 • 11 an unsatisfying shrug" Hay, Federal Jurisdiction of the 
Common Market Court 12 Am. J. Corn. L. (1963) at 39. Cf. !:!~Y id. 
at 44 and note 106. 
19. Thus in a leading current treatment Schermers has no hesitation 
in including the Community in his general treatise on interna-
tional institutional law but he is careful to distinguish be-
tween supranational and intergovernmental organizations. See 
~~~;;;;~~~~' note 13 supra at 19-24. 
20. ~-S!· Robertson, note 10 supra, at 145. 
21. In their comprehensive collection of texts, cases and readings, 
Stein, Hay and Waelbroeck suggest six phases (The Phase of En-
thusiasm 1945-1949; Towards Integration by Sectors 1950-1955; 
Relaunching 1955-1958; A Split--A Bridge--Political "Relaunch-
ing"? 1958-1963; Crisis-Consolidation 1963-1968; Enlargement 
1969-
~g~ g~~ !~~;!;~;!;~;!;~£~~ ~~ ~~;;~g;;~;!;~~;; (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapo-
lis, New York, 1956) pp. 10-13. Greilsammer, suggesting that 
"/t/here is virtually no process that can be delimited in time 
as well as the process of European integration" opts for four 
periods 1946-1950; 1950-1958; 1958-1969; 1969- Greilsarrnner, 
Theorizing European Integration in its Four Periods 2 The Jeru-
=== ==== 
salem Journal of International Relations 129 (1976) (for the 
===== ======= == ============= ========= 
evaluation of the different periods see text to notes 25-26 in-
fra). Dahrendorf suggests three less well-defined phases: The 
Founding Fathers--Monnet et al. (approx. 50s); Founding sons--
Hallstein et al. (approx. 60s), and the present generation. R. 
~g~;;~~~~;;£, ~ ~~~;;~ ~~;;£g~? (E.U.I., Florence, 1979--Jean Monnet 
Lecture). 
Pryce also suggests six phases although different from Stein 
et al.: 1950-51; 1952-54; 1955-57 (Relance); 1958-62 (New Corn-
i ' 
I 
I 
' 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
munities in Action); 1963-69 (Conflict, Crisis and Stagnation); 
1969-72 (Second Relance). R. Pryce, The Politics of Eg~ ~~E2Ee, 
= ==-== === ======== == --- -----~ 
~~ ~~~~~~~~ (Butterworths, London, 1973) at 1-27. 
Stagnation of supranationalism rhowever, does not irrpl y staCJ11ation of substan .. 
ti ve integration. 
Greilsammer id. 
At 141 (emphasis added). 
The major decision on direct effect was given on February 5, 
1963. On supremacy on July 15th, 1964. For more detailed dis-
cussion see text to note 41 infra. 
26. The period of De Gaulle in which UK accession was rejected 
French "veto'1) and in which the Luxembourg crisis occurred 
ated a general overhaul of theories of integration. See ~-~· 
Haas, The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America 5 
g~~~~~1 ~~ ~~~~~ ~~~~~~ g~~~~~~ 315 (1967) at 325-331. 
An extremely pessimistic assessment in the mid-sixties--with 
statements such as "Supranational structures may not survive 
to 1966"--is that of Heathcote, The Crisis of European Supr 
tionality, 5 Journal of Common Market Studies 140 (1966). 
======= == ====== ====== ======= 
analysis, strongly influenced by the political crises of that 
period, is instructive in illustrating the cleavage. Heathcote 
at 141, adopts an ~ priori definition of supranationality according to 
which "a supranational organisation is one which (a) by~asses 
the nation-state's authority and deals directly with the citi-
zens; which (b) takes over some functions traditionally exer-
cised by the nation-state; and (c) is in the position to origi 
nate decisions not only on behalf of the state but despite it" 
It is interesting that there is almost exclusive con-
centration on the decision making actors and processes and o 
oblique--if at all--reference to the validity and status of t 
decisions adopted vis-a-vis national measures. The latter are 
101. 
the traditional preoccupations of the lawyer. And yet without 
this latter type of validity the power to originate measures 
despite Member State opposition would have precarious value if 
these measures could subsequently be overturned by a Member 
State change of mind; Heathcote's first criterion,--the author-
ity to deal directly with the individual--introduced already by 
the Treaty of Paris (a power which, incidentally, remained 
largely intact during the Sixties) has been overtaken by devel-
opments in the Sixties by decisions on self-executing measures 
and supremacy which are rrore revolutionary, have greater imPact and could 
far better serve as distinguishing criteria for supranational 
organizations. 
Puchala, although dealing with the wider concept of interna-
tional integration captures with his 'blind men and elephant' 
metaphor neatly, if somewhat acidly, the problem of the disci-
plinary cleavage: "Each blind man {touchin~/ a different 
part of the large animal, and each /concludin~/ that the ele-
phant {international integratio~/ had the appearance of the 
part he touched." Puchala, Of Blind ~en, Elephants and Inter-
national Integration, 10 g~~~~~1 ~~ S~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~ 267 
(1972) at 267. His own sophisticated "concordance system" 
strangely pays little attention to the constitutional develop-
ments which could have been regarded as important supportive 
elements, at 277-284 but see at 269-271. 
27. Note 26 supra, and Greilsammer, note 21 supra at 142-146. 
28. "Constitutionalization" implies a combined and circular :?rocess 
by which the Treaties were interpreted by techniques associated 
with constitutional documents rather than multipartite treaties 
and in which the Treaties both as cause and effect assumed the 
'higher law"attributes of a constitution. For an interesting 
102. 
discussion ~ ~~£~~~~~~~~ ££ ~~~ l~~~ ~~~~g1 ~~~~~~~ ~! ~~~ 
~~~~~g~ ~£~~~~~ ~£ ~~~~~~g~~£~g1 ~~~ 166-197 (1978). 
The German Federal Constitutional Court has actually said 
that "The European Economic Community Treaty is, as it were, 
the constitution of this Community" Federal Constitutional 
Court, First Chamber, Decision of October 18, 1967; {1962/ AWD 
477-78; {196~/ ~~~~gg~~~~~ 134-37 cited by Stein in Proceed-
======= 
~~~~ id. 168. 
29. See, e.g., Pescatore, note 32 infra. 
- - ========= 
30. ~g~, note 15 supra~ o. 69. 
31. ~g~' id., p. 31 ff. 
32. Cf. ~· ~~~~g~~~~' ~~~ ~g~ ~~ ~~~~~~g~~£~ (Sijthoff, Leiden, 
19 7 4) . In his excellent study Judge Pescatore tends to play down 
the institutional crises (e.g. pp. 11-19) such as the Luxem-
bourg accord. Consequently his treatment gives a general im-
pression of continuing progressive evolution. 
33. I prefer "decisional" to "institutional" since the former con-
veys the need to look at the actual processes and not merely 
at formal functions. Far more so~histicated tools and frame-
works have been offered for the analysis of federal models in 
general and the Community model in particular. Elazar's se-
ries of matrixes is a recent most valuable contribution as re-
gards the former (see, Elazar, The Role of Federalism in Po-
litical Integration, in D.J. Elazar (ed.) Federalism and Po-
= = ====== ========== === --
1~~~~g1 ~~~~~~g~~~~ (Turtledove, Ramat Gan, 1979) 13). See 
~lso ~-~· ~~~~~' ~~~~~g1~~~: ~~~g~~, ~g~~g~~~~~ ~~g~~£~~gg~~ 
(Little, Brown, Boston, 1964). Lindberg's model has become 
something of a classic as regards the latter (see Lindberg, 
The European Community as a Political System: Notes Toward 
the Construction of a Hodel 5 ~~~~~g1 ££ S~~£~ ~g~~~~ ~~~~~~; 
103. 
359 (1967) and~· ~~~~~~~~ g ~· ~~~~~~~~1~, ~~~~E~'~ ~~~!9-~e 
------ - ----- -= 
~~1~~~: ~g~~~~~~ ~£ S~g~g~ ~~ ~~~ ~~~~g~g~ s~~~~~~~ (Prentice 
Hall, New Jersey, 1970). The limited framework here is probably 
sufficient for our purposes since it concentrates on suprana-
tionalism in its instrumental facet and not on the uses to which 
it has been put in the evolvement of substantive policies and 
the evaluation thereof. The limited framework will also enable 
me, in the confines of this essay, to flesh it out so that it 
does not remain too abstract. 
A fully fledged decisional analysis would have to take separate-
ly each single policy, determine the factors, forces and actions 
relevant thereto and attempt to trace the decision making proc-
ess. Puchala, note 26 supra at 278, has constructed such a mod-
el as regards the agricultural sector. Inevitably, this cannot 
be done here and I have to content myself with a general Commu-
nity analysis even if at a great sacrifice of sophistication. 
It is submitted however that the general Community analysis re-
mains relevant to individual sectors. Naturally I do not claim 
that this framework can achieve precise measurement. It fails, 
thus, one of Deutsch's crucial tests for "theoretically power-
ful" models. (See !S· Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (The 
--- - ======= === ====== == ========== 
Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1963) Ch. 1 .) Still, as pro-
viding a rough measuring instrument enabling at least the indi-
cations of trends it may be considered adequate for this retro-
spective analysis. Detailed frameworks such as Puchala's, carry 
the danger of remaining too theoretical and incapable of practi-
cal applications. Thus, in ~. ~g11~~~, N. ~'lallace & Webb (eds), 
= ======= = ==== === 
~~1~~~ ~~~~~~ !~ !~~ ~~~~E~~~ ~~~~~!!Y (John Wiley and Sons, 
-- --- -------- ---------
London, 1976) which analyzes policy making in specific fields, 
the authors, including Puchala himself, had to adopt less de-
tailed frameworks. 
35. 
104. 
Lindberg, in his "scale of decision locus", note 33 supra at 356 ... 
357, offers a more comprehensive breakdown along a ". con tin ... 
uum ranging from decisions taken entirely or almost entirely in 
the Community system" to "decisions taken entirely by the nation-
al systems individually". The full range consists of: 
1 . 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Decisions . . . 
Decisions . 
tern 
taken entirely in the /E~/ sys!e~ 
taken almost entirely in the LE~/ sys-
Decisions . . . taken predominantly in the European Com-
munity system, but the nation states play a significant 
role in decision making 
Decisions are taken about equally in the European Commu-
nity system and the nation-states 
Decisions are taken predominantly by the nation states, 
but the European Community system plays a significant 
role in decision making 
Decisions are taken almost entirely by the nation 
Decisions are taken entirely by the nation states indi-
vidually 
This model is less useful for us, since its main purpose is to 
determine in relation to a list of substantive functions which 
political systems fulfil, the degree to which the Community is 
"substituting" the Member States. In legal terms its purpose 
would be to delineate substantive Community jurisdiction and 
petence. It does not focus on the decision making process itsel 
and thus its utility here may be questioned. Since, if there is 
a measure of truth in the assessment ". that the Council 
Minister~/ is in fact no longer a Community Institution, but 
a sort of clearing house for national interests, which by using 
the principle of unanimity prevents any further progress of the 
European Community" (Aigner, Member of the European Parliament, 
Debates of the European Parliarrent 10.7.80 p. 290 (English version)), then 
105. 
terms of the instrumental means of supranationalism, the fact 
that the locus of decision falls within Lindberg's first catego-
ry, becomes less meaningful. Lindberg's "scale of peripherali-
zation-centralization" (drawing on Riker) and of systems and 
subsystems goes some way towards this decisional analysis but 
is, again, too detailed to be of use in a limited survey. 
Articles 14, 15 ESC. Interestingly, the Schuman Declaration 
======= =========== 
merely states: 'Par la mise en commun de productions de base et 
l'institution i'~ Haute Autorite nouvelle, dont les decisions 
lieront la France,l'Allemagne .. " indicating decisions bind-
ing on states and not in states. The formal supranational leap 
was effected by the actual Treaty framers who gave the High Au-
thority power to adopt measures directly effective in the legal 
order of the Member States. 
Decisions binding on members may be taken by UN organs see, 
~·2·, S~g~~~~ ~~ ~' eh. VII. For Commentary, see~· Dinstein, 
~g~~~gg~~£gg1 ~g~, vol. 5 pp. 53-57 (Schocken, Tel-Aviv, 1979). 
Robertson, note 10 supra. 
See note 13 supra. Religious law--especially where given exclu-
sive jurisdiction in, say, family matters--may beregarded as su-
pranational in this sense. The Catholic Church and Jewish Rab-
binate could therefore be regarded in old and modern times as 
being supranational. 
The literature on the doctrine is immense. For a lucid up-to-
date statement see,~-~·,~· ~Y~!! ~g3 ~- D~shwood, The Substan-
- ----- --- - =-====== === ======= 
~~~~ ~g~ ~~ ~~~ ~~S eh. 3 (Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1980). 
For wider studies, see, Waelbroeck, Effets Internes des Obliga-
tions Imposees a l'Etat, in Miscellanea W J 
- - ---- =========== =·=· 
Ganshof Van Der 
======= === ---
~~~~~~~' Tome Deuxieme (Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1972) 573. Bebr, 
Directly Applicable Provisions of Community Law: The Develop-
106. 
ment of~ Community Concept 19 ~~~~~~~~ 257 (1970). 
41. Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administraitie der 
Belastingen L196}/ E.C.R. 1. 
====== 
42. The main operative part of the judgment is so well known as to 
render citation almost superfluous. For the benefit of non-Eu-
ropeans, the following are the key elements in the judgment: 
The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish 
a Common Market, the functioning of which is of direct 
concern to interested parties in the Community, implies 
that this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely 
creates mutual obligations between the contracting 
states. This view is confirmed by the preamble to the 
Treaty which refers not only to Governments but to peo-
ples. It is also confirmed more specifically by the 
establishment of institutions endowed with sovereign 
rights, the exercise of which affects Member States and 
also their citizens. Furthermore, it must be noted 
that the nationals of the States brought together in 
the Community are called upon to cooperate in the func-
tioning of this Community through the intermediary of 
the European Parliament and the Economic and Social 
Committee. . . This confirms that the States have ac-
knowledged that Community law has an authority which 
can be invoked by their nationals before those courts 
and tribunals. . . The conclusion to be drawn from 
this is that the Community constitutes a new legal or-
der of international law for the benefit of which the 
states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit 
within limited fields, and the subjects of which com-
prise not only Member States but also their nationals 
at 12. 
43. In Case 127/73 Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SABAJI1 L197~/ 
~~~~~~51, the European Court held that Articles 85 and 86 
were capable of bestowing rights and duties on individuals 
se. It should be noted however that these Treaty articles 
selves involved actions of individuals. Cf. case 
de Geus L196~/ ~~~~~~ 45 in which this development is alreadY 
anticipated. 
The doctrine was evolved. further in a subsequent case 
107. 
which was concerned with the general prin-
ciple embodied in Article 7 EEC (non discrimination on grounds 
of nationality) and which, unlike SAB~f,did not necessarily in-
volve individuals. Even the Commission--usually very integra-
tionalist minded--doubted whether this Treaty principle should 
be given "horizontal effect''. The court took the radical posi-
tion and held that the Treaty coulil indeed bestowrights and duties on 
individuals inter se. Case 36/74 Walrave and Koch v. Associa-
tion ~nion Cycliste Internationale L197!/ ~~~~~~ 1405. 
Case 43/75 Defrenne v. Sabena L197i/ E.C.R. 455. 
See also 
====== 
It is not proposed to discuss here the well known distinction 
between direct applicability and direct effect. (See, ~·.9.·, 
Winter, Direct Applicability and Direct Effect, Two Distinct 
and Different Concepts in Community Law, 9 C.M.L. Rev. 425 
====== === 
(1972). The extension of direct effect to directives was re-
markable. Whereas Regulations by virtue of Article 189 EEC are 
directly applicable and thus inevitably, if self executing, 
produce--by analogy to the reasoning of the Court in relation 
to Treaty provisions--automatic direct effect, directives are 
only binding as to the result but leave to the national author-
ities the choice of form and method. It may then have been 
thought that they could not produce direct effect. See Joseph 
Aim and Societe SPAD v. ~'Administration des douanes L197~/ 
~~~~~~~~ 901. The Court of Justice, in a step-by-step ap-
proach, has applied the doctrine even though subject to possi-
ble different structural conditions (note 155 infra) to direc-
tives as well. Cases signalling this evolution are: Case 9/70 
Franz Grad ~· Finanzamt Traunstein L197Q/ ~~~~~~ 825 (direct 
effect of a time limit in a directive-~verticar' effect); case 
41/74 Van Duyn v. Home Office L197!/ ~~~~~~ 1337 (direct effect 
of a substantive provision of a directive but one which elabo-
108. 
rated a substantive right bestowed by the Treaty--"vertical" ef-
fect); Case 51/76 Verbond van Nederlandese Ondernemngen v. In-
spector der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen L1972/ ~~~~~~ 113 (di-
rect effect of a substantive provision of directive concerning 
an obligation not directly bestowed by the Treaty and against 
which a national implementing measure was reviewed--"vertical" 
effect. Cf. Case 21/78 Delkvist /1978/ E.C.R. 2327). On the 
-- - - ====== 
possible extension of "horizontal" direct effect to directives 
see Easson, Can Directives Impose Obligations on Individuals 4 
~~~~ ~~~· 67 (1979). But see now Case 148/78 Ratti L197~/ 
E.C.R. 1629 (Advocate General submissions) and Usher, The Di-
====== 
rect Effect of Directives E.L. Rev. 268 (1979); see also 
Timmermans, note 155 infra. 
45. Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL L196!/ E.C.P. 585. With the sa~e reser-
====== 
vations expressed in note 42 supra the following are the main 
operative elements in the judgment: 
By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC 
Treaty has created its own legal system which, on the en-
try into force of the Treaty, became an integral part of 
the legal system of the Member States and which their 
courts are bound to apply. By creating a Community of 
unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own 
personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of rep-
resentation on the international plane and, more particu-
larly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sover-
eignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the 
Community, the !'~ember States have limited their sovereign 
rights, albeit within limited fields, anc have thus cre-
ated a body of law which binds both their nationals and 
themselves. The integration into the laws of each Hember 
State of provisions which derive from the Community, and 
more generally, the terms and the spirit of the Treaty, 
make it impossible for the States, as a corollary, to ac-
cord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measur~ 
over a legal system accepted by them on a basis of reci-
109. 
procity. Such a measure cannot therefore be inconsistent 
with that legal system. The executive force of Community 
law cannot vary from one State to another in deference to 
subsequent domestic laws without jeopardizing the attain-
ment of the objectives of the Treaty set out in article 
5(2) and giving rise to the discrimination prohibited by 
article 7 
at 593-594. 
Another important instance of constitutional interpretation oc-
curred in Case 38/69 Commission ~· Italian Republic L197Q/ 
E.C.R. 56 in relation to Community "secondary" legislation. 
====== 
The Italian Government argued that a certain internal Community 
measure (pursuant to Article 235 EEC and accelerating the real-
ization of the Common Market) had a contract basis as between 
the Member States and constituted an international agreement to 
which even reservations could be made. The Court gave short 
shrift to the argument upholding the institutional rather than 
contractual nature of Community measures. 
Here, of course, we have one of the most intractable problems 
of Community law. The treaty of Rome is in many of its provi-
sions fairly general lending itself to expansive teleological 
interpretation by the Court. This coupled with certain "elas-
tic" clauses (e.g. Art. 235 EEC) gives a wide measure of lati-
tude to the policy making organs to extend the boundaries of 
Community competence. Often this meets with national resist-
ance. Cf. Close, Harmonisation of Laws: Use or Abuse of the 
Powers under the EEC Treaty? 3 E.L. Rev. 461 (1978). 
--- --- ==== === 
Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm and Others v. Bundekartellamt L196_2/ 
E.C.R. 1. 
====== 
49. 
50. 
51 . 
. 52. 
Case 106/77 Italian Finance Administration v. Si~menthal L197~/ 
E.C.R. 629. 
====== 
Recital 3 of Judgment. 
Recitals 7-9 of Judgment. 
See, ~· ~~~~1~ (ed.) ~1 ~~~~~~£ ~~1 ~~~~~~£ S£~~~~~~~~£ e ~ 
~~~~ ~~~1~~~~ (Franco Angeli, Milano, 1978). 
53. The case involved, naturally, a combination of direct effect 
supremacy issues. In relation to supremacy the court stated in 
Recitals 17-23 that 
In accordance with the principle of precedence of Commu-
nity law, the relationship between provisions of the 
Treaty and directly applicable measures of the institu-
tions on the one hand and the national law of the Member 
States on the other is such that those provisions and 
measures not only by their entry into force render auto-
matically inapplicable any conflicting provision of cur-
rent national law but--in so far as they are an integral 
part of, and take precedence in, the legal order applica-
ble in the territory of each of the Member States--also 
preclude the valid adoption of new national legislative 
measures to the extent to which they ~~uld be incompati-
ble with Community Provisions. . . L~/very national 
court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Com-
munity law in its entirety and protect rights which the 
latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set 
aside any provisions of national law which may conflict 
with it, whether prior or subsequent to the Community 
rule. Accordingly any provision of ~ national legal sys-
tem and any legislative, administrative or judicial prac-
tice which might impair the effectiveness of Community 
law by withholding.from the national court having juris-
diction to apply such law the power to do everything nec-
essary at the moment of its application to set aside na-
lll. 
tional legislative provisions which might prevent Communi-
ty rules from having full force and effect are inco~pati­
ble with ~e requir~ts which are the very essence of 
c;-mm~y law. This would be the case in the event of a 
conflict between a provision of a Community law and a sub-
sequent national law if the solution of the conflict were 
to be reserved for an authority with a discretion of its 
own, other than the court called upon to apply Community 
law, even if such an impediment to the full effectiveness 
of Community law were only temporary 
(emphasis supplied) . 
The internal Italian provision decided upon by the Italian 
Constitutional Court whereby any question of conflict between 
Community law and national law was a constitutional issue, res-
olution of which must be decided by that Constitutional Court 
itself by an internal reference from the lower court can be 
criticized in terms of the general efficiency of the Italian 
legal system. It resembles the Amparo institution which led to 
the "degeneration" of an important constitutional mechanism in 
the Mexican legal order. See ~· S~~~~ll~~~~~ ~~g~~~gl ~~~~~~ 
~~ ~~~ S£~~~~~£~~~~ ~£~1~ (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1971) 
at 20-21. 
From the point of view of European law, the European Court's 
decision contains a possible ambiguity since, as seen, its rul-
ing is applicable to a " ... national court having jurisdic-
tion to apply such law " It could possibly be argued 
that in cases of conflict the lower national court, by virtue 
of the decision of the Italian Constitutional Court, has no 
such jurisdiction. Since the jurisdictional competence of 
courts is usually a matter for the national legal order, the 
Court of Justice could not interfere in this matter any more 
than if Gertain lower courts were denied jurisdiction over mat-
ters involving a large sum of money even if concerned with Com-
112. 
munity law. 
54. See generally, Bebr, How supreme is Community ~aw in the Nation-
al Courts?, 11 C. H. L. Rev. 4 7 9 ( 19 7 4) 3. 
====== 
In the Netherlands and Luxemburg, having a monist system 
which acknowledges the supremacy of treaty law, acceptance was 
not difficult. (See Articles 63 and 65, 66, 67 of the Dutch 
Constitution.) Application of the European Court's decision in, 
say, Van Gend en Loos was in fact non-problematic. As regards 
Luxemburg see Pescatore, Preeminence des traites sur la loi in-
terne selon la jurisprudence Luxembourgeoise /1951/ ~~~~~~1 ~~~ 
Tribunaux 455. 
========= 
In Belgium, the situation was constitutionally ambiguous un-
til the landmark decision of the Belgian Cour de Cassation in 
the Le Ski Case L_197~/ C.M.L.R. 373 in which the Belgian 
======== 
Court adopted the most full-blooded version of supremacy as re-
quired by the European Court. The question of a Community pro-
vision coming into direct conflict with norms of the Belgian 
(and French) Constitution arose in a recent decision--Case 
149/79 Commission~· Kingdom of Belgium decision of 17.12.80 
(not yet reported). The Court remitted the case back to the 
parties for further clarification before final resolution. The 
Belgian government in its pleading did not deny that Community 
rules override national rules but suggested that in interpreting 
the meaning of a term in the Treaty (in that case "public serv-
ice") the Court should use an approximation of the Constitution-
al law of the Member States as an interpretative aid. 
55. This was the case in Germany and Italy. See, German Handelsge-
sellschaft case /1974/ 2 C.M.L.R. 551 (Decisions of 29.5.1974 
---- - - ======== 
BVerfG 37; 271); and Italian Frontini Case L_197j_/ 2 c . .H. L. E.=. 
=======--
386. For a useful discussion on the imolications of 
this case see H.G. Judicial Protection in 
======== ========== == 
113. 
~~~ ~~~£g~g~ ~£~~~~~~~~ (Kluwer, Deventer, 1979) pp. 92-97. 
Note that the German Federal Constitutional Court was concerned 
with constitutional safeguards as regards legislation; the su-
premacy challenge was only indirect. Otherwise, the German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court has fully accepted the supremacy of 
Community law even over subsequent national law--see, German 
LUtticke Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht decision of June 9, 1971 
L_1971/ Avm, 418-420 (BVerfG 31; 145). The German Federal Con-
stitutional Court also rejected the possibility of Verfassungs-
beschwerde (constitutional complaints) as against acts of the 
Community authorities limiting this type of recourse to action 
by German public authorities. See German Constitutional Riq.hts 
case, Bundesverfassungsgericht decision of October 18, 1967 
L_196]/ AV.7D 477 (BVerfG 22; 293); and note in 5 ~;:;~;:;~,; ~~~- 483 
(1967-68). 
56. However, unless the German Federal Constitutional Court modifies 
its own position (cf. now BVerfG decision of July 25, 1979, 15 
~~~£gg~~~~~ 68 (1980)) the conflict cannot be fully resolved un-
til the Community has a written bill of rights which corresponds 
to the guarantees of the German basic law. Another condition 
which the German Federal Constitutional Court imposed, which has 
been only partially fulfilled is the evidence of a democratical-
ly legitimated parliament directly elected by general suffrage 
(which now exists) which possesses legislative po~rers and to 
which the Community organs empowered to leqislate ~ fully re-
sponsible on a political level. Whereas the demand for a codi-
fied bill of rights may not be unreasonable the latter demand is 
fanciful and fails to appreciate the political nature and polit-
ical potential of the Community. It is doubtful whether the 
Parliament will ever get full legislative powers. It can hope 
perhaps for eo-decision powers. The Council of Ministers will 
not--unless fundamental changes in the Treaty take place--be 
subject to political control by the European Parliament. 
I 
I 
i 
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114. 
57. The French Cour de Cassation (Chambre ~ixte) accepted the doe-
trine in the celebrated case Administration des Douanes v. La 
Soci§t§ "Caf§s Jacques Vabre" ~-~· (1975) 2 C.M.L.R. 336. 
======== 
The 
Court relied however on Article 55 of the French Constitution 
which gives Treaty provisions (subject to certain conditions, 
esp. reciprocity) a force higher than French statutes even 
those subsequently enacted. This reasoning does not amount 
then to full acceptance of the shift in the Grundnorm. It 
should be noted that Procureur G§n§ral Touffait had explicitly 
requested, in relation to Article 55 of the French Constitu-
tion, that the Court should not " ... mention it and instead 
base /it~/ reasoning on the very nature of the legal order in-
stituted by the Rome Treaty". This the Court inplicitly declined to do. 
In a subsequent case, however, Clave Bouhaten ~ Kempis v. 
Geldolf (Husband and Wife) /1976/ 2 C.M.L.R. 152 the 3rd civil 
- - ======== 
chamber arguably " ... did take the plunge ... " (March-
Hunnings, Rival Constitutional Courts: A Comment on Case 106/ 
77 15 C.M.L. Rev. 483 at 484 (1978)) and accepted the doctrine 
====== === 
without reference to Article 55 of the French Constitution. 
The Criminal Chamber of the Cour de Cassation has also been 
Community minded--see, Administration des Constitutions Indi-
rects v. Ramel _L1971/ s~~~~~~~ 357; and Republic v. Von Saldern 
et al. noted in 10 C.M.L. Rev. 223 (1971). By contrast the 
====== === 
Conseil d'Etat has, basing itself on somewhat antiquated no-
tions of separation of powers,refused the acceptance of the su-
premacy principle as applied to parliarrenta:ry "loi". The doctrine would 
probably apply to qovernrrental decrees (cf. Cohn-BenClit case, note R supr~ · 
- -
See Syndicat G§ncral des Fabricants de Serroules _L197Q/ C.H.L.R. 395. ~ 
also, Syndicat cles inporteurs de veterrents et produi ts artisanaux C. E. 
28.5.1979, and C.E. 22 Oct. 1979 _L198Q/ A.J.D.l\. 95. On the ambiguous posi 
tion of the French Constitutional Court, see, Mitchell, What Happened ,!£ 
Constitution on 1st January 1973? 2 Canbrian ~· Rev 69 (1980) at 78-79 and 
notes therein. See also Kovar & . S:i.Iron, Sorre Reflections on the Decision 
the French Constitutional Council of Decerrber 30, 1976 14 C.M.L. Rev. 525 
(1977) . 
115. 
58. Ireland actually introduced a Constitutional amendment--see Ar-
ticle 29, Third amendment to Irish Constitution of 1972. And 
see Temple-Lang, Legal and Constitutional Implications for Ire-
land of Adhesion to the EEC Treaty 9 s~~~~~ ~~~· 167 (1972). 
The Danish Constitution already had a provision of delegation of 
powers to international organizations (Article 20 of Danish Con-
stitutions). But see, Due and Gulman Constitutional Implica-
tions of the Danish Accession to the European Communities 9 
C.M.L. Rev. 456 (1972) which analyzes the debate as to the pos-
====== === 
sibility of Danish compliance with the principle of supremacy 
especially vis-~-vis constitutional provisions (at 265-267). 
There have been very few references from Denmark to the European 
Court so that the matter is still judicially open. See 
Rasmussen, Survey of Cases 4 E.L. Rev. 484 (1979). 
---
59. See~-~· Wintertorn, The British Grundnorm: Parliamentary Su-
premacy Re-examined 92 ~~~~~~ 591 (1976). 
note 57 supra. 
But see Mitchell, 
60. In the most recent case--indeed the first case in which the 
House itself made a reference under Article 177--R. v. Henn & 
Darby _L198Q/ 2 W.L.R. 597. Their Lordships did not raise di-
====== 
rectly the question of supremacy. They did however accept the 
duty to refer and by implication the binding authority of Commu-
nity law as interpreted by the European Court. Note however 
that in any event this case was not concerned with British leg-
islation subsequent to Community law. See, Faull, Moralit§ ~­
blique et libre circulation des produits 4 C.D.E. 446 (1980); 
====== 
Weiler, Europornography, First Reference of the House of Lords 
to the ECJ, 4 4 M. L. R. 91 ( 1 9 81 ) . 
====== 
61. Lord Denning's judicial statements have so oscillated that they 
must now be taken with a measure of caution. In Blackburn v. 
116. 
A.G. L197_!/ 2 ~11 ~,;~,; 1380 he said "We have all been brought up 
to believe that in legal theory, one Parliament cannot bind an-
other and that no Act (such as the European Communities Act, 
Sections 2 and 3 of which sought to entrench the supremacy of 
Cowmunity law) is irreversible ... if Parliament should Ltry 
and revoke the Ac!/, then I say we will consider that event when 
it happens" at 1382. It would seem thus that he was acknowledg-
ing that the sovereignty principle was a legal rule which could 
be changed by the Courts and that in the case of the Treaty of 
Rome that possibility of Grundnorm shift was not excluded. By 
contrast in Felixstowe Dock and Railway eo. v. British Transport 
Docks Board L197!i_/ 2 £;,;~,;~,;~,; 655 he stated "It seems to me that 
once a Bill is passed by Parliament and becomes a statute, that 
will dispose of all this discussion about the Treaty. These 
courts will then have to abide by the Statute without regard to 
the Treaty at all" at 664. In two subsequent cases his state-
ments became more subtle. Thus in Shields v. E. Coomes 
(Holdings) Ltd. /197~/ 1 All E.R. 456 he made the following hy-
=== ==== 
pothesis: 
"Suppose that the Parliament of the United Kingdo~ were 
to pass a statute inconsiste~t with article 119 Ldeal-
ing with equal pay for wome~/ by giving the right to 
equal pay only to unmarried women. I should have 
thought that a married woman could bring an action in 
the High Court to enforce the right to equal pay given 
to her by article 119 ... If Lthe court~/ should find 
any ambiguity in the ~t~tutes or any inconsistency with 
Community law, then Li!/ should resolve it by giving 
the primacy to Community law" 
at p. 460. This may look like acceptance of supremacy but 
Denning was careful to choose a situation of inconsistency rath-
er than conflict that is where the Corrmunity provision extended Brit-
ish law and did not directly conflict with it. But in Macarthys 
Ltd. v. Smith L1972/ 3 ~~~ ~~E~ 325, he stated that filling the 
117. 
gaps in this way was on the assumption 
" ... that our Parliament, whenever it passes legisla-
tion, intends to fulfil its obligations under the Trea-
ty. If the time should come when our Parliament delib-
erately passes an Act with the intention of repudiating 
the Treaty or any provision in it or intentionally of 
acting inconsistently with it and says so in express 
terms then I should have thought that it would be the 
duty of our courts to follow the statute of our Parlia-
ment. I do not however envisage any such situation. 
As I said in Blackburn v. Attorney-General: 'But if 
Parliament should do so, then I say we will consider 
that event when it happens.' Unless there is such an 
intentional and express repudiation of the Treaty, it 
is our duty to give priority to the Treaty" 
(at 329). With which Lawton LJ agreed. 
The third judge (who subsequently retra,cted sarrewhat: cf. L1980/ 3 v7.L.R. 
at 949) said "If the terms of the Treaty are adjudged Luxembourg 
to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Equal Pay Act 
1970, European law will prevail over that municipal legisla-
tion." I.e. adopting a supremacy position although not in rela-
tion to subsequent legislation. This position does not change 
in the light of the final decision of the court of appeal once 
the reference from Luxembourg was received. Denning said then 
/1980/ 3 W.L.R. 947 at 949: 
- - ====== 
and: 
" ... It is important now to declare--and it must be 
made plain--that the provisions of article 119 of the 
E.E.C. Treaty take priority over anything in our Eng~ 
lish statute on equal pay which is inconsistent with 
article 119. That priority is given by our own law. 
It is given by the European Communities Act 1972 it-
self. Community law is now part of our law: and, 
whenever there is any inconsistency, Community law has 
priority. It is not supplanting English law. It is 
part of our law which overrides any other part which is 
inconsistent with it" 
" . . Community law is part of our law by our own 
statute, the European Communities Act 1972. In apply-
ing it, we should regard it in the same way as if we 
118. 
found an inconsistency between two English Acts of Pc;~.r­
liament: and the court had to decide which had to be 
given priority." 
Denning could be read to be saying that the 1972 
European Communities Act is no more nor less than any other Act 
and that supremacy in this case is simply a result of it being 
enacted after the 1970 Equal Pay Act which was at issue 
several provisions were reenacted in the 1975 Act). 
A leading authority summarizes the situation thus: 
(1) While the European Communities Act 1972 remains 
in force, existing directly applicable or effective 
Community law will be the lav1 in the United Kingdom, 
notwithstanding any legislation prior to the Act which 
is inconsistent with such directly applicable or effec-
tive law; 
(2) Community law which is not directly applicable or 
effective will have no force in the United Kingdom un-
til given effect by Act of Parliament or by order or 
regulation enacted pursuant to powers given by. the Eu-
ropean Communities Act 1972 or other legislation; 
(3) Directly applicable or effective Community law 
will take effect in the United King~om, notwithstanding 
any legislation prior to the 1972 LEuropean Communi-
tie~/ Act, or even after the Act but prior to the com-
ing into effect of the Community rule; 
(4) A subsequent Act of Parliament which is inconsist-
ent with a rule of Community law will be read subject 
to the rule of construction ins. 2(4) so that Communi-
ty law can take effect notwithstanding the Act, at any 
rate if the Court is satisfied that the subsequent in-
consistent legislation is not intended, expressly_or 
impliedly, to reeeal s. 2(1) or (4) of the 1972 LEuro-
pean Communitie~/ Act; but 
(5) Any subsequent Act of Parliament inconsistent with 
the European Communities Act 1972, including one which 
repeals the latter in whole or in part and one which is 
intended to limit the application of s. 2(1) and (4), 
will be giv~n effect by the United Kingdom courts. 
London, 1980) at pp. 25-26. But see note 153 infra. 
62. Note 41 supra at p. 7 (emphasis supplied). 
63. Id. at pp. 23-24. 
64. I am most indebted here to a paper delivered by Professor H. 
119. 
Waelbroeck at a conference held in Bellagio, Italy in July 1979 
entitled Community Preemption and Related Problems on which I 
have relied extensively in this part. See also Q.~. ~~~~~~~~ 
et al. (eds.) Leadina Cases and Materials on the Law of the Eu-
== == ======~ ===== === ========= == === === -- === == 
~~~~g~ S~~~~~~~~~~ (Kluwer, Deventer, 1977 at 88-95). 
65. Thereby indirectly prohibiting national legislation even if com-
patible in fields already occupied by a regulation. See e.~. 
Case 34/73 Variola L1971/ E.C.R. 990; Case 39/72 Commission v. 
====== 
6 6. 
67. 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
72. 
7 3. 
Italy /1973/ E.C.R. 113. 
- - ====== 
Case 22/70 Commission~· Council L1971/ E.C.R. 273. 
====== 
Recitals 17-18 of Judgment p. 274. 
Opinion 1/75 /1975/ E.C.R. 1335. 
- - ======= 
Id. at 1363. Note however that unlike ERTA where there \vere no 
Treaty provisions at all for external competence in relation to 
transport, the OECD case fell within the commercial policy which 
has such provisions. 
Joined cases 3, 4 and 6/76, Cornelis Kramer and Others L197~/ 
E.C.R. 1279. 
====== 
Id. Recitals 35-39 of Judgment, p. 1310. 
Treaty of Accession, Article 102. 
Opinion 1/78 /197~/ E.C.R. 2871. 
====== 
74. Reci'tals 57-60 of Judgment, pp. 2917-2918. 
7 5. 
120. 
76. Hanson, Methods of Interpretation--~ Critical Assessment of Re-
sults, in Judicial and Academic Conference (Court of Justice of 
the European Communities, Luxemburg, 1976) II. 
77. Id. at II 9; II 25 and II 26. Hansen's critique is not merely 
one of judicial policy and judicial role. In analyzing Van 
Gend en Loos he makes an acute distinction between cateaorical 
------ ---- ----~-~-------
Treaty provisions which prescribe a particular consequence 
(e.g. Article 85(2)) and imperative provisions which only pre-
scribe a legal obligation. He maintains that the doctrine of 
direct effect as expounded in Van Gend en Loos and its progeny 
renders--unjustifiably and illegitimately--all imperative pro-
visions categorical. 
78. Id. II 25. 
79. Whereby, unlike the classical condominium in which there is 
joint national control over territory, here there is joint con-
trol over economic and other sectors of public policy. 
80. Cf. Tenth Amendment to US Constitution. 
81. On the doctrines of implied and additional powers, see,~-~·, 
~~j!~~~g' note 64 supra at 1-9. See also, Schwartz, Article 
235 and law-making powers in the European Community 27 I.C.L~Q~ 
--- --- -- --- =====---
614 (1978) and Mitchell, note 55 supra at 73. The discussion 
on implied or additional powers is crucial in fully fledged 
federations like Canada and the U.S.A. since two sets of ~­
pendent power centres exist. The issue becomes much less acute 
in the Community since it is the governments of the Hember 
States which control the legislative process of the Community. 
Expanding the Community jurisdiction will thus ipso facto be bY 
the consent of at least a majority of Member States. Whether 
121. 
expansion can be done throuqh elastic clauses such as Article 
235 or necessitates actual Treaty amendment is less important 
except in as much as individuals may contest the expansion of 
Community jurisdiction undertaken bv their aovernment or in 
- _, 
ERTA situations where the Member States prefer to proceed out-
side the Community framework. 
82. See,~-~., Case 22/70 note 64 supra (external relations-trans-
port policy); Opinion 1/78, note 71 supra (Common Commercial 
Policy); Case 91/79 Commission~· Italian Republic L198Q/ 
~~~~~~ 1099 (Environmental Policy). See also Gijlstra; 
Schwartz note 81 supra. 
83. There is scope to examine the reasons for the totally differ-
ent approach of, say, the Privy Council--for many years the 
"supreme court" of Canada--in relation to the Canadian Consti-
tution. Was the restrictive Privy Council approach a result 
of a reasoned assessment of the different character of the Ca-
nadian federation, or perhaps the result of the British law 
lords' inability to adapt to the different snirit of federal 
jurisprudence? 
84. Cf. ~g~ note 15 supra at 69 ff. Hitchell, note 57 su9ra at 
73. Objections can of course be raised by national parlia-
ments (see,~-~·, Debate in British House of Lords, July 4, 
1978; see also note 8 supra) and national pressure groups, al-
though the former have, at least in theory, the ability to 
control their ministers' activity at the Community level. The 
"political estoppel" imposed on the Governments of the Member 
States in challenging jurisdictional expansion was recently 
illustrated in Case 91/79 note 82 supra. In that case Italy 
was defending its non-implementation of Directive 73/404/EEC 
which formed part of the Community's Environmental Programme. 
122. 
Although serious doubts exist as regards the Community's com-
petence to operate in this field--(cf. ~· ~~g£~~~ & ~· ggg~~, 
Comeetence of the Euroee~~ g~~~~!EY fQE ~~~!EQ~~~~E~! ~~1~£~ 
===-====== == === ====-=-- --------- --- -------------
(1977) at 24-31)--and therefore about the legality of the Di-
rective in question, the Italian Government which partook in 
evolving the Policy (see, OJ C 12 20.12.1973) could not but 
state in that case that it did " •. not intend to raise the 
question whether the directive is valid in the light of the 
fact that combating pollution is not one of the tasks entrust-
ed to the Community by the Treaty" at 1103. 
85. This is not to imply the Court's role is a-political. In fact 
the Court has shown a high degree of political acumen in, say, 
changing course on the question of human rights. It has also 
played an important role in demarcating the division of compe-
tences between different European Community Institutions. 
See,~-~·, Case 22/70 Commission v. Council L1971/ ~~~~~~ 263 
and joined cases 138/79; 139/79 note 5 supra. 
123. 
86. This interplay is well illustrated in ~· gggg~, ~· ~~~11~~, ~· 
~~~~£~g' ~- ~~g~~~, ~~£~g~~~ ~g~~~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~~~g~g~ ~£~~~~~~~g 
(N.Y. -London, Prager Publishers Inc., 1977) and~· ~g11g£~, ~· 
~g11g£~' C. ~~~~ (eds.) note 34 supra. 
87. See Wallace et al. note 34 supra, esp. Webb, Introduction: Var-
--- ======= -- --
iations on a Theoretical Theme, 1-31; and H. Wallace, National 
Bulls in the Community China Shop: The Role of National Govern-
ments in Community Policy Making, 33-68. 
88. This inevitable feature of Community life is not only a sharp 
reminder that it is still a Europe of Nations but also places 
quality restraints on the body. "The need to cater for the dif-
fering interests of the Hember States and to accept national 
quotas, however unofficial, ... inhibits the development of an 
elite corps of policy-makers ... "H. Wallace, id., at 53. 
89. Article 10, Merger Treaty. 
90. It should be noted that apart from a few limited fields such as 
competition, the actual practical execution of many Community 
policies is in the hands of the Nember States acting as agents 
for the Community. 
91. See ~~g£g~~~~, note 32 supra at 7-10. 
92. See Article 149, EEC. 
93. There is here an apparent paradox. To the extent that, say, the 
governments of all ten Me!T'.ber States agree on a "desired" course 
of action, how can this be said to be contrary to the Community 
spirit? For do not the governments represent the .JI1ember States 
which together are the ColT'munity? True as this may be, the 
124. 
originating Treaties still remain the main normative basis for 
Community evolution. To the extent that the governments consid-
er disregarding the Treaty objectives (without formally amending 
it) they may legitimately be characterized as acting contrary to 
the Community spirit. 
94. There is a certain terminological confusion regarding "second-
ary" legislation. Regulations and Directives are often referred 
to as secondary legislation. The better view, it is submitted, 
is to regard them as primary legislation. For if we view the 
Treaty as being the Constitution of the European Communities, the 
legislation thereunder, by analogy to national systems,would be 
primary. Perhaps the power of legislation entrusted to the Corn-
mission under enabling measures of the Council may be charac-
terized as "secondary". 
95. A recent study giving a realistic appreciation of the institu-
tional balance is ~· ~~~~g, ~~~~~ g~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~ ~~~~~~ (Euro-
potentials Press, London, 1980); see also~~~~~, note 86 supra. 
96. Term borrowed from Mar~and note 4 supra. 
===-==== 
97. The following remarks by a leading commentator are instructive 
in this context. " L~/11 Hember States have organised 
their policy-making in such a way as to promote their own na-
tional interests. These efforts to keep the formation and 
implementation of Community rules under national control are 
sustained by the fact that the organs of the European Communi-
ties still lack a democratic legitimation of their own ... 
date, the control of European policy through national parlia-
ments is at any rate comparably weak and is at most exerted via 
detour that is through the control of governments." 
Control of the National Parliaments of the Nine over Europea~ 
Affairs in~· ~~~~~~~ (ed.) ~~~1~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~1 ~~~~ ~~~~~~g 
125. 
~~1~~~ (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, Germantown, 
1980) at 147. 
98. In fact a different type of democracy deficit emerged whereby 
the executive branch of the governments of the Member States 
able to pursue policies which, perhaps, would be more open to 
challenge if conducted "at home". s R B 1 ee ogers & o ton, The True 
99. Cf. Case 1/58 Friedrich Stork & Co. v. High Authority of the Eu-
ropean Coal and Steel Community L195~/ E.C.R. 17. 
====== 
100. See Cappelletti, The Mighty Problem of Judicial Review and the 
Contribution of Comparative Analysis, ~~~~ 1 (1979). On recent 
developments of human rights and the Community legal order see, 
Economides and Weiler, Accession of the Communities to the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights: Commission 1'1emorandum 42 
~~~~~~ 683 (1979). See also, case 44/79 Liselotte Hauer v. Land 
Rheinland-Pfalz L197~/ ECR 3727. 
---
See H. Wallace, note 87 supra, at 53. 
See,~-~.,~~~~~~~~~~~£~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~g presented by the Com-
mittee of Three to the European Council (Council of the European 
Communities, Luxembourg, 1980) hereinafter J:~~~~ ~~~~Men ~~g~~~ 
pp. 49-53. 
On this effect of COREPER the Three Wise Hen commented that the 
Commission" ... should not, as so often happens now, be drawn 
into 
edly 
negotiating with Lnational experts, etc~/ to find a suppos-
acceptable form of the Lpolicy/ measure". They also corn-
mented that "{~./he Commission must frame its proposals in a more 
independent manner". Three w· 1' 
===== -=~~ ~~~ ~~~~~~ p. 54. 
126. 
104. ~~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~at, e.g., 53 and oassim. 
105. For texts and brief commentary see conference de presse du Presi-
dent de Gaulle, September 9, 1965; Dichiarazione del Consiglio 
dei Ministri delle CEE, Bruxelles, Oct. 26, 1965; Communique de 
presse sur les accords de Luxembourg, 29 janvier 1966. All in R. 
~~~~~~ ~· ~1~~~, 1'~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ 411-422 (Padova, Cedam, 
1970). See also~-~·~· ~~~~~~~' ~· ¥~~1~~~~-~~~ ~~~~~~~, ~~~~~­
~~~~~~~ ~~ ~~~ ~~~ ~£ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ (London, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1973) at 143-146. 
106. ~-~· the procedure in the Agricultural Management Committees. 
See text to note 114 infra. 
107. ~-~· Article 126 EEC--"/T/he Council, after receiving the opinion 
of the Commission ... , may ... unanimously determine what new 
tasks may be entrusted to the ,LEuropean Social Fun£!/·" 
108. !·~· where the Treaty provides for a qualified majority in Coun-
cil a small number of states can veto a decision. 
109. See, O.J. 71, 4.11.1961; O.J. L 326, 29.12.1969. In relation to 
agreements based on article 238 EEC which does not provide for a 
consultative Committee, the Council set u9 a group of national 
observers who "constitute . . . more than token representation, 
although less than active intervention". Bot, Negotiating Commu-
nity Agreements: 
(1970). 
Procedure and Practice, C.M.L. Rev. 286 at 294 
====== === 
110. Among commentators there is no dispute about the decline 
in the Commission role although opinions differ about the ap-
praisal of the phenomenon. Costanis, The Treaty-making power £i 
the European Economic Community: The persoective of a Decade 5 
C.M.L. Rev. 421 (1967-8), Alting von Geseau The external repr~-
====== === 
127. 
sentation of plural interest, 5 Journal of Common Market Studies 
======= == ====== ====== ======= 
426 (1967) and Leopold, External Relations power of the EEC in 
theory and practice ~~~~~~~~ 54 esp. at 59-62 (1977) tend to be 
more critical of this development. Bot, id, offers a more bal-
anced approach maintaining that the exigencies of international 
relations and their conduct make this development largely inevi-
table. 
111. Costanis, id. p. 435. 
112. Id., p. 434 (emphasis added). But see Bot, note 109 supra at 
309-310. For an amusing account of the technical obstacles 
which this negotiating pattern produces, see w. Field, The Euro-
--- = ===== === ==== 
~~~~ ~~~~~~~~ ~~ ~~~1~ ~£~g~~~ (Alfred Publishing, Washington, 
1976) at 105. 
1 13. See g~ne~all.y Weiler, The European Parliament and Foreign Af-
fairs: External Relations of the EEC in Cassese note 97, supra, 
======= 
1 14. 
at 151. 
See ~~;;~~~1 ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~, Supplement 2/80 Bull. 
E.C. (Commission of the European Communities, Luxemburg 1980) at 
18-19. 
115. Id.at22. 
116. The Court of Justice affirmed the legality of Nanagement Commit-
tees and even seemed to approve their political role. In a case 
before the Court it was argued first that since execution of 
policies involved legislative functions it should have been left 
entirely in the hands of the Council. The Court first acknowl-
edged the distinction: "according /with/ the legal concepts 
recognized in all Member States, between ... measures directly 
based on the Treaty itself and derived law intended to ensure 
128. 
their implementation. It cannot Lthe Court conclude~/ therefore 
be a requirement that all the details of the regulation concern-
ing the Common Agricultural Policy be drawn up by the Coun-
cil. " An alternative argument was that the " ... Manage-
ment Committee procedure ... constituted an interference in 
the Commission's right of decision, to such an extent as to put 
in issue the independence of that institution. Further the in-
terposition between the Council and the Commission of a body 
which is not provided for by the Treaty is alleged to have the 
effect of distorting the relationships between the institutions 
and the exercise of the right of decision." The Court's reply 
was that the Management Committee procedure was a legitimate ex-
ercise by the Council of its power under Article 155 to stipu-
late conditions under which it would delegate power. Thus per 
the Court: "Without distorting the Cormnuni ty structure and the 
institutional balance, the Management Committee machinery ena-' 
bles the'Council to delegate to the Commission an implementing 
power of appreciable scope, subject to its power to take the de-
cision itself if necessary." Case 25/70 Einfuhr- und Vorrats-
stelle v. Koster L197Q/ II E.C.R. 1161 at 1170-1171; Recitals 3-
====== 
10 of Judgment. 
117. Accord- Doe 115, 1968-69 at 30.9.68 of European Parliament and 
Resolution of 3.10.68 O.J. C 108 p. 37. 
118. See generally ~~~~~~g1~ ~~ ~£~~~ ~£ ~~~ ~~~~~~~~~ ~£ ~~~ ~~­
~£~~gg ~£~~~~~~~~ g~~ J~~ g~~~~£~~~ ~~~£~~ ~g~~ g~ ~~~ ~~~~~~~ 
££ ~~~ ~£~~~~~£g ~~ g~ Jg~~g~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ ~£~~ y~~~~ ~~~ ~~g~£­
~g~~~~~ ££ ~~· ~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~g (Commission of the European Com-
munities, Brussels, 1979). 
119. A recent event has been the intervention in January 
ish Prime Minister with the President of the Commission as re-
129. 
regards the portfolio of one of the British Commissioners. 
120. The so-called "mixed agreement". See Kapteyn & Verloren van 
Themaat note 105supra at 351 ff. 
121. ~~~~£~~1~ note 11 supra. 
122. Id.at10. 
1 23. Case 48/71 Commission~· Italian Republic /197~/ ~~£~~~ 532; case 
48/69 Commission v. I.C.I. Ltd. L197~/ ~~~~~~ 649. 
124. ~~~~£~~1~ note 11 supra at p. 17. 
1 25. See notes 7-8 supra. 
126. Akehurst, Withdrawal from International Organizations, 32 Current 
======= 
127. The leading authority on withdrawal generally is Feinberg, 39 
~~~~~~~~~~ 189 (1963) on whom Akehurst draws. 
128. Akehurst id. at 151. A view shared even by" ... international 
lawyers from Communist countries, which normally argue that there 
is an implied right of withdrawal from international organiza-
tions" Id. This accords of course with the European Court of 
Justice view. See, Case 128/78, Commission v. U.K. {1972( E.C.R. 
====== 
419 esp. at 429. 
129. Id. 
1 30. E~~£~ 1 note 21 infra at 55. Since the Travaux of the Treaties of 
Pari~ and Rome have not been released it is difficult to see how 
Pryce can be so assertive in his submission. 
------------------------------- -- ---
130. 
1 31 . Id. 
1 32. "Alliance Politics" is the refinement of the "bag of sticky mar-
bles" concept. See ~· ~~£~~~~1~, ~~~£~~g~ £~~~~~g~~£~ ~~ ~~~ 
~~~ ~~~E~ ~~9 ~!~!~~~!~~ ~! ~11~g~~~ ~£1~~~~~ (The 
--- ----- --- -------~~- --
Second Phase: 
======= ===== 
University of Essex -Noel Buxton Lecture, 1974). 
133. See Feinberg, and Akehurst, notes 127, 126 supra and examples 
therein. Indeed, in the few cp.ses cited "withdrawal" was subse-,. 
quently construed as "suspended membership". 
134. And see generally,~-~·~~~~~~ ~£1~~~~g1 £~~~~~g~~£~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~­
dence (Sijthoff, Leyden, 1969). 
===== 
135. See, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff 
in Tehran (United States·of America v. Irari) l198Q/ I.C.J; (19 
====== 
I.L.M. 555 (1980)). 
====== 
1 3 6 • See ~. Sg~g~11~~~~, ~~~~~~g1 ~~~~~~ ~~ ~~~ S£~~~~g£~g~~ ~£~1~: ·· 
(Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1971) esp. Ch. 4; and Cappelletti, 
Giustizia Costituzionale Soprannazionale, 23 ~~~~~~g ~~ ~~~~~~£. 
g~£~~~~~g1~ 1 ( 1 9 7 8 ) • 
137. On the system of juridical review generally, see~-~· the erudite 
treatment by Schermers note 55 supra; ~· ~~~.!.!.!~ Brovm & F.G. 
========= - ------- ===== = - -
Jacobs, The Court of Justice of ~~~ ~~E~E~.§.~ g~~~~!~!~.§ (Sweet 
====== === ===== == ======= == --- -------- -----------
Maxwell, London, 1977). ~· yg~~~~~g~~~~ g ~· ~g~g~' S£~~~~~~~~~ 
Communautaire (Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1977). Naturally my treat-
============= 
ment here will only sketch the bare limbs of the complex system. 
1 38. See, Schermers id. § 53 - § 144 (pp. 31-80). 
========= 
1 39. In this context one may record the words of Justice o.w. Holmes: 
"I do not think the us vmuld come to an end if we lost our power 
131. 
to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would 
be impended if we could not make that declaration as to the laws 
of the several States." Collet d L 1 p 295 296 (N y c e ega apers - .. , 
Peter Smith, Reprint 1952). 
140. ~.g. Articles 173, 175, 184, 215 EEC. 
141. Cf. Stein & Vining, Citizen Access to Judicial Reviev,r of Admin-
istrative Action in ~ Transnational and Federal Context, in F. 
~g~£~~~ ~~~£~~g~ ~g~ g~~ the Individual (North-Holland, Amster-
========== 
dam, 1 9 7 6 ) 11 3 . 
142. ~.g. Articles 169, 170 EEC. 
143. Thus the Commission has apparently decided not to bring an ac-
tion against France in the wake of the decision of the Conseil 
d'Etat in the Cohn-Bendit case, note 8 supra, although a clear 
violation had taken place (see, Isaac, L'affaire Cohn-Bendit 15 
S~~ 265, 1979). The Commission may fear that bringing an action 
under Article 169 EEC might give the impression of interfering 
with the independence of the French judiciary. This attitude, 
if it is the basis of the Commission's reluctance, is, it is 
submitted, unconvincing. The major part of the jurisprudence on 
the European Convention on Human Rights is dependent on the ex-
haustion of local remedies which implies, ipso facto, the sub-
jection of judicial decisions to scrutiny by the organs of that 
Convention. The same would apply mutatis mutandis to "169 ac-
tions" based on wrong decisions taken by Hember States' final 
appeal courts. 
See Cow~ission observations in Case 144/77 Commission v. Italian 
Republic L_197~/ E.C.R. 1307 and see text to note 163 infra. 
====== --- ---
Id. 
; 3 2. 
146. See note 8 supra. 
147. Jacobs, When to Refer to the European Court, 90 ~~~~~~ 486 {1974) 
at p. 486. 
148. See text to note 212 infra. 
149. The substantive review grounds for legality under Art. 173 EEC 
and validity under 177 are largely similar although certain 
slight differences exist. See ~~~~,;;~~,;;~ note 55 supra at § 371 
(pp . 2 1 0- 2 11 ) . 
The breadth of the remedy is also different. Under 177 which 
k . l'nter-court procedure the individual's is, strictly spea lng, an 
· 1' 't d In addition since the right of arguing his case lS more lml e . 
time limit for annulment under 173 will have passed it would be 
strange if ex tunc effect could be given to the 177 reference un-
less specifically indicated by the Court of Justice. Cf. Bebr, 
Remedies for Breach of Community Law, Community Report to 9th 
congress of FIDE (FIDE & Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1980) at 10.5-
10.6. See note 151 infra. 
150. case 61/79 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Denkavit 
Italiana Judgment of Court of 27.3.80 (not yet reported) Recital 
12 of Judgment. 
151. Rasmussen, Why is Article 173 Interpreted Against Private Plain-
tiffs? 5 E.L. Rev. 112 at 115 (1980). 
==== === 
' h · l'f correct, l'llustrates another subtle ev-Rasmussen s t esls, 
olutionary trend in the very system of judicial Review. It is 
and dis-not proposed to discuss here all the various advantages 
advantages that each limb of the system entails. It has ~-~· 
· · al been justifiably pointed out that the 177 procedure for judlCl 
review of Member State actions does not allow the Member States 
133. 
sufficient facilities (by comparison to 169-170 EEC pro-
cedures) to defend their position before the Europe-
an Court. See, U.K. House of Lords Select Co~mittee on the Euro-
--- = = ===== == ===== ====== ========= == === ----
g~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~ (~~z~-~£ ~~~~~ ~~ ~~,;;~~ ~~ ~~g~,;;~, HHSO). See 
ggnerally, Rasmussen, id. and comprehensive bibliography cited in 
note 6 therein. 
152. Wisconsin~· Constantineau, ~££ ~~~~ ~~~~ ~~~ (1971). 
153. There are two elements in this cooperation between the 
European Court and national courts. First, the national 
courts must show a willingness to make references. The pattern 
is checkered. In 1979 the following references were made: Bel-
gium: 6 from the Cour de Cassation, 7 from courts of first in-
stance or of appeal; Denmark: 1 from a court of first instance; 
France: 2 from the Cour de Cassation, 2 from the Conseil d'Etat, 
14 from courts of first instance or of appeal; Federal Republic 
of Germany: 2 from the Bundesgerichtshof, 1 from the Bundesver-
waltungsgericht, 9 from the Bundesfinanzhof, 5 from the Bundes-
sozialgericht, 16 from courts of first instance or of appeal; 
Ireland: 1 from the High Court, 1 from the Chuirt Chuarda; Ita-
lY= 7 from the Corte di Cassazione, 12 from courts of 
first instance or of appeal; Luxembourg: 1 from a court of first 
instance; Netherlands: 1 from the Hoge Raad, 1 from the Centrale 
Raad van Beroep, 3 from the College van Beroep voor het 
Bedrijfsleven, 1 from the Tariefcommissie, 5 from courts of first 
instance or of appeal; United Kingdom: 1 from the House of 
Lords, 1 from the Court of Appeal, 6 from lower courts. For a 
useful attempt at analyzing the different pattern of references, 
see Mortelmans, Observations in the Cases Governed by Article 177 
of the EEC Treaty: 
(19,79). 
Procedure and Practice 16 C.H.L. Rev. 557 
====== === 
Secondly, once the case is remitted back to the national court 
the latter must construe the case--where discretion is given--in 
134. 
a manner consistent with and truthful to the European Court's 
ruling. The English Court of Appeal (on receipt of the European 
Court's judgment in Santillo note 147 infra, R. ~· The Home Sec-
retary, ex parte Santillo, The Times, 23 December 1980) "presid-
ed over with the pertinacious idiosyncracy" of Lord Denning HR 
illustrated how, if it ". approves of a rule of English law, 
no amount of EEC law will deflect /it/ from giving the former 
priority". European Legal Movement Shows Signs of Strain Finan-
===== 
cial Times 22.12.1980 at p. 16. 
==== ===== 
1S4. Article 189 EEC. 
1SS. The Court has been consistent in its enumeration of the condi-
tions for determining the direct effect of a measure: in gener-
al it must impose a precise obligation which does not necessi-
tate an implementing measure and which leaves no discretionary 
power to the Member States. (As regards the direct effect of 
directives one must ascertain, in addition, " ... v1hether the 
nature, general scheme and wording of the provision in question 
are capable of having direct effects". Case 41/74 note 44 supra 
at 13S6 (per Hayras A.G.)). 
There is a conflict in the Court as to whether these two 
tests are cumulative or mutually exclusive. Cf. Case 131/79 R. 
~· Home Secretary ex parte Santillo Judgment of 22.S.1980 (not 
yet reported); Case 148/78, note 44 supra; and Case 88/79 Mini-
stere Public~· Grunert Judgment of 12.6.80 (not yet reported). 
See discussion in Usher, Direct effect of directives: dotting 
the • I l s . . ., S E.L. Rev. 470 (1980) at 472-473; and see also, 
==== === ----
Timmermans, Directives: Their Effect within the National Legal 
----- ------ ------ --- --=--
Systems, 16 C.M.L. Rev. S33 (1979). 
====== === 
1S6. See Case 148/78 id. Usher, id. Timmermans id. 
13S. 
1 s 7. ~-.9:· Article 1 21 EEC. 
1S 8. E!·.9:· Article 87 EEC. 
1S 9. E!·.9:· Article 43 (2) EEC. 
1 60. Article 1 00 EEC. 
161. Article 1SS EEC (emphasis supplied). 
1 62. And see als~, ~~~~~~~~~' note SS supra at §§ 439-441 (pp. 2S2-
2S4) . 
163. Pryce, note 21 supr~, p.S9. 
1 64. 
1 6S. 
1 66. 
Question 4S3/79--Debates of the European Parliament 10.3.80 at 
24 (English version) . 
On this problem in general see Cappelletti, The Doctrine of 
Stare Decisis and the Civil Law: ~ Fundamental Difference--or 
no Difference at All?, in~· ~~~~~~~~~' ~- Q~Q~~!g, ~- ~§tz 
(eds.) ~~~~~~~~~£~ £~~ ~£~~g~ ~~~~~~~~ (;.c~;~-~~~r,-Tu~~::en, 
1981) 381, esp. at 383-387 and references therein. Cf. 
Rasmussen, note 1S1 supra. 
The Commission, it is submitted, qua prosecuting authority is 
entitled to use discretion when deciding on prosecutions pro-
vided it is based on consideration of the proper administration 
of justice and the interest of seeing that, per Article 1SS 
EEC, the law is applied. There is, hJ1,.:ever, a danger that this discre-
tion may be swayed by pure national or political expediency. 
See ~·.9:·, Case S1/76 Federation of Dutch Undertakings v. In-
spector of Customs and Excise L1972/ 1 E.C.R. 113 and see 
====== 
136. 
Duffy, EEC Directives, Judicial Control of National Implernenta-
tion, 41 H.L.R. 219 (1978). 
======= 
168. Since not all legal systems provide for a "preemptive" declara-
tory challenge of legislation. 
169. Even if the disputed provision is not penal, entering into any 
legal obligat1ons on · a bas1's of a law subsequently to be de-
clared invalid may be economically harmful. 
1 70. In Ireland, for example, Finbarr Murphy observes that "[~/n .a ntDillJer 
its Reports the Oireachtas Joint Committee has pointed to the 
'bl hl'ndrances to access to remedies in con-existence of poss1 e 
· 1 It has observed that Irish imple-nection with Cowmun1ty aw. 
menting measures frequently do not cite the Community basis for 
the measures in question". Finbarr Murphy, Rerredies for Breach of COir.-
munity Law, Irish Report to Ninth FIDE Congress. 
and Maxwell, London 1980) 5.12-5.13. 
(FIDE--Sweet 
171. In costa, van Gend en Loos and their progeny the Court always 
relied on the uniformity requirement introduced by l'rticle 177 
as a ground in the decisions. See notes 42 and 45 supra. 
172. Case 44/79 note 100 suora. 
1 73. Recital 14 of Judgment p. 2744. 
174. Case 14/68 note 48 supra, Recital 6 of Judgment. 
1 75. f th t L17_7-/ J·urisdiction is to ensure the Viz. "the purpose o a 
uniform interpretation and application of Community law, and in 
h · · whl'ch have direct effect, through the particular t e prov1s1ons 
national courts." Joined Cases 66, 127 and 128/79 Amministra-
zione delle Finanze v. Meridionale Industria Salumi ~·£·!·, 
137. 
Judgment of 27.3.80 (not yet reported) (emphasis supplied). 
1 76. 
"At an early stage in his legal education the student encounters 
the Latin maxim Ubi jus ibi remedium . . . Lt~/ which the real-
ist replies: Ubi remedium ibi jus.i• F.H. Lawson, Remedies in 
= = ====== ======== --~~~1~~~ ~g~ (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1972) at 14. 
£ggg~11~~~~, note 1 36 supra ,is equally emphatic: "All of this 
hearkens back to the old truth that a right without an adequate 
remedy is no right at all" at 78-79. 
177. The Court on numerous occasions has indicated that "the general 
principle of equality ... is one of the fundamental principles 
of Community law. The principle requires that similar situa-
tions shall not be treated differently unless the differentia-
tion is objectively justified." Joined Cases 103, 1~?/77 Royal 
Scholten-Honig ~- Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce 
L197~/ ~~£~~~ 2037 Recitals 26-27 of Judgment. See also joined 
cases 117/76 and 16/77 Ruckdeschel v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg- St. 
Annen /1971/ ~~£~~~ 1753 at 1769. And~ generally Schermers, 
========= note 55 supra, §§ 89-94 (pp. 52-54). 
178. See generally, ~-~· ~~~g~~, Handbook of the Law of Federal 
- - ------ ======== == === === == ======= £~~~~~ (West Publishing, St. Paul, 1976) at~·~· 195-196. 
179. Salumi, note 175 supra Recital 9 of Judgment (emphasis added). 
1 80. 
On the general question of the retroactive and prospective na-
ture of judicial review, ~ ~- ~~EE~~~~~~~ ~ ~· ~o~e~, Comeara-
- ----------- - - -=-=- ===-=== ~~~~ £~~~~~~~~~~~g1 ~~~ (Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1979) at 
98-112. 
See_Lagrange A.G. submissions in Joined Cases 28, 29 and 30/62, 
Da Costa v. Nederlandse Belastingadrninistratie L1961J ~~£~~~ 31 
at 41. See also for an oblique reference by the Court itself 
138. 
Case 29/68 Milchkontor ~- Hauptzollamt Saarbrucken L196~/ ~~s~~~ 
165, Recital 2 of Judgment. For a general discussion on the is• 
sue of Inter partes v. Erga omnes decisions, see S~~~~11~~~~ ~ 
s~~~~' id. at 96-98. 
181. French Raffaele Case, Court of Appeals, Paris decision of 
13.11.70, Gazzette du Palais, 1971, J. p. 206. Cited and trans-
lated in~~~~~~~~~, note 55 supra, § 618 (p. 354); and see also 
Schermers, id. § 619 for a survey of attitudes of other Courts. 
182. Case 51/74, Hulst v. Produktschap Voor Siergewassen L1972/ 
E.C.R. 79. 
====== 
1 83. ~~~~~~~~~ note 55 supra, note 1 55 p. 355. 
184. case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Sabena L197~/ ~~s~~~ 455. 
185. Salumi, note 175 supra Recital 10 of Judgment Denkavit, note 150 
supra Recital 18 of Judgment. In Defrenne the Court was obvi-
ously swayed by the enormous economic impact a fully fledged ex 
tunc, erga omnes decision would have brought about. 
186. Id. and cf. Bebr note 149 supra. 
187. Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz ~· Landwirtschaftskammer fur das 
Saarland /1976/ E.C.R. 1980, hereinafter Rewe. Case 45/76 Comet 
- - ====== ----
- -
~· Produktshap voor Sleugewassen L197~/ ~~s~~~ 2043. For a 
sharp analysis see Bebr id. 
188. Denkavit, Salumi, notes 150, 175 supra; and Case 68/79 Hans ~ 
v. Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs L198Q/ ~~s~~~ 501; in a 
slightly different context see Case 130/79 Express Dairy Food v. 
Intervention Board for Agricultural Produce. And see Hartley, 
The Effects in National Law of the European Court 5 E.L. Rev. 
--- -- --- ----~--- ----- ==== === 
139. 
366 (1980). See also, Case 826/79 Am:ministrazione delle Finanze 
dello Stato v. M2diterranea Inpt>rtazione, decision of July 10, 1980 (not yet 
reported) and Case 265/78 Fer.werda v. Produktschap Voor Vee en Vlees ;1980/ 
E.C.R. 617. - . -- -- - --- - ·-
189. Case 39/73 Rewe-Zentralfinanz v. Landwirtschaftskammer Westfalen-
Lippe /1973/ E.C.R. 1039. 
- - ====== 
190. Article 13(1) EEC. Regulation 159/66 EEC, J o 192 (25.10.1966). 
1 91. See Article 58 Verwal tungsgerichtsordnung. 
192. Recital 3 of Judgment, Rewe, note 187 supra. 
193. The Court at that time, it is submitted, was hardly cognizant of 
the profound nature of the problem. In subsequent cases the lac-
onism was substituted by more detailed analysis and a greater ap-
preciation of the policy conundrums. The Court even came to ex-
press its regret at the situation. See note 210 infra. 
194. Recital 5 of Judgment. 
195. An expression extending to all "the conditions under which 
Lclaim~/ may arise, the requirements for lodging an action, peri-
ods of prescription and awards of interest" Bebr, note 149 supra 
at 104. 
196. Commission submissions at 1994. 
197. See~~~~~~~~~ note 55 supra at~§ 67-88 (pp. 39-51). 
198. Recital 5 of Judgment. 
199. Note 50 supra. 
200. Rewe Recital 5 of judgment. 
201. However the Court has been quite adept in creatively casting 
rules of procedure in relation to its direct jurisdiction. Cf. 
202. 
140. 
Oliver, Limitation of Actions Before the European Court 3 ~~~~ 
~~~ • 3 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . Further, the Court in its Human Rights cases has 
indicated its willingness to draw on the different constitutions 
of the Member States in construing a Community standard. Are 
procedural rules--or at least time limits--so much more diffi-
cult? 
Recently, in its interlocutory decision in case 149/79, note 55 su-pra/ the 
Court stated that reference to Lsubstanti~ provisions of dorrestic level sys-
tems Las a mean~/ to restrict the scope of the provisions of 
Community law, which has the effect of damaging the unity and 
impairing the efficacity of that law, cannot be accepted (Pro-
ceedings of the Court of Justice no. 28/80, 15-19.12.80). Di-
verse domestic procedural provisions may have the same dam-
aging effect on the unity and efficacity of Community law. Yet 
whereas in Case 149/79 the Court indicated in principle a pre-
paredness to overrule Belgian Constitutional law in order to 
protect the unity of Community law in the cases discussed here 
national procedural law was sufficient obstacle for the Court to 
concede disunity and lack of efficacity. 
In Rewe the Commission correctly asks 11 . . ,;,;hether each Hem-
ber-State can, insofar as it is concerned, decide which is the 
right laid down by national law to which Lfor the purpose of ap-
plying the time limit~/ a Community right must be assimilated"· 
Re we , p . 1 9 9 4 • 
203. First steps have been taken in this direction in relation to 
Community charges. See~-~· Council Regulations 1430/79 OJ L 
175/1 12.7.79; 1697/79 OJ L 197/1 3.8.79. But note that even 
204. 
here the Regulations are not aimed specifically at reimbursement 
in cases of annulment or declaration of invalidity by the European Court~ 
See note 17 8 supra. The author is now engaged in a fully 
141. 
205. 
fledged comparative analysis of this problem. 
Notes 150, 188 supra. 
206. 
207. 
Just Recital 25 of Judgment. 
This, of course, should b b 1 
e a anced against the possible drop in 
turnover which the imposition of the illegal charae may --
- have had 
on the importer's business. The Danish legal system in which the 
Just case took place acknm·Tledges this factor. One may wonder 
why the Court--within the 
system of direct effect--did not insist 
on a Community concept of unJ· ust enr1' chment h t e recipients of 
which would be the Member States th 
emselves rather than the trad-
er. To do so would have been more in accord with the fundamental 
nature of the Customs Union within the legal order of the Cowmu-
nity. 
208. Note 188 supra. 
209. 
210. 
Express Dairy gives an oblique positive indication as to the 
question of the erga omnes effect of decisions of invalidity 
based on 177. The claim was brought on the basis of a similar 
decision in an earlier case.· - -Case 131/77 /1978/ E.C.R. 1041. 
- - ====== 
But see Joined Cases 4/79, 109/79 and 14 1 5 79 Providence Agricole 
de Champagne (not yet reported) where h t e Court appears to reject 
automatic ex tunc eff t f d 1 ec o ec arations of invalidity. 
Express Dairy, Recital 12 of Judament 
~ . Here the Court was moved 
to indicate its view by actually k 1 d 
ac now e ging the regrettable 
absence of Community provisions, id. 
211. See note 149 supra. 
212. 
213. 
Note 178 supra. And se 1 c ~~ ase 118/78 f.~. Neijer B.V. v. De-
partment of Trade~ Others ;1979/ E.C.R. 1387. 
- - ===l:== 
See generally Harding, The Choice of Court Problem in Cases of 
Non-Contractual Liability under EEC L 1 ~I 6 £,;£1-,;~,; ~~~ • 3 8 9 
(1979); and see Case 26/74 Roquette 
v. Commission /197~/ ~,;£,;~,; 
"On the question of interest . . . ~!7n the absence of 677 viz. 
214. 
215. 
142. 
· law on this point, it is currently for, provisions of Commun1ty 
the national authorities, in the case of reimbursement of .. dues 
improperly collected, to settle all ancillary questions relating 
t h as Payment of interest". Recital 12 to such reimbursemen , sue 
of Judgment. Determination of quantum of damages falls within 
· f · · which arguably there exist the difficult category o 1ssues 1n 
t o pay a different measure of damages objective societal reasons 
Member States suffering from a simi-to plaintiffs in different 
lar type of non-contractual violation, since the quantum of 
damages should probably be in line with the general expectation 
baseC! on normal awards. In other words differing e::xpectations ~10uld create an 
"unlike situation" calling for :'unlike treatment"· 
1 Cannellett_i ~~9: ~. Garth (eds ·) , ~££~~~ !;£ See general y, ~- ==~~======- ___ _ ===== 
( 1 h den riJ'n/Milan, Sijthoff/ Justice: A World Survey A p en aan 
~::;;:;, 1;7;7~=:.=~:;;;11~~~! ~~9: ~- ~~~~~~~~ (eds.), ~££~~~ ~£ 
= ==--------- --- -
Justice: E~2~~~~~g I~~~~~~~~£~~ (Alphen aan den rijn/Milan, ;:~:::;f/0~~~~~~-~;7;); ~- s~~~~11~~~~ ~~g ~· ~~~~~ (eds.)~ ~~-
cess to Justic~: ~~~~g~~g ~~~~~~ ~~g ~~~~~~£~~~~~ (Alphen aan 
==== == ======- .~------~- 1979) · K Koch Access to Jus-
den rijn/Milan, SlJthoff Oceana, , =· ====' ====== == === 
tice: The Anthr212212sr~~~1 E~~~~~£~~~~ (Alphen aan den rijn/Mi-
---- === =====---------- --
lan, Sijthoff/Oceana, 1979). 
1 · · Document, L'Acces des Consomma-See ~-~· Provisiona CommlSSlon 
· /266/80/ ·g The European University teurs ~ la Justice, ENV or1 · 
Institute and the Ford Foundation are sponsoring a research pro-
ject entitled "~thods, Tools and Potential for European Legal 
h Of t he American Federal Experience" di-Integration in the Lig t 
· t f which will be dedi-
rected by M. Cappelletti one maJor par o 
J. ust.1' ce problems at the Community level. cated to access to 
216. ~- s~~~~11~~~~ ~~g ~· ~~11£~, ~~~g~~~~~~1 ~~g~g~~~~~ £~ ~~~· ~g~­~~~~ ~~ S~~£1 ~~~£~g~££~ (Nilan/Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Giuffre/ 
143. 
Oceana, 1973). 
217. Thus, ~-~.,the question is not treated in the otherwise excellent 
Community Report on Remedies for Breach of Community Law submit-
ted to the Ninth FIDE Congress. Bebr, note 149 supra. 
21 8. And this despite the very different substantive rights. To create such a distinc-
tion might produce an even nore offensive type of inequality. The 
constitutional weakness of the non-Community migrant calls per-
haps for even stronger meta-legal protection. 
219. Thus, for example, one of the objectives of the Community compe-
tition policy is to improve the quality and the prices of goods 
for the benefit of consumers. The prohibition on monopolistic 
agreements and practices when translated into a duty imposed on 
undertakings to refrain from certain activities, bestows a dif-
fuse and indirect right on consumers to be protected from abuse. 
This immediately poses one of the main access problems, that of 
safeguarding rights not directly granted, and formed in terms of 
a duty on potential violators. Under the relevant regulation 
(Regulation 17, OJ 1959-62, 87) the Commission has the direct 
task of enforcing the competition policy--acting thus as a "su-
pranational public agency". In addition Regulation 17 provides 
that individuals, even if not parties to an alleged violative 
agreement, may lodge a complaint against it with the Commission 
provided they have a "legitimate interest". This term is yet to 
be clearly defined by the European Court. Should consumer 
groups--national or transnational--be bestowed with automatic 
legitimate interest which the Member States already enjoy? The 
advantages would be obvious since they would have then all the 
legal and political resources of the Commission with them. In 
Joined Cases 41/73, 43-48/73, 50/73, 111/73, 113/73, 114/73 Ge-
144. 
nerale Sucriere ~- Commission L197l/ ~~£~~~ 1465 the Court al-
lowed the intervention in the proceedings by the Italian Unione 
Nazionale Consumatori in accordance with Article 37 of the pro-
tocol of the Court's statute. It said: 
Since it is the particular objective of the Union to 
represent and protect consumers, it can show an inter-
est in the correct application of Community provisions 
in the field of competition, which not only ensure 
that the common market operates normally but which al-
so tend to favour consumers. 
Accordingly the Union has an interest in the solution 
of the Cases at issue, to the extent that the latter 
concern the finding that the applicants in the main 
actions indulged in a concerted practice with the ob-
ject and effect of protecting the Italian market. 
(Recitals 7-8 of Judgment.) We can see here evidence of the 
type of argumentation surrounding the issue of class action, 
private-public prosecutors, etc. 
See generally, Temple-Lang, The Position of Third Parties in 
the EEC Competition Cases, 3 ~~~~ ~~~· 177 (1978). 
220. Economides and Weiler, note 100supra at p. 604. 
221. Id. 
222. Shonfield, note11 supra, at 11. 
223. The literature on the European Parliament, its functions and 
pc:Mers is very large. See ~- ~~j~;!;~, ~~g1~~~~~g~~ ~£ ~~~~g~~~ ~~­
;!;~~~~;!;~~~ (Europa Union Verlag, Bonn, 1977) § 5.2. See also 
note 5 supra. The European Parliament--like most national par-
liaments--has many functions which are not directly concerned 
with decision making and policy shaping. These, and the effect 
of direct elections on them, will not be discussed here. As 
regards decision making, the lack of legislative power and the 
limited control by Parliqrrent over the political organs ha.ve been the two nost 
important factors which have rendered the Parliament extremely 
2 24. 
2 25. 
2 26. 
2 27. 
2 28. 
14 5. 
weak--perhaps even irrelevant 1'n the process. 
Case 26/62 note 42 supra at p. 12. See also note 45 supra. 
The Parliamentary involvement in the decision makl'ng process--
especially in the control of the Community budget--has substan-
tially increased since 1963. s ~, e.~. Verges, Les Pouvoirs Fi-
nanciers du Parlement Europe'e c D E 3 ( 1 
· n, =~=~=~ 972). Wooldridge & 
Sassella, Some Recent Legal Provisions Increas1'nq h 
_ t e Budgetary 
Powers of the European Parliament and 
_ establishing a European 
Court of Auditors,~~~~ 13 (1976). 
Under the system of. the dual mandate 1· t was suggested " •.. 
that the aspiration of most. members of Lnationalf parliaments 
interested in European affairs is to serve not in the European 
Parliament, but in national government. I h 
_ _ n ot er words, the 
LEuropea_n/ Parliament 1's· 1 1' 't db a so 1m1 e y its composition, in 
that its members tend to be essentially backbenchers of the na-
tional parliaments" Cooin:bes, Th. e Role f th ~ ~ European Parlia-
ment, in ~g~g~ note 86 supra·, at 289. 
The overall turnout was 62 per cent. I th K 
n e U .. it was 31 per 
cent. In Italy it was substantially higher but that is a Member 
State with a general system of compulsory voting albeit without 
real sanctions against non-voters. se 11 e genera y, Editorial, The 
European Parliamentary Election, 4 E.L. ~~~· 145 (1979). 
A recent poll in the U.K. showed that despite direct elections 
only recently held the connection between electors and their 
Members was extremely tenuous. 
101 · (1980) esp. at 104. 
See, Britain and the EEC Which? 
--- --- --- ===== 
229. See note 5 supra. 
2 30. 
~ 31. 
146. 
It is true of course that Parliament has criticized aspects of 
the wasteful Common Agricultural Policy. The 1980/81 budgetary 
crisis may however place Parliament in the public eye as a Com-
munity spender opposed to national thrift. 
For a lucid discussion of the history of these strands in the 
European Federal movement, see Greilsarnrner, So~ Observations on 
European Federalism, in ~1g~g~ note supra, 114 at pp. 112-119. 
232. The signs of strain are apparent for example in the Commission's 
delicate rejection of Parliament's request to get a more mean-
ingful say in the international agreement making process. See, 
~-~·,Reply of President Jenkins to the European Parliament, De-
bates of the European Parliament of 16.4.1980 at 136 (English 
version) . 
233. One of the sponsors of the Debrc-Foyer Bill, note 7 supra, is a 
prominent member of the European Parliament. In general certain 
factions among the British and Danish Labour Members and French 
G Gaullists and Communists are European minimalists. 
234. See, e.5if·• Deb~tes of European Parliament of 12.12 .. 1978 at 163 
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